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INTRODUCTION

The majority of state appellate court systems consist of two tiers: a
court of last resort, usually called the supreme court, and an intermediate
appellate court, usually called the court of appeals.' Similarly, the federal
court system consists of an intermediate appellate court, the United
States Court of Appeals, 2 and a court of last resort, the United States
Supreme Court. 3
One of the hallmarks of a two-tier appellate court system is discretionary supreme court review.4 In the usual two-tier system most appeals
go to the intermediate appellate court for decision, 5 after which the litigant ordinarily has no automatic right to a further appeal to the supreme
court.6 Instead, the supreme court may grant review of a court of appeals
decision at its discretion. 7 In practice, a relatively small percentage of requests for discretionary review are granted: an average of thirteen percent
in state supreme courts 8 and approximately five percent in the United

1.

NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL RE-

(1990) [hereinafter STATE COURT STATISTIcs]. In New York and Maryland,
the court of last resort is the court of appeals. Id. at 206, 218. For purposes of this article the writer
will follow the majority practice of referring to the court of last resort as the supreme court. See id. at
47. The article also will follow majority usage in referring to the intermediate appellate court generically as the court of appeals. Id. In Florida, the intermediate appellate court is named the district
court of appeal. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 4.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988). See generally Robert L. Stern et al., Epitaph for Mandatory
Jurisdiction, 74 A.B.A. J. 66 (1988).
4. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13 (1990).
5. STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 48. In the state and federal systems, there are
some cases which can be appealed directly from the trial court to the supreme court. In federal
practice, that class of cases is extremely small. Stern et al., supra note 3, at 66. In state practice, a
common example would be the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the supreme court in a
case in which the death penalty has been imposed. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (providing
that "the supreme court shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death
penalty"). Most states allow relatively few direct appeals to the supreme court, instead channelling
the majority of appeals to the intermediate appellate court. STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1,
at 48.
6. STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 48.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 57, 59. The range is from 3% to 36%. Id. The data include, however, all types of
requests for discretionary review, including petitions for extraordinary writs. See id. app. C, at 298302. Another treatise reports a representative range as being 8 % to 21 %. ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES § 6.7(c), at 159 (2d ed. 1989).
PORT 1990, at 47-50, 53
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States Supreme Court 9
Explicit criteria for the exercise of discretionary supreme court review have been adopted, in one form or another, in most two-tier jurisdictions. Most commonly, these take the form of nonbinding guidelines; the
best known example is United States Supreme Court Rule 10, which announces the Court's Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certio0 In some places, like Florida, the criteria for discretionary review
rari.'
are part of the supreme court's jurisdictional authorization."
This article examines explicit criteria for discretionary supreme court
review of intermediate appellate court decisions. The criteria of interest
here are those found in rules, statutes, or constitutional, provisions of the
state and federal appellate systems. 2 Florida's discretionary review system is compared with those of other jurisdictions and with contemporary
professional standards.
The article begins with a comparison of the sources which establish
the criteria for discretionary supreme court review. The article finds that
the great majority of jurisdictions establish their review criteria by rule or
statute rather than by constitutional provision. Approaches which rely on
rule or statute are favored because they offer advantages in terms of flexibility. Florida relies excessively on inflexible constitutional limitations.
Second, this article examines the criteria for discretionary review employed in the respective jurisdictions. One aspect of this inquiry is to identify those factors which the various states and the federal system have
thought important enough to enumerate as specifically warranting (or in
some cases, not warranting) review by the court of last resort. The article
concludes that Florida's criteria for maintaining decisional uniformity are
similar to the criteria used in the majority of jurisdictions.
The article also concludes, however, that Florida's remaining criteria
for supreme court review are substantially more restrictive than those employed in the great majority of states. The Florida Supreme Court does
not have jurisdiction to review a case on the basis of importance unless
there has been a certification of great public importance by the district
court of appeal.' 3 Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court does not have the

9.

See William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L.

REV. 1, 10 (1986).

10. See infra app. B.
11. See FLA CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
12. Beyond the scope of this study are discretionary review criteria adopted by decisional law,
including case law standards for extraordinary writs. This article undertakes a facial examination of
express discretionary review criteria set forth by constitutional provision, statute, or rule.
13. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
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ability to grant review for supervisory purposes,14 and in most instances
the supreme court cannot review a district court of appeal decision unless
the district court of appeal has issued a written opinion. 15 Florida's criteria are also unusually restrictive because they are jurisdictional in nature;
if the constitutional criteria are not satisfied, supreme court review is precluded. 16 By contrast, in other states and in the federal system the criteria
for discretionary review are either promulgated as nonbinding guidelines,
or are expressed in broad, elastic terms; this allows the supreme courts in
those jurisdictions the latitude to make independent determinations of im17
portance and to select cases for review accordingly.
Third, this article examines Florida's requirement for a written opinion showing on its face that one of the criteria for discretionary review
has been satisfied."8 The article finds that few jurisdictions impose such a
requirement. 9 To the limited extent that other states have done so, they
have provided procedural alternatives where the intermediate court declines to prepare an opinion.2 0 Florida affords litigants no such procedural
alternative; Florida's written opinion requirement is the most restrictive
system in the United States.'
Fourth, the article notes that a supreme court's workload capacity for
discretionary review is necessarily related to the amount of judicial time
occupied by the supreme court's mandatory jurisdiction. 2 In Florida, the
most time-consuming mandatory item is the review of death penalty
cases. 3 To the extent that a supreme court's time is consumed by matters
which it is required to hear, it has correspondingly less time to dedicate to
discretionary review. The article concludes that proposals to expand the
Florida Supreme Court's discretionary review powers must be evaluated
in light of the ability of the court to absorb any additional workload that
may be entailed.24
This article makes several recommendations for change in Florida.
First, the Florida Supreme Court should have the power to review any
district court of appeal decision on the basis of the importance of the
question presented. The present categorical restrictions on the Florida Su-

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
infra parts III.B, VI.
infra part III.
infra part V.
infra parts III.B, VI.
infra text accompanying notes 327-38.
infra text accompanying notes 329-38.
infra part VI.
infra part VII.
infra notes 491-93 and accompanying text.
infra part VII.
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preme Court's discretionary jurisdiction should be modified or removed
from the constitution, and the court should be authorized to promulgate
its own criteria for the exercise of discretionary review. As a cautionary
device, the court could require petitions for discretionary review to be accompanied by a statement of counsel certifying that the question
presented is of exceptional importance, as is presently required when
counsel file motions for rehearing en banc in the district courts of
appeal.25
Second, the present requirement for a written opinion as a prerequisite for discretionary review should be eliminated. The existence or nonexistence of a written opinion is one relevant factor to be considered in deciding whether a case is important enough to warrant review, but the
absence of an opinion should not automatically preclude review. The court
could, as a matter of policy, decline to review no-opinion cases where review is sought on the basis of an asserted conflict of decisions. Alternatively, if the written opinion requirement is retained as a condition precedent for obtaining review in all cases, the requirement should be deemed
satisfied where the litigant has requested a written opinion, and the district court of appeal has declined to write one.
Finally, this article recommends that Florida follow the majority of
American jurisdictions and require that the jury be unanimous to impose
the death penalty. The unanimous jury requirement is sound policy.
Death is the ultimate sanction and should be imposed only where the jury,
as the voice of the community, is in unanimous agreement. A rule of unanimity reduces the risk of erroneous adjudication. Where the jury is divided, the life sentence should be imposed and the case deflected to the
district court of appeal. Such a change in law would likely reduce the
Florida Supreme Court's death penalty workload. Alternatively, the trial
court's authority to override a jury's recommendation for a life sentence
should be repealed. The override cases are almost always reversed and
have little actual effect on the imposition of the death penalty.

II.
A.

Two-TIER APPELLATE COURT SYSTEMS

The Development of Intermediate Appellate Courts

When appellate workload is small enough, a state does not need an
intermediate appellate court. Appeals can proceed directly from the trial
court to the state supreme court. However, supreme courts cannot expand
indefinitely to absorb additional appellate caseload. The prevailing view is

25.

FLA. R. App. P. 9.331.
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that they should not exceed nine members.

6

The most common number

of justices in the state supreme courts is seven.2
When appellate workload outruns the ability of the supreme court to
handle it, the most common solution has been to create an intermediate
appellate court."' This occurred in a few states in the nineteenth century,29 and Congress created the federal courts of appeals in 1891.30 By
1957, thirteen states had intermediate appellate courts, including Flor-

ida.31 By 1980, the number had grown to thirty-two, 3 2 and at present
there are thirty-nine.3" They are found in every state with a population of
over 2.6 million and some with populations even lower.3 4
B. ABA Standards Relating to Court Organization

The theory underlying two-tier appellate court systems is summarized in the American Bar Association's (ABA) Standards Relating to
5 The Court
Court Organization (the Court Organization Standards)."

Organization Standards find that "[a]ppellate courts perform two basic
functions." 36 The first is commonly referred to as the error correction
function, which involves "reviewing trial court proceedings to determine
whether they have been conducted according to law and applicable procedure."37 The second is commonly referred to as the law development func-

26. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13 (1990).
27. Id. § 1.13 commentary at 39-40; see DANIEL J. MEADOR, AMERICAN COURTS 92-93
(1991).
28. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13 commentary at 39-40 (1990).
29. See STERN, supra note 8, § 1.3, at 6. New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Missouri, Texas, Illinois, and Louisiana had intermediate appellate courts by 1891. Id. In New Jersey, the intermediate'
appellate court was created in the eighteenth century. Id. at 6 n.10.
30. Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 6; see also STERN, supra note 8, § 1.3, at 6 (stating that when
the Supreme Court of the United States fell three years behind schedule, Congress responded similarly to some states by establishing the circuit courts of appeals).
The 1891 legislation shifted appeals in diversity jurisdiction cases to the courts of appeals. In
cases involving federal statutes or the federal constitution, the litigant still had a right of direct appeal
to the Supreme Court, bypassing the courts of appeals. Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 6-7. The Judiciary
Act of 1925 shifted most of the remaining mandatory appellate jurisdiction to the courts of appeals.
Id. at 7-9.
31. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: IMPROVING

CASE PROCESSING V (1990) [hereinafter IMPROVING
32. MARLIN 0. OSTHUS, STATE INTERMEDIATE

CASE PROCESSING].
APPELLATE COURTS V

(2d ed. 1980).

33. For a list of the 39 states, see infra app. C.
34. See infra app. D. The largest state without an intermediate appellate court is Mississippi,
with a 1990 population of 2,573,000. See infra app. D. Twenty states have lower populations than
Mississippi, of which nine have intermediate appellate courts. See infra apps. C-D.
35. See STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13 & commentary (1990).
36. Id. § 1.13 commentary at 38.
37. Id. § 1.13 commentary at 38-39.
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tion, which involves "developing the rules of law that are within the competence of the judicial branch to announce and interpret."3
Where a two-tier appellate system is created, the Court Organization
Standards recommend that few cases should be appealable directly to the
supreme court as a matter of right.3 9 Appeals directly from the trial court
to the supreme court should be reserved for matters of greatest importance, such as "capital cases and . . . a limited number of other matters."4 0 Included in this category are highly important emergency matters
where permission should be granted to appeal directly from the trial court
to the supreme court, bypassing the court of appeals.4 '
Under the Court OrganizationStandards, all other appeals first proceed to the court of appeals.4 2 Once the court of appeals renders a decision, any further review will be at the supreme court's discretion.43 Except
in rare cases, after the litigant has been heard in the court of appeals, the
litigant is not entitled to a successive appeal to the supreme court.44
The general theory is that just as a litigant is entitled only to one
trial, the litigant is also only entitled to one appeal as a matter of right."
Initial appellate review is usually triggered by the aggrieved litigant, "and
is, in any event, performed chiefly for that person's benefit." 4' 6 By contrast, any review after the initial appeal is ordinarily done for purposes of
law development, 4 7 which "is performed for the benefit of the community
at large."' 8 Accordingly, review after the first appeal is primarily for benefit of the wider community and "only incidentally for the benefit of the

38. Id.
39. Id. § 1.13(a).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 1.13 commentary at 39. In federal practice this is certiorari before judgment. See 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1988) (providing that cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court before or after rendition of judgment); ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE § 2.3 (6th ed. 1986) (analyzing certiorari jurisdiction before rendition of judgment by the
court of appeals).
42. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13(b)(ii) (1990).
43. Id. § 1.13(a) & commentary at 39-40; STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS
§ 3.00 commentary at 5-6 (1977).
44. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13 commentary at 40 (1990). The Standards
acknowledge that in rare cases an exception is warranted. By way of illustration, where the initial
review of a death sentence is conducted by the intermediate appellate court, the Standards recommend a further appeal as a matter of right to the state supreme court. Id. Such a procedure is
followed in Alabama. ALA. R. APP. P. 39(c). In Florida, if a district court of appeal declares a statute
or provision of the Florida Constitution invalid, there is a right of appeal to the supreme court. FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
45. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13 commentary at 40 (1990).
46. Id. at 39.
47. Id. at 41-42.
48. Id. at 39.
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particular litigants. 49
In the two-tier appellate system there are different roles for the court
of appeals and the supreme court. 50 Where the court of appeals entertains
the initial appeal, that court is responsible for the error correction function, assuring that the applicable procedures have been followed and that
the correct law has been applied. 5 In addition, the court of appeals has
initial responsibility for the law development function. 52 After the court of
appeals has made a decision, any litigant may petition for discretionary
review of any decision of a court of appeals. 5s The state supreme court
grants review selectively; the court is intended to specialize in law development functions, to resolve legal issues of great importance to the jurisprudence of the state, and to assure decisional uniformity throughout the
state.54
C.

The Workload Savings

When a two-tier appellate system is implemented, most appeals go
initially to the intermediate appellate court instead of the supreme court.
Demonstrably this shifts a great deal of the review-for-correctness workload from the supreme court to the intermediate court.
Once the intermediate court decides the case, however, the losing litigant in most jurisdictions can petition the supreme court for discretionary
review. Under the Court OrganizationStandards, as well as in practice in
most jurisdictions, there is no categorical limitation on the right of a litigant to seek discretionary supreme court review of a court of appeals
decision.55
At first blush it might seem that allowing every losing litigant to petition for discretionary review would erase the benefits of a two-tier system. In practice the system operates efficiently; a two-tier appellate sys-

49.

Id. The word "incidentally" may overstate the case to some extent, but the Standards'

essential position is that any successive review ordinarily should have significance beyond the individual case. Id. at 41-42.

50. See id. at 38-40.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53.

Id. § 1.13(a) commentary at 39. "The highest appellate court should have authority to

review all types of cases, regardless of subject matter or amount involved; important questions of
substantive law and procedure can occur in cases of otherwise small significance." Id. § 1.13 commentary at 39.
54. See id. at 39-40. Of course, cases which arrive in the supreme court by direct appeal, such
as death penalty cases, require the supreme court to perform error correction as well as law develop-

ment functions.
55. See supra note 53;
(1977).

STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS
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tern still results in a significant workload savings, compared with a system
in which all appeals go directly to the supreme court. First, there is a

significant attrition in cases after the court of appeals renders a decision.
For many reasons, in numerous cases the parties do not seek further review in the supreme court.56 Second, petitions for discretionary review can
be read and decided quickly, in a fraction of the time necessary for consideration of a plenary appeal on the merits. 57 Such review focuses ini-

tially on the question of whether jurisdiction should be accepted, and in
the great majority of cases results in an order denying review. 5 The task
of determining whether to exercise discretionary review is an important
element of the supreme court's workload, 59 but the time expended per
individual case is very small.6 0 Third, in practice supreme courts actually

grant discretionary review in only a small percentage of the cases where it
is requested. The net effect of the two-tier system is to shift the timeconsuming review-for-correctness function to the court of appeals and to
streamline the supreme court's workload.
D.

The Structure of Two-Tier Appellate Court Systems

While two-tier appellate systems are now found in most American

jurisdictions, the systems are not identical. The most familiar two-tier
model is the federal system, in which there are separate courts of appeals,
each with its own geographic jurisdiction. 6' Many states, including Flor-

56. See infra note 255.
57. One Florida Supreme Court Justice estimated that reading and deciding a petition for discretionary review consumed, on average, 20 minutes of his time. See Arthur J. England, Jr. &
Michael P. McMahon, Quantity Discounts in Appellate Justice, 60 JUDICATURE 442, 448-49 (1977).
Other time estimates have been offered for the same function in the United States Supreme Court.
STERN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1.16, at 38-39 (noting that petitions for certiorari may be decided by
Supreme Court Justices in a matter of a few minutes or longer, depending upon the importance and
complexity of the issues presented).
58. See Rehnquist, supra note 9.
59. William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload, in WALTER F.
MURPHY & CHARLES H. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS § 3.5, at 114-15 (4th ed.
1986).
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Because the supreme court can accept only a
small percentage of cases for review, as a practical matter, the decision of the court of appeals will be
the final one in most cases. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commentary at 4-5
(1977). See generally John A. Stookey, Creating an Intermediate Court of Appeals: Workload and
Policymaking Consequences, in PHILIP L. DUBOIS, THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 153 (1982)
(discussing the effects of two-tier appellate systems).
61. STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 47-51, 185; STERN, supra note 8, § 6.1, at 135.
The exception is the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has a subject
matter, rather than a geographic, jurisdiction. STERN, supra note 8, § 2.6(c)(2), at 55.
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ida, follow this pattern.6 2 Another approach is to create a single, statewide

court of appeals, with or without internal subdivisions.6
Where a state follows the federal model and organizes its intermediate appellate court into separate courts of appeals, a major responsibility
of the supreme court is to reconcile conflicts between the courts of appeals, thus assuring statewide decisional uniformity. Where a state has a
single intermediate appellate court, that court can itself assure statewide

decisional uniformity, thereby relieving the supreme court of that responsibility. 4 In practice, some of the statewide courts of appeals have undertaken that responsibility, while others have not,6 5 and a state's practice
may or may not be reflected in its supreme court's discretionary review
criteria.
In most states, as in the federal model, the court of appeals and the
supreme court are generalists, handling all appeals regardless of subject
matter.66 However, a few states have established courts with specialized
subject matter jurisdiction. Most common is a division between criminal
and civil courts, 67 but there are other types of specialized subject matter

62. STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 50-51 & pt. IV.
63. Such single, statewide intermediate appellate courts have as few as three or as many as 28
members. See MEADOR, supra note 27, at 94-95; STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 50 & pt.
IV.
New Jersey's statewide intermediate appellate court (of 28 judges) is divided into seven, fourjudge "parts," for administrative purposes. IMPROVING CASE PROCESSING, supra note 31, at 99; see
also STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 216.
The Wisconsin appellate structure demonstrates another variation: "[T]he intermediate appellate
court panels in Wisconsin are unified. As such, each district is bound by the published decisions of
another district." Richard S. Brown, Allocation of Cases in a Two-Tiered Appellate Structure: The
Wisconsin Experience and Beyond, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 189, 229 (1985) (footnote omitted).
64. OsTHus, supra note 32, at 12-14; Ben F. Overton, A Prescriptionfor the Appellate
Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 205, 213 (1984).
65. See Overton, supra note 64, at 213 (enumerating the states without en banc procedures).
In New Jersey's statewide intermediate appellate court, consistency is maintained within, but not
between, the seven administrative "parts." IMPROVING CASE PROCESSING, supra note 31, at 101; see
also Overton, supra note 64, at 213.
Under Michigan's former practice, panels of the court of appeals were permitted to disregard
decisions of other panels on the same point of law, so long as the conflict was certified to the supreme
court. Edward M. Wise, The Legal Culture of Troglodytes: Conflicts Between Panels of the Court of
Appeals, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 313, 322-23 (1991). By rule adopted in 1990, panel decisions are binding on subsequent panels and can only be overruled by a special en banc panel of the court of appeals
or by the supreme court itself. Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Within Michigan's Court of Appeals:
PrecedentialEffect of Its Decisions on the Court Itself and on Michigan's Trial Courts, 37 WAYNE
L. REV. 265, 305-11 (1991). By order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the provisions of this rule
have been continued in effect until December 31, 1993. Mich. Admin. Order 1993-4.
66. See STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 51-52.
67. In Alabama and Tennessee the intermediate appellate courts consist of a court of criminal
appeals and a court of civil appeals. MEADOR, supra note 27, at 94-95; see STATE COURT STATISTICS,
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jurisdiction. 68 In these specialized systems, like the generalist ones, su-

preme court review is usually discretionary, and the specialized subject
matter does not appear to affect the criteria for discretionary review.

9

Another organizational variation is found in the six states having socalled assignment or deflection systems.7" In these states all appeals are
filed with the supreme court. 7' The supreme court then assigns a portion
of the appeals to the intermediate appellate court and retains the remain-

der in the supreme court for decision on the merits. 2 As in the more

supra note 1, at 186, 229.
In Alaska the court of appeal has criminal jurisdiction only. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.020
(1992). Civil appeals proceed directly to the supreme court. See id. § 22.05.010; see also STATE
COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 187.
In Texas there are two specialized courts of last resort: a supreme court having civil jurisdiction
and a court of criminal appeals having criminal jurisdiction. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 5; see MEADOR, supra note 27, at 93; STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 230.
In Oklahoma the supreme court and intermediate appellate court handle civil matters only.
OKLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 5; see MEADOR, supra note 27, at 93; STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra
note 1, at 222. Criminal appeals proceed directly from the trial court to the court of criminal appeals,
which is the court of last resort in criminal cases. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 30.1 (West 1993).
68. In Pennsylvania one intermediate appellate court, the Commonwealth Court, has appellate
jurisdiction in cases involving state or local governmental agencies, including administrative law matters and zoning. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 762 (1992); OSTHUS, supra note 32, at 5-6, 41-42. The
other intermediate appellate court, the Superior Court, has the remainder of the intermediate appellate jurisdiction, including most civil and criminal appeals. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 742 (1992).
Both courts have statewide jurisdiction. See STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 224.
In New York most appeals from trial courts of general jurisdiction proceed to the Appellate
Division, which is the principal intermediate appellate court. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4. A second
intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Term, has jurisdiction over appeals from certain trial
courts of limited jurisdiction. See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 8; STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at
218.
In Indiana there is a specialized intermediate appellate tribunal for tax matters. STATE COURT
STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 200.
Oregon has a tax court which one authority classifies as an intermediate appellate court, MEADOR, supra note 27, at 95. The National Center for State Courts does not classify the Oregon tax
court as an intermediate appellate court, apparently because the Oregon court has trial as well as
appellate responsibilities. See STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 223.
69. See STERN, supra note 8, §§ 6.1-.2, at 135-38 (discussing the requirements for discretionary review in a number of states with courts of specialized jurisdiction); infra app. C.
70. The six states are Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Oklahoma. See
STERN, supra note 8, § 2.5, at 31, 32 n.34. The North Dakota court has been established on a
temporary basis and is scheduled to expire on January 1, 1994. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-01 note
(1991). As previously mentioned, Oklahoma's court of appeals has civil jurisdiction only. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 30.1 (West 1991).
71. See STERN, supra note 8, § 2.5, at 31, 32 n.34.
72. See id. In four of the states, the rules of court indicate that the cases are to be screened so
that the supreme court retains the most important cases at the outset, while referring to the intermediate appellate court those cases which do not appear to warrant supreme court attention. See HAW.
R. App. P. 31; IDAHO R. App. P. 108; IOWA R. App. P. 401; N.D. ADMIN. R. 27, § 10. In Hawaii, for
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traditional appellate systems, after the intermediate appellate court renders a decision, discretionary review is available in the state supreme
court.7 3 To the extent that those states have adopted discretionary review

criteria, they are included in the present study.

4

E. Bypassing the Intermediate Appellate Court
Although beyond the scope of this article, many jurisdictions allow
an appeal to bypass the intermediate appellate court and proceed directly
to the supreme court if certain conditions are met. There are two different
models. Under the Court Organization Standards and the federal model,
a bypass of the intermediate appellate court is an extraordinary step and
75
should be employed only where the matter is both urgent and important.
The theory is that with rare exception the court of appeals should first
address each matter within its jurisdiction. This gives the supreme court
the benefit of the court of appeals' decision and analysis.76 This approach
assures that routine error correction will occur at the court of appeals
level.
The other model is a variation on the assignment or deflection systems described in the preceding section. The theory is that overall appellate review time can be reduced if cases warranting supreme court review
are identified at the outset and channeled to that court.77 Under this ap-

example, screening is done by a single justice of the supreme court, while in Iowa it is accomplished
by a panel of three justices. See Interview with Associate Justice Frank Padgett (Sept. 17, 1986), in
20 HAWAII BJ. 95, 95 (1987); STERN, supra note 8, § 2.5, at 31.
On the other hand, in Oklahoma all cases are routinely assigned to the court of appeals unless a
party moves to retain the appeal in the supreme court. OKLA. R. APP. P. 1.16 (appeals in civil cases);
William W. Means, Reflections on Deflection: Appellate Assignment to Oklahoma's Court of Appeals, 24 TULSA L.J. 1, 31 (1988).
In South Carolina the supreme court retains all criminal appeals and allocates the civil appeals
between itself and the court of appeals by the age of the case. STERN, supra note 8, § 2.5, at 32 n.34.
73. See STERN, supra note 8, § 2.5, at 33.
74. This study examines only the explicit criteria for discretionary review after the court of
appeals has rendered a decision. In some assignment jurisdictions, the assignment criteria bear a close
resemblance to the criteria for discretionary supreme court review. See HAw. R. APP. P. 31(a);
IDAHO R. APP. P. 108; IowA R. APP. P. 401; N.D. ADMIN. R. 27, § 10. For purposes of consistency,
this article considers only explicit criteria for discretionary review after the intermediate appellate
court has rendered a decision. Pre-decision assignment criteria are omitted from consideration.
75. STANDARDS RELATING-TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10(d) & commentary (1977); see 28
U.S.C. § 1254 (1988) (providing for the transfer of a case from a court of appeals to the United
States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari before or after the rendition of judgment).
76. STERN, supra note 8, § 2.4, at 30.
77. Id. § 2.5, at 31; Brown, supra note 63, at 191 ("[V]ery little sustained attention has been
paid . . . to . . . the concept of immediately transferring some of the more important intermediate
court cases to the highest court while simultaneously reducing the amount of time that the supreme
court spends on less important error correcting matters.").
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proach, appeals are screened after filing, allocating to the supreme court
those cases which have sufficient importance to warrant supreme court
review. 7 8 This procedure occurs in Massachusetts and Connecticut.7
Under both bypass models, explicit or implicit criteria are employed

in order to identify cases which should be passed directly to the supreme
court. Such criteria are beyond the scope of this article. The criteria of
interest here are the criteria for discretionary supreme court review after
the intermediate appellate court has rendered a decision.
III.

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S LIMITED JURISDICTION TO
REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL

A.

Overview of the FloridaAppellate Structure

Florida's two-tier appellate system was created by constitutional
amendment in 1956.80 At present, Florida has five district courts of appeal, each with its own separate territorial jurisdiction. 81 In Florida, few
appeals can be taken to the supreme court as a matter of right. 2 Virtually all appeals from the trial court of general jurisdiction, the circuit
court,8" proceed to the district court of appeal.84 Florida has a procedure
to transfer an appeal to the supreme court, thereby bypassing the district
court of appeal, when the matter is of great importance and the appeal
requires immediate resolution by the supreme court. 85 Bypass is a proce-

supra note 8, § 2.5, at 31.
Id. at 32-33.
FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 4, 5 (1956).
81.
FLA. STAT. §§ 35.01-.043 (1991).
82. Appeals from judgments imposing the death penalty are the most time-consuming category
of appeals of right. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1); infra text accompanying notes 491-92. There
is also an appeal as a matter of right where a district court of appeal has declared invalid a state
statute or a provision of the state constitution. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1). Also within the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction are appeals from final judgments in bond validation proceedings
and review of certain public utility regulation matters when provided by general law. Id. § 3(b)(2);
see PHILIP J. PADOVANO, FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE §§ 2.5-.6 (1988).
83. Florida has a two-tier trial court system. See STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at
195. The circuit court is the trial court of general jurisdiction. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5. The county
court is a trial court of limited jurisdiction. Id. § 6. The state is divided'into 20 judicial circuits. FLA.
STAT. § 26.01 (1991).
84. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1).
85. This "pass-through" mechanism (also referred to as "bypass") is invoked where the district
court of appeal certifies that the pending appeal is "of great public importance" or will "have a great
effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state," and in either case, requires "immediate resolution by the supreme court." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5). The supreme court has
discretion concerning whether to accept jurisdiction. Id. Pass-through jurisdiction may only be initiated by the district court of appeal. Id. There is no "reach-down" mechanism which would allow the
Florida Supreme Court to initiate a transfer on its own motion or the motion of a party. See id.; see
78.
79.
80.

STERN,
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dure which is sparingly used.86
The membership of Florida's smallest district court of appeal is nine
judges; the largest is fifteen. 7 Appeals are ordinarily determined by
panels of three judges. 88 However, each district court of appeal is authorized to sit en banc and has the responsibility to maintain decisional uniformity within the court.8 9 Once the district court of appeal renders its
decision, further review by the Florida Supreme Court is, with one exception, discretionary.9 0
There are two pathways for a litigant to obtain discretionary review
in the Florida Supreme Court. The first is by petition for discretionary
review filed directly with the supreme court. 1 The second is by permission of the district court of appeal. 2
B.

Petitions to the Supreme Court

A litigant may apply directly to the supreme court for discretionary
review of a district court of appeal decision. The supreme court may
grant such review only if the district court of appeal decision fits within
94
one of four specific categories enumerated in the Florida Constitution.
When Florida's two-tier appellate system was created, the designers
of the system believed that it would be necessary to create constitutional
barriers to access to the supreme court. 5 They feared that there would be
double appeals in every case, first to the district court of appeal and then

also OsTHus, supra note 32, at 11-12 (discussing the use of bypass mechanisms to expedite supreme
court review on important questions).
86. See Arthur J. England, Jr. et al., Constitutional Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court of
Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 147, 195 (1980) ("The most important aspect of section
3(b)(5) [the bypass mechanism] is its clearly narrow intended application.").
87. Ch. 93-63, § 3, at 407, Laws of Fla. (amending FLA. STAT. § 35.06 (1991)).
88. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(a).
89. FLA. R. App. P. 9.331; Ben F. Overton, District Courts of Appeal: Courts of Final Jurisdiction with Two New Responsibilities-An Expanded Power.to Certify Questions and Authority to
Sit En Banc, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 80, 90 (1983). Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdictional
article does not authorize Florida Supreme Court review of conflicting decisions within a district court
of appeal. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (authorizing discretionary review of "any decision of a
district court of appeal . . . that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district
court of appeal ....") (emphasis added); England et al., supra note 86, at 188.
90. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3), (4). The exception is found in § 3(b)(1), which confers a
right of appeal where the decision of the district court of appeal has declared "invalid a state statute
or a provision of the state constitution." Id. § 3(b)(l).
91. Id. § 3(b)(3); FLA. R_ App. P. 9.120.
92. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
93. Id. § 3(b)(3).
94. Id.
95. See infra part V.C.
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Accordingly, the system was designed so that the

constitution itself would spell out the categories of decisions eligible for
97
review in the Florida Supreme Court.
At present, the Florida Supreme Court has the power to grant discre-

tionary review of a decision of a district court of appeal which:
(1) "expressly declares valid a state statute";

(2) "expressly construes a provision of the state or federal
constitution";
(3) "expressly affects a class of constitutional or state officers"; or

(4) "expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another dis98
trict court of appeal or the supreme court on the same question of law."
For the supreme court to grant review, not only must a district court
of appeal decision fit within one of the four constitutional categories, but

that fact must appear "expressly" on the face of a written opinion issued
by the district court of appeal. 99 Moreover, for these purposes the supreme court will only consider a written opinion joined by a majority of
the district court of appeal panel; a concurring or dissenting opinion will
not be considered. 10 0

96.

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF

FLA., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1953/1954) [hereinafter

JUDICIAL

COUNCIL REPORT].

97. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4 (1956); see infra app. E.
98. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). During the 1980 revision of the jurisdictional article, the
court and a Florida Bar committee proposed deletion of the third criterion, which permits review if
the case "affects a class of constitutional or state officers." England et al., supra note 86, at 158. It
was ultimately retained at the request of the court clerks and sheriffs associations. Id. The category
affects a small group of cases-16 were filed in 1991. Supreme Court of Florida, Annual Statistics for
the Calendar Year of 1991 (unpublished report, on file with the Florida Law Review) [hereinafter
Supreme Court 1991 Statistics].
99. The term "expressly" is part of the constitutional language. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3);
see Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357-59 (Fla. 1980); see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d
286, 288 n.3 (Fla. 1988). No particular form of opinion is required, and the opinion need not expressly refer to one of the constitutional criteria. See Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis, 401 So. 2d 1341, 1342
(Fla. 1981). It is sufficient if it can be determined from the opinion that one of the constitutional
criteria is satisfied. Id.
Under the Internal Operating Procedures of the Florida Supreme Court, "[w]hen notice of a
party's seeking discretionary review is filed, the clerk's office determines whether a district court of
appeal has written an opinion in the case. If there is no opinion, the case is automatically dismissed."
35 FLA. STAT. ANN.. SUP. CT. MANUAL INTERNAL OPERATING P. § IIA(1)(a) (West Supp. 1993).
100. Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 & n.3 (Fla. 1986). There are minor exceptions to the
requirement of a written opinion. Where there is no written opinion, but only a ruling citing other
case law, there will be jurisdiction if "one of the cases cited as controlling authority is pending before
this Court, or has been reversed on appeal or review, or receded from by this Court, or . . . the
citation explicitly notes a contrary holding of another district court or of this Court." See Florida Star
v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d at 288 n.3 (citing Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981)).
It should also be noted that the written opinion requirement and the enumerated categorical
restrictions do not apply to petitions for extraordinary writs filed in the Florida Supreme Court, such
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The requirement for a written opinion was added to the Florida Constitution by amendment in 1980.101 Florida does not require that a written
opinion be prepared in each case, and affirmances without opinion are
common in Florida practice. Although the absence of a written opinion
will preclude Florida Supreme Court review in virtually every case, litigants are not entitled to demand written opinions which would thereby
enable them to seek supreme court review.10 2 There is no alternative pathway for a litigant who has requested, but failed to obtain, an opinion discussing a point on which the litigant desires supreme court review.103
Where there is a written majority opinion, the supreme court may
entertain a petition for review based on one of its four jurisdictional categories. Of the four enumerated categories, by far the most important is
the one pertaining to conflict of decisions. The other three categories are
invoked infrequently.104
What is striking about the four jurisdictional categories is an omission: the supreme court is not empowered to grant review under this subdivision on account of the importance of the question presented. Plainly,
the supreme court's four discretionary review categories do not exhaust
the universe of important legal issues which the state's highest court
should be empowered to resolve. For example, a question of first impression by definition does not conflict with other decisions; unless the issue
happens to involve constitutionality, constitutional interpretation, or a
class of constitutional or state officers, the supreme court cannot on its
own grant discretionary review. Similar examples include cases of statuas mandamus or prohibition. See infra part VI.
101. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); see also Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357-59 (Fla.
1980) (holding that the 1980 constitutional amendment which added the written opinion requirement
ended record proper review).
102. See School Bd. v. District Court of Appeal, 467 So. 2d 985, 986 (Fla. 1985); see also
Williams v. State, 425 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Davis v. Sun Banks, 412 So. 2d 937 (Fla.

Ist DCA 1982). The written opinion requirement is discussed in more detail in part VI infra.
103.

Although commentators have suggested that an opinion should be written in each case

affording an arguable basis for supreme court review, no rules have been promulgated giving guidance
in that regard. See John M. Scheb & John M. Scheb, II, Making Intermediate Appellate Courts
Final: Assessing Jurisdictional Changes in Florida's Appellate Courts, 67 JUDICATURE 474, 485
(1984).
104. In 1991, 671 cases were filed which sought discretionary review on the basis of conflict of
decisions, under article V, § 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. By comparison there were 24 cases

filed which invoked the provision relating to a declaration of validity of a state statute; 47 cases said
to construe a provision of the state or federal constitution; and 16 cases affecting a class of constitutional or state officers. Supreme Court 1991 Statistics, supra note 98. The statistics just given pertain

only to filings under article V, § 3(b)(3). There were additional filings under article V, § 3(b)(4)
(certified decisions of the district courts of appeal), which included another 31 cases in which the
district courts of appeal had themselves certified direct conflict. Supreme Court 1991 Statistics, supra
note 98.
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tory interpretation, decisions affecting a common law right, and cases

calling for reconsideration of existing precedent. Regardless of the significance of the legal issue, the supreme court may not grant discretionary

review unless the case falls into one of the four categorical pigeonholes or
unless the district court of appeal has granted permission, an alternative

explained in the next section.
C.

The Alternative Path: Certification of Importance or Conflict

There is an alternative pathway to supreme court review: certification

by the district court of appeal. The Florida Constitution provides that the
supreme court may review a district court of appeal decision if the district
court certifies that the decision "passes upon a question

. . .

of great pub-

lic importance," or certifies that its decision is in "direct conflict with a
decision of another district court of appeal."' 0 5 The certification of direct
conflict or great public importance is normally accomplished by a brief

statement in the district court of appeal opinion.' 06 Once the certification
has been entered, a litigant must file a notice to invoke supreme court
107
jurisdiction.

105. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
"Direct conflict" as used in this section differs from the phrase "expressly and directly conflicts"
used in article V, § 3(b)(3). If the district court of appeal certifies that there is a "direct conflict" of
decision, then that is a sufficient basis for supreme court jurisdiction, regardless of whether the opinion is perfunctory or spells out the conflict in detail. See PADOVANO, supra note 82, § 2.11.
By contrast, where there has been no district court of appeal certification and discretionary review is sought in the Florida Supreme Court, the opinion of the district court of appeal must give
sufficient treatment to the matter to demonstrate on the face of the opinion, expressly and directly,
that there is a decisional conflict. See FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
106. Where the district court of appeal desires to certify direct conflict, the court must use the
"magic words" of the constitution. Interview with Sid White, Clerk, Florida Supreme Court. A statement in the opinion that the district court of appeal "disagrees with," "acknowledges," or "recognizes" conflict with another district court of appeal is not treated as a certification of conflict. If the
decision is not certified, then the litigant proceeds by petition for discretionary review on the ground
of conflict of decisions. Id.
107. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(b). If the litigants decide not to take the case to the supreme court,
the district court of appeal decision becomes final.
In 1991 district courts of appeal certified 282 cases on the basis of great public importance or
conflict. See Table of Certifications, 16 FLA. L. WEEKLY, Cumulative Index, Jan. 4-Mar. 29, 1991, at
71-72; id. Apr. 5-June 21, 1991, at 75; id. June 28-Sept. 27, 1991, at 71; id. Oct. 4-Dec. 20, 1991, at
62. Although the time frames do not match exactly, in 1991 the Florida Supreme Court received
certifications in only 220 cases. Supreme Court 1991 Statistics, supra note 98. Thus, litigants in
approximately 22% of the cases certified to the Florida Supreme Court did not seek review in the
supreme court.
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Florida's certification process has been described as "relatively successful."10 8 The certification procedure is used with regularity."0 9 It enlists
the aid of the district courts of appeal in identifying issues of decisional
conflict or importance which should be considered by the supreme
court.110 Supreme court procedure is simplified where a case has been certified because jurisdictional briefs are not required;""l instead, only briefs
on the merits are submitted. 12 The supreme court has the discretion to
decline to review a decision 4certified by a district court of appeal, 1" but in
practice it rarely does So.11
D. The Systems Compared
The two pathways for discretionary review-permission of supreme
court and permission of district court of appeal--each employ different
criteria. Both systems provide for supreme court review when there is a
conflict of decisions. However, the systems differ sharply where a question
of importance is presented.
The district court of appeal may certify any question, without limitation, as being of great public importance. Such a certification confers jurisdiction on the supreme court to entertain a petition for review. 1" 5 Absent district court of appeal certification, the supreme court cannot
consider a petition for review on the basis of the importance of the question presented." 6 In short, the Florida Supreme Court's authority to grant
discretionary review is narrower than the certification authority of the district courts of appeal. Although the purpose of the supreme court is to
decide the legal questions of greatest importance to the state, the court
does not have the independent authority to grant a petition for review on
7
the ground that the question is important."2

108.

Overton, supra note 64, at 227.

109. In 1991 review was sought in 189 cases certified as being of great public importance, and
in 31 cases where there was certified direct conflict. Supreme Court 1991 Statistics, supra note 98.
110. Overton, supra note 64, at 226-27.
111. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.120(d).
112. Id.

113. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
114. See Supreme Court 1991 Statistics, supra note 98; Supreme Court of Florida, Annual
Statistics for the Calendar Year of 1990 (unpublished report on file with the Florida Law Review)
[hereinafter Supreme Court 1990 Statistics].
115. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
116. See id. § 3(b)(3), (4).
117.

See id.
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CRITERIA FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW: DEFINED BY
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTE, OR RULE?

A.

Overview

The form and nature of discretionary review criteria vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One common pattern is exemplified by the federal
system. The United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction is prescribed by
statute which, insofar as pertinent here, allows the Supreme Court to review by certiorari any decision of a federal court of appeals, as well as
certain final judgments of state courts."i The jurisdictional statutes do
not announce any criteria which should be employed by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its discretionary review powers. Instead, the
Court has adopted Supreme Court Rule 10, entitled Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorari."9 Rule 10 embodies the Supreme
Court's criteria for discretionary review, and the criteria are entirely separate from the statute establishing the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
A similar example is found in California. There, the state constitution provides that "[t]he Supreme Court may review the decision of a
court of appeal in any cause."120 The constitutional grant of jurisdiction
to the California Supreme Court does not itself contain criteria suggesting
or prescribing how discretionary review should be exercised.1 2 1 Instead,
California Appellate Rule 29 sets forth the guidelines which will be applied by the court when considering a petition for discretionary review. l 2
As indicated earlier, Florida takes a different approach. The Florida
Constitution specifies the classifications of district court of appeal decisions which can be reviewed by the supreme court. 123 The criteria for discretionary review are jurisdictional in nature.
By far the most common approach is for discretionary review criteria
to be promulgated by rule, as is true in federal practice. 2 4 Some states
have prescribed discretionary review criteria by statute, 1 25 while a few,

118. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1988).
119. SuP. CT. R. 10; see infra app. B.
120. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 12(b).
121. See id.
122. CAL. ApP. R. 29; see infra app. C.
123. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3), (4).
124. Discretionary review criteria are promulgated by rule in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas (criminal), Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. See infra app. C.
125. Discretionary review criteria are prescribed by statute in Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia (limited criteria only). See
infra app. C.
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including Florida, have placed discretionary review criteria in the constitution. 26 In some of the states which rely on constitution or statute, rules
have been promulgated to implement or amplify the subject of discretionary review. 2 7 Finally, a few states have not adopted explicit, codified criteria for discretionary supreme court review. 128 The next section considers
the ABA Model Judicial Article, which recommends that the supreme
court establish the jurisdiction of the appellate courts by rule. 29
B. ABA Model Judicial Article
The ABA Model JudicialArticle130 was promulgated to implement
the ABA Standards of Judicial Administration (the Judicial Administration Standards).'3 ' It proposes a recommended judicial article for state
constitutions.
The Model JudicialArticle visualizes the judicial branch as a single
system to be led and managed by the supreme court. To that end, the
supreme court is given the power to establish its own jurisdiction, and
that of the court of appeals, by rule of procedure. 3 2 This is accomplished
by vesting all appellate jurisdiction initially in the supreme court; the supreme court then by rule allocates appellate jurisdiction between itself
33
and the court of appeals.
Consistent with the Court OrganizationStandards, the intent is that
most appeals go first to the court of appeals, "with subsequent review

126. Provisions concerning discretionary review are contained in the constitutions of Florida,
Georgia, Missouri, New York, and Ohio. See infra app. C.

127. Rules amplify constitutional or statutory provisions regarding discretionary review in
Georgia, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and Ohio. See infra app. C. Appendix C omits rules which
merely reiterate the contents of a constitutional or statutory set of discretionary review criteria. See
infra app. C.

128. Louisiana, Nebraska, and Oklahoma have no explicit discretionary review criteria. Virginia has no generally applicable criteria, but does have criteria applicable to limited classes of cases.
See infra app. C.

129.

See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.

130. ' MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE §§ 1-9 (1978), reprintedin Report No. I of the JudicialAdministrationDivision, ANN. REP. OF THE ABA, 1978, at 926, 926-32. Citations will be to the Model
Judicial Article as it appears in the ABA report. The Model Judicial Article was also reprinted in
Douglas C. Dodge & Victoria S. Cashman, Introduction to the ABA Model Judicial Article, 3
STATE CT. J. 8 (1979).

131.
132.

Dodge & Cashman, supra note 130, at 8. An earlier version was adopted in 1962. Id.
MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE, supra note 130, § 2, at 927.

133. "The Supreme Court has initial appellate jurisdiction of all judgments and reviewable
orders except to the extent such jurisdiction is vested by rules of procedure in another court." Id.

§ 2(1), at 927. This authorizes the supreme court to "allocate appellate jurisdiction between the
Supreme Court and other courts." Id. § 2 cmt. at 927.
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available before the Supreme Court on a discretionary basis."'" 4 Since all

of the appellate jurisdiction is prescribed by rule, any explicit criteria for
discretionary review would necessarily be set forth by rule.

The emphasis in the Model Judicial Article is on flexibility. The
strong rulemaking power-including the power to allocate appellate juris-

diction by rule-allows rapid adjustments to meet the demands of judicial
administration. 3 5 Under the Model Judicial Article, the rulemaking
power is intended to be exercised in an appropriate process of consultation
with the bar, the public, and the legislative branch of government.'
The idea of allocating appellate jurisdiction by rule has made some
headway in the states.'3 " This approach is used in Florida in a limited
way: the district court of appeal jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals
is prescribed by rule. 3 8

134. Id. § 2 cmt. at 927.
135. The commentary to the current Model Judicial Article does not explicitly discuss the
reason for prescribing appellate jurisdiction by rule. However, allocation of jurisdiction by rule was
also a feature of the 1962 version of the Model Judicial Article. MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE § 2
(1962), reprinted in Report of the Section of Judicial Administration, ANN. REP. OF THE ABA,
1962, at 391, 393-94. In the Comment to the 1962 article, the drafters favored rule, rather than
statute, because "(1) . . . such power ... would enhance the independence of the judiciary; (2) . . .
it would place the power to meet current problems in the hands of those most likely to be expert in
the subject; [and] (3) . . . the rule-making power was more flexible than the legislative power in its
capacity to meet the demands of judicial administration." Id. § 2 cmt. at 394.
136. MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE, supra note 130, § 8, at 931. Such consultation can take many
forms. For example, in the federal system the Rules Enabling Act creates a public process for rule
development. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (1988). It also provides for submission of proposed rules to
Congress for a six-month waiting period. Id. § 2074. The system is one of "judicial rulemaking pursuant to a legislative delegation and subject to a congressional veto." 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001, at 6 (2d ed. 1987); see also id.
§ 1061, at 220 (citing the exercise of such power by Congress).
In Florida, the state supreme court has the power to promulgate procedural rules in a formal
public process which is itself regulated by rule. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a); FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN.
2.130. Although the legislature does not have the power to promulgate a rule, it may repeal a rule
"by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature." FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 2(a). In comparison, the Model Judicial Article provides no specific legislative
check on the supreme court's rulemaking power. See MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE, supra note 130, § 8.
137. In a few states the constitution authorizes the supreme court to establish its own appellate
jurisdiction in whole or in part by rule. ILL. CONsT. art. 6, § 4 (partly by rule); IND. CONsT. art. 7,
§ 4 (partly by rule); Ky. CONST. §§ 110(2)(b), 116 (partly by rule); MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (entirely by rule); see also Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 10 (constitutional discretionary review criteria can be
amplified by rule).
In some states the supreme court can establish the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate
court by rule. See ARK. CONST. amend. 58, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 7, § 6; Ky. CONST. § III (statute
and rule); OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 5 (statute and rule); WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 30(2) (statute or rules
authorized by statute).
138. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1); see FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130.
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C.

The Recommendation of the Florida Supreme Court's Article V
Review Commission

The Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction is almost entirely defined
by the Florida Constitution. 3 9 While Florida is not alone in that approach, few states place such extensive jurisdictional detail in the constitution itself.140 States more commonly rely on statute to provide some or
1 41
all of the state supreme court's jurisdiction.
In 1984, the Florida Supreme Court's Article V Review Commission
recommended that the Florida Constitution be changed to allow modification of the supreme court's jurisdiction by special rulemaking procedures.1 42 The Commission's approach would create a new method of
amending the supreme court's jurisdictional article. Modification under
the proposed new method would occur "when the proposed modification is
initiated by the concurrence of not less than five justices [out of the Florida Supreme Court's membership of seven] and approved within one year
by a joint resolution of a majority of the membership of each house of the
legislature." 1 43 The Commission's proposal would leave intact the existing
method of changing the jurisdictional article by constitutional amendment.144 As a result, there would be two ways to change the supreme
court's jurisdiction: special rulemaking and constitutional amendment.1 45
The Commission proposed the change because it saw a need for additional flexibility.1 46 In the Commission's view, "changes in the jurisdiction
of the supreme court may become necessary from time to time in order to

139. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). A small portion of the court's jurisdiction is prescribed by
statute. See id. § 3(b)(2) (providing that the legislature may legislate the supreme court's jurisdiction
in bond-validation proceedings and review of certain utility regulation matters); id. § 3(b)(10) (stating that the supreme court shall, when requested by the attorney general, render an advisory opinion
about the validity of initiative petitions proposing amendments to the Florida Constitution "addressing issues as provided by general law").
140. See, e.g., N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 3.
141. See, e.g., PA. CONsT. art. 5, § 2(c).
142. THE SUPREME COURT'S ARTICLE V REVIEW COMMIssIoN, FINAL REPORT 14 (1984)
[hereinafter ARTICLE V REPORT].
143. Id. at 16.

144. Id.
145.

The Commission proposed adding the following language to article V, § 3(b) of the Flor-

ida Constitution:
The jurisdiction of the supreme court . . . may be changed by the action of both the
supreme court and the legislature. Any proposed change must be initiated by the concurrence of not less than five justices of the supreme court and must be approved within

one year by a joint resolution of a majority of the membership of each house of the
legislature before it will become effective.

Id. at 15.
146.

Id. at 16.
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adjust caseloads and meet new problems." 14 7 The Commission advanced
its proposal to "allow a degree of experimentation because a change in
jurisdiction could be made with the knowledge that if it did not meet
expectations, it could be altered more quickly than through the traditional
method of submitting a constitutional amendment to the voters."'1 48
The Commission's proposal is essentially an enhanced version of the
supreme court's present rulemaking authority. The supreme court presently is authorized to adopt rules without the concurrence of the legislature, but a rule can be repealed by legislation enacted by a supermajority
vote. 149 Under the Commission's proposal, the supreme court could initiate a jurisdictional change, subject to legislative concurrence. The legislative vote would serve as an alternative to the statewide referendum needed
for a constitutional amendment. Under existing rulemaking procedures,
there would be opportunity for input and comment prior to the finalization of a supreme court recommendation for a jurisdictional change. 15 0
This would be followed by a public deliberative process in the legislature.
D.

Conclusion

Regulation of discretionary review in the Florida Constitution is
cumbersome, unnecessary, and discourages innovation. Under the present
system, the supreme court must have a high degree of certainty that a
jurisdictional reform will work before being willing to amend the constitution to undertake it. Given the slow and arduous process of constitutional
change, it is very difficult to fine tune the jurisdictional article by constitutional amendment. Both the Commission's recommendation and the
Model Judicial Article would give greater flexibility in modifying the
Florida Supreme Court's jurisdictional article than now exists. Either approach would facilitate change in the system of discretionary review. Either recommendation would accomplish a needed reform.
Should these recommendations not find favor, another alternative
would be to address specifically the problem of discretionary review. That
could be done by amending the constitution to allow the supreme court to
review any decision of a district court of appeal. 15 1 Guidelines for discre-

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
150. See FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.130.
151. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12 ("The Supreme Court may review the decision of a
court of appeal in any cause."); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1988) ("Cases in the courts of appeals may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court by. . . writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to
any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree ....
").
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tionary review would be promulgated by rule. 152 While the latter alternative is possible, the Commission's approach, or that of the Model Judicial
Article, would give the supreme court greater flexibility.
V.

CRITERIA FOR DISCRETIONARY SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS

A. ABA Standards of Judicial Administration
The ABA Standards of JudicialAdministration (JudicialAdministration Standards) provide that a state's highest court "should have authority to review all justiciable controversies and proceedings, regardless
of subject matter or amount involved." 153 The Judicial Administration
Standards specifically oppose placing subject matter limitations on the
ability of the supreme court to review a case, and also oppose limiting
154
supreme court jurisdiction on the basis of the amount in controversy.
There are essentially two reasons for the ABA position.
First, exclusions based on subject matter or amount in controversy do
not successfully separate the important from the unimportant cases.155
According to the ABA:
[The matter excluded] may present questions that should be resolved as a matter of public interest or because of their importance in the administration of justice. Such questions can be of
importance even though they arise in cases that are otherwise
of minor consequence because the law governing such cases
often affects the interests of hundreds or thousands of
citizens.156
The appellate courts must be organized with their essential functions in
mind;1 57 a rule of categorical exclusion is inconsistent with the proposition
that a state's highest court has the ability to select cases on the basis of
importance.
Second, the imposition of categorical limitations on supreme court
review does not necessarily achieve an efficient appellate system. 58 Where
152. As a transitional matter, the existing constitutional categories for discretionary review
would become rules until changed. The constitutional sections directly affected would be FLA. CONST.

art. V, § 3(b)(3) and (4). Closely related is the bypass provision in FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5).
153. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13(a) (1990); STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 (1977).
154. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commentary at 4 (1977).
155.
156.

Id.
Id.

157.
158.

STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS
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states have imposed restrictions on the supreme court's ability to review
intermediate appellate court decisions, the justification has been "to elimi'
nate the expense and delay involved in such further review. "159
The ABA
Commentary observes:
Absolute prohibition of further review is unnecessary to achieve
this aim, however. When the volume of appellate litigation is
sufficient to justify an intermediate appellate court, the volume
of cases in that court is generally very large in comparison to
the capacity of the supreme court, which has the time to review
only a small proportion of the cases decided by the intermediate
appellate court. This practical limitation forecloses multiple appellate review except in a relatively small number of cases."'
In accordance with the Judicial Administration Standards, the Model
Judicial Article imposes no categorical limitations on the ability of the
supreme court to review decisions of the intermediate appellate courts. 61
Under the Model JudicialArticle, criteria for discretionary review would
62
be promulgated by the supreme court by rule.
B.

The States and the Federal System

The United States Supreme Court's Rule 10 begins by stating, "A
review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor."' 16 3 The Rule then indicates that
the Court's specific criteria of importance, "while neither controlling nor
fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons
that will be considered ....,,164
The Supreme Court's formulation, which has existed in approximately the same form since 1925,165 has been very influential in the
states. Many states expressly provide, as the United States Supreme
Court does, that the enumerated criteria are illustrative and do not control or fully measure the state supreme court's discretion.'
Other states

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE,

supra note 130, § 2, at 927.

See id.; supra part IV.B.

163.
164.

SuP. CT. R. 10.1; see infra app. B.
SUP. CT. R. 10.1; see infra app. B.
165. 13 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 810.01 (2d ed. 1991) (reviewing Sup. CT. R. 10 (1990); SuP. CT. R. 17 (1980); Sup. CT. R. 19 (1970); Sup. CT. R. 38(5)
(1939); SuP. CT. R. 35(5) (1925)).
166. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3018 (1988); ALASKA R. App. P. 304; COLO. App. R. 49; CONN. R.
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impart the same point in different language. 1 67 In some jurisdictions, the
criteria for review do not expressly state that they are guidelines, but the
criteria include at least one broad, nonlimiting standard which is essentially open-ended. 168 A few of the two-tier states confer a power of discretionary review on the supreme court but have adopted no explicit criteria
for discretionary review.169 Apart from Florida, in the small number of
states in which criteria for discretionary review are found in the constitution, the constitutional criteria confer broad discretionary authority on the
supreme court.' 7 0 Some states do, however, make certain categories of

App. P. 4127; IDAHO App. R. 118; ILL. S. CT. R. 315; MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 117 cmt.; N.D. S. CT.
ADMIN. R. 27, § 13(c); OR. R. App. P. 9.05(4); PA. R. App. P. 1114 note; S.C. App. CT. R. 226(b);
TENN. R. App. P. I1(a); TEX. R. App. P. 200(c) (criminal cases); UTAH R. App. P. 46; Wis. R. App.
P. 809.62(1).
167. ARIz. R. Civ. App. P. 23(c)(4) ("reasons why the petition should be granted ... may
include, among others ... [listing criteria]) (emphasis added); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 31.19.c.4 (same);
N.Y. CT. App. R. 500.11(d)(1)(v) ("argument showing why the questions presented merit review by
this court, such as . . . [listing criteria]") (emphasis added); OHIO S. CT. PRAC. R. II, § 4(A)(2)
(motion for leave to appeal to supreme court shall address specified criteria or state "why leave to
appeal should be granted") (emphasis added).
168. E.g., Mo. CONST. art. V, § 10 ("general interest or importance of a question involved in
the case, or for the purpose of reexamining the existing law"); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(a)(5), (6) ("in
[the supreme court's] opinion, a question of law is involved which ought to be reviewed"); HAW. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 602-59(b) (Michie 1988) ("grave errors of law or of fact"); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 12-203 (1988) ("desirable and in the public interest"); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
211A, § 11 (West 1992) ("substantial reasons affecting the public interest or the interests of justice"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14B(4) (Michie 1990) ("issue of substantial public interest"); N.C.
GEN STAT. § 7A-31(b)(1) (1992) ("significant public interest"); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 22.001(a)(6) (West 1993) ("error of law. . . of such importance to the jurisprudence of the state
that, in the opinion of the supreme court, it requires correction"); ARK. R. S. CT. & CT. App. 1-2(d),
(f) ("issue of significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance"); CAL App. R.
29(a)(1) ("settlement of important questions of law"); GA. S. CT. R. 29 ("cases of great concern,
gravity, and importance to the public"); ILL S. CT. R. 315(a) ("general importance of the question
presented"); IOWA R. App. P. 402(c) ("Court of Appeals.

.

. has erred

. . .

or.

.

. has decided a

case which should have been retained by the Supreme Court."); Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.20(1) ("A motion
for discretionary review . . . is a matter of judicial discretion and will be granted only where there
are special reasons for it."); MICH. CT. R. 7.302(B)(5) ("clearly erroneous and will cause material
injustice"); N.J. R. App. PRAC. 2:12-4 ("if the interest of justice requires"); see also ALA. R. App. P.
39(c)(3)-(5), (k) (criteria include question of first impression, request for change in existing supreme
court precedent, and conflict of decisions; scope of review includes application of law to stated facts).
169. See supra note 128.
170. Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Georgia are examples. In Missouri, supreme court review
may be had "because of the general interest or importance of a question involved in the case, or for
the purpose of reexamining the existing law, or pursuant to supreme court rule." Mo. CONST. art. V,
§ 10. A Missouri Supreme Court rule allows for review when "the opinion filed [by the Court of
Appeals] is contrary to a previous decision of an appellate court of this state." Mo. S. CT. R. 83.03.
In New York the court of last resort may grant discretionary review in a civil case "upon the
... N.Y.
ground that, in its opinion, a question of law is involved which ought to be reviewed by it.
CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(5), (6). Under one of New York's constitutional provisions, the appeal "shall
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cases, typically involving smaller matters, unreviewable by the supreme
7

court.1 1

In sum, the experience in most jurisdictions has been that explicit
review criteria are best employed as general guidelines for the exercise of
discretionary review. A majority of states, as well as the federal system,
explicitly state that their review criteria do not limit the power of the
supreme court to grant discretionary review. Even where that is not so,
the states' discretionary review criteria ordinarily have at least one standard of considerable breadth which would allow the court wide latitude to
accept cases on the basis of importance or the imperatives of the administration of justice. Florida's system runs counter to prevailing practice, in
that the supreme court's constitutional categories are not guidelines, but
are jurisdictional limitations. There is no open-ended, importance-based
72
standard.1
Although most states use criteria as general guidelines, the substance

be allowed when required in the interest of substantial justice." Id. § 3(b)(6). The constitutional
provisions have been amplified by rule. N.Y. CT. APP. R. § 500.11(d)(1)(v) ("[Q]uestions [which]
merit review by this court [include those which] are novel or of public importance, or involve a
conflict with prior decisions of this court, or . . .a conflict among the Appellate Divisions."). Discretionary review in criminal cases is statutory. Stuart M. Cohen, Criminal Leave Applications to the
Court of Appeals, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1990, at 28, 28-29. There are no explicit review criteria for
criminal cases. Id. at 29.
In Ohio, the supreme court may review a court of appeals decision "[i]n
cases of public or great
general interest .... " OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(d). The constitutional provisions have been
amplified by rule, which require the petitioner to address specified criteria or to state "why leave to
appeal should be granted." OHIO S. CT.PRAC. R. II, § 4(A)(2).
In Georgia, "[tihe Supreme Court may review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which
are of gravity or great public importance." GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, V 5.
171. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-202 (1989 & Supp. 1992) (stating
that the decision of the intermediate appellate court is final where it has granted or denied leave to
appeal in: post-conviction proceedings; certain matters pertaining to the right or amount of bail; inmate grievance commission proceedings; judgments entered following a plea of guilty; and orders
revoking probation).
Another variation is a limited preclusion of review based on subject matter, jurisdictional
amount, or court of origin, but permitting supreme court review if specified criteria are met. See
ARIz. CoNsT. art. VI, § 5(3) (stating that the supreme court does not have jurisdiction of "civil and
criminal actions originating in courts not of record, unless the action involves the validity of a tax,
impost, assessment, toll, statute, or municipal ordinance"); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (stating that
the supreme court does not have jurisdiction of civil actions for $200 or less, "unless the action involves the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, [toll], municipal fine, or the validity of a statute");
VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.07 (Michie 1988) (stating that certain traffic, misdemeanor, administrative, matrimonial, criminal, and inmate cases are unreviewable in the supreme court, unless the case
"involves a substantial constitutional question as a determinative issue or matters of significant precedential value"); see also TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225 (West 1992) (providing that certain unreviewable civil cases have right of appeal if specified criteria are met).
172. A "great public importance" criterion is available to the district courts of appeal, FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4), but is not available to the Florida Supreme Court. Id. § 3(b)(3).
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of the criteria varies. The criteria found in the United States Supreme
Court's Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorari have
been adopted intact in some states and have served as a foundation in
others.1 73 The Supreme Court's guidelines provide for discretionary review

in three different instances. First, review should be granted when the
court below "has decided an important question of federal law which has
not been, but should be, settled by this Court ....,u74 Second, review is
appropriate where there is a conflict of decisions between the appellate
tribunals below, or a conflict between the decision below and an applicable decision of the Supreme Court.17 5 Third, review should be granted if
the appellate court "has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision. "176
Though the meaning may be broader, this last category includes review to
1
prevent a miscarriage of justice. "7
The Judicial Administration Standards have also recommended criteria for discretionary review.17 8 These are "that the matter involves a
question that is novel or difficult, is the subject of conflicting authorities
applicable within the jurisdiction, or is of importance in the general public
interest or in the administration of justice.'

7

9

While both sets of criteria

are used in the states, the federal standards are used with greater frequency. 180 Accordingly, the basic federal criteria-importance, conflict of
decisions, and supervisory function-are discussed first, followed by criteria not falling into any of these categories.
1. Important Question of Law Which Should Be Settled by the
Supreme Court
A number of states have adopted more or less intact the following
United States Supreme Court standard: review may be granted when an
important question of law is presented which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Supreme Court.' 81 In some states the phraseology resembles
173. For the text of Supreme Court Rule 10, see infra app. B.
174. Sup. CT. R. 10.1(c).
175. Id. R. 10.1(a)-(c). For purposes of federal questions, the applicable conflicts are those
between United States Courts of Appeals, state courts of last resort, or both, or between any of them

and the United States Supreme Court. Id.
176. Id. R. 10.1(a). The power of supervision is asserted with respect to the United States
Courts of Appeals, but not the state courts. Id.

177. See

STERN ET AL.,

supra note 41, at 222.

178. STANDARDS RELATING
179. Id.
180. See infra app. C.
181. Sup. CT. R. 10.1(c).

TO APPELLATE COURTS
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that of the United States Supreme Court,8 2 while in other states the

standard refers to a case of first impression,'l 3 a novel question,"" or an
undecided point of law.' 85 Another formulation adopted by some states is,
simply, that the legal question is an important one.'88 Still other states'
guidelines call for review when the matter is of great public importance or

affects the public interest. 8 7
182. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(5), (6) ("a question of law is involved which ought to be
reviewed by the court of appeals"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480A.10(1) (West 1990) ("whether the
question presented is an important one upon which the court has not, but should rule"); ALASKA R.
APP. P. 304(c) ("significant question of law, having substantial public importance to others than the
parties to the present case, which question. has not previously been decided by the supreme court of
the state of Alaska"); COLO. APP. R. 49(a)(1) ("question of substance not heretofore determined by
this court"); CONN. R. S. CT. § 4127(1) ("question of law not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court"); IDAHO APP. R. 118(b)(1) (similar); IND. R. APP. P. 1l(B)(2)(b) ("decision of the Court of
Appeals erroneously decides a new question of law"); N.J. R. APP. PRAC. 2:12-4 ("question of general
public importance which has not been but should be settled by the Supreme Court"); N.D. S CT.
ADMIN. R. 27, § 13(c)(1) ("question of substance not previously determined by the Supreme
Court"); PA. APP. P. R. 1114 note ("[w]here the appellate court below has decided a question of
substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court"); TEX.R. App. P. 200(c)(2) (criminal
cases) ("important question of state or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by the
Court of Criminal Appeals"); UTAH R. APP. P. tit. VII, 46(d) ("Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by
the Supreme Court").
183. ALA. R. APP. P. 39(c)(3) ("a material question requiring decision is one of first impression
in Alabama").
184. N.Y. CT. APP. R. 500.11 (d)(1)(v); S.C. APP. CT. R. 226(b)(1); see STANDARDS RELATING
TO APPELLATE COURTS

§ 3.10(c) (1977).

185. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 31.19(c)(4) ("no Arizona decision controls the point of law in question"); ARIz. R. Civ. APP. P. 23(c)(4) ("a decision of the [state] Supreme Court should be overruled
or qualified"); OR. R. APP.P. 9.05(3)(e) ("the issues presented have importance beyond the particular case and require decision by the Supreme Court").
186. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 10 ("importance of question involved"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 203018(b)(1) (1992) ("general importance of the question presented"); N.C. GEN.STAT. § 7A-31(c)(2)
(1992) ("[Ilegal principles of major significance"); VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.07(B) (Michie 1992)
("matter of significant precedential value"); ARK.R. S. CT. & CT. APP. 1-2(d), (f) ("legal principle
of major importance"); CAL.APP. R. 29(a) (review "appears necessary to secure ... the settlement
of important questions of law"); ILL. S. CT. R. 315(a) ("general importance of the question
presented"); MICH. CT. R. 7.302(B)(3) ("issue involves legal principles of major significance to the
state's jurisprudence"); TENN. R. APP. P. 11 (a)(2) ("the need to secure settlement of important questions of law").
187. See GA. CONST. art. 6, § 6, 5 ("gravity or great public importance"); MASS. ANN.LAWS
ch. 211 A, § 11 (Law. Co-op 1986) ("substantial reasons affecting the public interest or the interests
of justice"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(B)(4) (Michie 1990) (decision "involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the supreme court"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A31(c) (1989) ("[t]he subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest"); ARK.R. S. CT.&
CT. APP. 1-2(d), (f) ("issue of significant public interest"); CONN.R. S. CT. § 4127(4) ("question of
great public importance"); GA. S. CT. R. 29 ("cases of great concern, gravity, and importance to the
public"); N.Y. CT. APP. R. § 500.11(d)(1)(v) ("public importance"); OHIO S. CT. PRAc. R. II,
§ 4(A)(2) ("case . . .of public . . . interest"); PA. R. APP. P. 111 note ("issue of immediate public
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In another variation, discretionary review is available "for the purpose of reexamining the existing law. ....,88 In two states, review is
available if a decision of the highest court will help develop, clarify, or
harmonize the law, when "the case calls for the application of a new principle or policy," there is possible statewide impact, or the question is
likely to be a recurrent one unless resolved by the supreme court.1 89 One
state extends this criterion to include the establishment or change of a
policy within the supreme court's own authority. l90
Several states have singled out for separate treatment the situation
presented when the court of appeals follows existing supreme court precedent, but the supreme court precedent should be changed. 191 Recognizing
this category of cases explicitly may be desirable to provide flexibility or
to plug gaps left by other criteria. 92
Some states' criteria have identified particular subject matter as presumptively warranting consideration for discretionary review. Included in
this category are questions of interpretation of the state or federal constitution 193 and questions as to the validity of a statute.9 4 Some states' crite-

importance"); TENN. R. App. P. II(a)(3) ("the need to secure settlement of questions of public interest"); WASH. R. App. P. 13.4(4) ("issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by
the Supreme Court"); see also STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10(c) (1977).
188. MO. CONsT. art. V, § 10.
189. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.04, subd. 4(5); MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 117, subd. 2(d) (same); see
Wis. R. App. P. 809.62(1)(c) (similar).
190. Wis. R. App. P. 809.62(1)(b).
191. ALA. R. App. P. 39(c)(5) ("[w]here petitioner seeks to have controlling Supreme Court
cases overruled which were followed in the decision of the court of appeals"); ARIz. R. CRIM. P.
31.19.c.4 ("a decision of the Supreme Court should be overruled or qualified"); ARIz. R. Civ. App. P.
23(c)(4) ("a decision of the Supreme Court should be overruled or qualified"); IND. R. App. P.
I1(B)(2)(d) ("Court of Appeals correctly followed ruling precedent of the Supreme Court, but...
such ruling precedent is erroneous or is in need of clai''mtion or modification"); Wis. R. App. P.
809.62(1)(e) ("court of-appeals' decision is in accord with opinions of the supreme court or the court
of appeals but due to the passage of time or changing circumstances, such opinions are ripe for
reexamination").
192. Where the court of appeals follows existing supreme court precedent, there is no conflict of
decisions. Similarly, if the supreme court has previously ruled on the point, the case is not included in
the federal formulation: "important question of... law which has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court. . . ." Sup. CT. R. 10.1(c) (emphasis added). So long as the discretionary review criteria
are nonbinding guidelines, there is sufficient flexibility to accommodate a request to revisit existing
precedent. Such flexibility is missing in Florida. See supra part III.
193. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3) ("construes a provision of the state or federal constitution"); N.M. STAT.ANN.§ 34-5-14(B)(3) (Michie 1990) ("significant question of law under the constitution of New Mexico or the United States"); VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.07(B) (Michie 1988)
("substantial constitutional question as a determinative issue"); ALA. R. App. P. 39(c)(1) ("initially
construing a controlling provision of the Alabama or Federal Constitution"); ALASKA R. App. P.
304(b) ("a significant question concerning the interpretation of the constitution of the United States
or the supreme court of the state of Alaska"); OHIo S. CT. PRAc. R. II, § 4(A) ("substantial consti-
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ria give weight to the fact that the litigation involves the state, affects a
class of constitutional or state officers, 19 5 or involves the legality of gov96
ernmental action.1
More elusive is the question whether a lower tribunal's error is itself
a factor to be weighed in granting review. Under traditional doctrine, the
function of the supreme court is not primarily to correct error. The asserted erroneousness of the decision below is not expressly mentioned in
the United States Supreme Court's ConsiderationsGoverning Review on
97
Writ of Certiorari,1
nor in the criteria adopted in most states. 98 It is
instead thought to be a matter considered sub silentio in the review of
petitions for certiorari. 9 9 A few states' criteria provide that error is a
factor that will be considered, at least where the issue is an important
one.2 00 Others assert that error, without more, is not enough.20 '

tutional question"); WASH. R. App. P. 13.4(3) ("significant question of law under the Constitution of
the State of Washington or of the United States"); Wis. R App. P. 809.62(l)(a) ("[a] real and
significant question of federal or state constitutional law").
194. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) ("decision of a district court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state statute"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480A.10 (West 1992) ("held a statute to be
unconstitutional"); ALA. R. App. P. 39(c)(1) ("decisions initially holding valid or invalid a city ordinance, a state statute, or a federal statute or treaty"); MICH. CT. R. 7.302(B)(1) ("substantial question as to the validity of a legislative act"); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.04(4) ("ruled on the constitutionality of a statute"); MINN. R Civ. App. P. 117(2)(b) (same); OR. R. App. P. 9.05(4)(b)
("constitutionality of a statute"); TEX. R. App. P. 200(c)(4) (criminal cases) ("court of appeals has
declared unconstitutional . . .a statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance").
In some jurisdictions a trial court's decision invalidating a statute may be appealed directly to
the supreme court as a matter of right, rather than discretion. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-4-102(1)(b) (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); ILL. S. CT. R. 302(a)(1); cf. FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 3(b)(1) (right of appeal from district court of appeal decision invalidating a state statute or a
provision of the state constitution).
195. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) ("affects a class of constitutional or state officers"); ALA R.
App. P. 39(c)(2) ("decisions that affect a class of constitutional, state, or county officers"); MICH. CT.
R. 7.302(B)(2) ("issue has significant public interest and the case is one by or against the state or one
of its agencies or subdivisions or by or against an officer of the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions in the officer's official capacity").
One study suggests that courts are more likely to grant review where the state is a party. Victor
E. Flango, Court Control of Access: Which Appeals Are Heard?, 8 STATE CT.J., Fall 1984, at 26,
27.
196. OR. R. APP P. 9.05(4)(b) ("the legality of an important governmental action which will
have irreversible consequences").
197. See Sup. CT R. 10.1.
198. See infra app. C.
199. See STERN ET AL., supra note 41, § 4.17, at 222 n.65 (" 'Nonetheless, the most common
reason members of our Court vote to grant certiorari is that they doubt the correctness of the decision
of the lower court."') (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A DisappearingAct, 35 MERCER L. REV. 1015, 1027 (1984)); see also Flango, supra note 195, at 27 ("All justices in the sample
were more likely to reverse than affirm petitions they voted to grant.").
200. HAw.REV. STAT. § 602-59(b)(1) (1985) ("grave errors of law or of fact"); TEX. GOV'T
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In sum, the first major criterion, whether the case presents an important question of law which should be settled by the supreme court, is em-

braced by the great majority of states in one form or another. It reflects
one major aspect of the law-development function of a court of last resort.
Many states have found it desirable to be more specific with respect to the
issues which warrant review and the considerations of importance which
will be applied.

Unlike most states, Florida has no general criterion of importance
which can be invoked at the supreme court level. 202 Unless there is also a
conflict of decisions, a constitutional issue, or a matter affecting a class of
constitutional or state officers, jurisdiction may not be invoked on petition

to the supreme court.2 0 3 The Florida system allows importance-based discretionary review only when a district court of appeal grants permission
204
through its certification of a question of great public importance.
2. Conflict of Decisions
Securing uniformity of decision is one of the most commonly employed criteria for granting supreme court review.20 5 This reflects the expectation that decisional law, like statutory law, should be consistently
applied to all persons within the court's jurisdiction.2 0 6 The federal system

CODE ANN. § 22.001(a)(6) (Vernon 1988) (civil cases) ("error of law . . . of such importance to the
jurisprudence of the state that . . . it requires correction"); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 31.19(c)(4) ("important issues of law have been incorrectly decided"); ARIZ. R. CIv. App. P. 23(c)(4) (same); IND. R.
App. P. ll(B)(2)(b) ("decision of Court of Appeals erroneously decides a new question of law");
IOWA R. App. P. 402(c) ("Court of Appeals. . . [h]as erred"); MIcH. CT. R. 7.302(B)(5) ("decision
is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice").
201. OR. R. App. P. 9.05(4) (stating that "[a]n assertion of the grounds on which the decision
.. . is claimed to be wrong, without more, does not" show that the issues have importance beyond
this case and therefore does not require decision by the Supreme Court); see also FLA. R. App. P.
9.120 committee notes (suggesting that in a jurisdictional brief "[i]t is not appropriate to argue the
merits of the substantive issues"); PADOVANO, supra note 82, § 12.13, at 204 ("the question whether
reversible error exists under the particular circumstances of the case is secondary at this point").
202. See FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
203. See id.
204. Id. § 3(b)(4).
205. See infra notes 207, 210-15.
206. See J. Timothy Eaton et al., Resolving Conflicts in the Illinois Appellate Court, 78 ILL
BJ. 182 (1990). As applied to decisional conflicts among intermediate appellate courts, conflict of
decisions could be seen as merely a special case within a larger category, that of important questions
of law which should be settled by the supreme court. A conflict of decisions among lower tribunals is
possible only.when the court of last resort has not decided the legal question at issue. The same is not
true where the intermediate appellate court has come into decisional conflict with the supreme court
itself. There the conflict criterion consists of an exercise of supervision, or law clarification, by the
supreme court. In any event, settlement of decisional conflict is a criterion employed with great frequency in the states. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text. This reflects the value attached
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and the states have differing approaches to resolve intermediate decisional

conflicts.
The approach taken by the United States Supreme Court is to identify the courts whose conflicting decisions the Supreme Court will resolve:
federal courts of appeals and (ordinarily) state courts of last resort."'
Excluded are conflicting decisions of lower tribunals. 20 8 Also excluded are

conflicts within a single court of appeals as a matter warranting supreme
court review, as internal consistency is the responsibility of the court of
20 9
appeals itself.

The states have arrived at a variety of definitions of reviewable decisional conflict. The simplest is that review will be granted "where it appears necessary to secure uniformity of decision ....
-21o More commonly, state criteria identify the courts whose conflicts will be considered.

Under one common formulation, the state supreme court will review a
court of appeals decision in conflict with the decision of another court of
appeals or the state supreme court.2 1 ' Other states include the above, but
to decisional consistency and establishes the category as one which carries priority.
207. SuP. CT. R. 10.1(a)-(c). Rule 10.1(c) refers to "state court" rather than, as in Rule
10.1(b), "state court of last resort." Id. R. 10.1(b)-(c). Under the Supreme Court's jurisdictional
statute, certiorari may be granted to review final judgments of "the highest court of a State in which
a decision could be had ....
" 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1992). This is usually, but not always, the state
supreme court. See STERN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3.14-.17, at 139-43.
The Supreme Court seeks to assure a uniform body of federal law by reviewing decisional conflicts between United States courts of appeals, state courts of last resort, and/or the United States
Supreme Court on matters of federal law. Because of its broader responsibilities for oversight of the
federal judiciary, the Supreme Court will also entertain conflicts of decision between the United
States courts of appeals on matters other than federal law. SuP. CT. R. 10.1(a).
208. See Sup. CT. R. 10.1(a)-(c).
209. STERN ET AL., supra note 41, § 4.6, at 204-05. "As Justice Harlan once wrote, 'decisions
between different panels of the same Court of Appeals will not be considered to present a reviewable
conflict, since such differences of view are deemed an intramural matter to be resolved by the Court
of Appeals itself."' Id. at 205 (footnote omitted). The commentators suggest, however, that an intracircuit conflict of decisions may be taken into account if other reasons for granting review are present.
Id. If an exceptional case were to arise, the Supreme Court's criteria are nonexclusive and broad
enough to allow review either on the basis of importance or under the Court's supervisory power. See
SUP. CT. R. 10.1(a), (c).
210. CAL. App. R. 29(a)(1); TENN. R. App. P. 11(a)(1) ("the need to secure uniformity of
decision").
211. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3) ("supreme court . . . [m]ay review any decision of a district court of appeal . . . that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court
of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3018(b)(2)
(1988) ("conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and a prior decision of the supreme
court, or of another panel of the court of appeals"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480A.10, subd. I (West
1990) (enumerating only "direct conflict with an applicable precedent of the supreme court"); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(B)(1) (Michie 1990) ("conflict with a decision of the supreme court"); id.
§ 34-5-14(B)(2) ("conflict with a decision of the court of appeals"); COLO. App. R. 49(a)(2)
("[wihere the Court of Appeals . . . has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in
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also include conflicts with the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court 212 or conflicts with other federal decisions.2 13 In one jurisdiction the
accord with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court"); id. 49(a)(3) ("[w]here a division of the
Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another division of said
court"); CONN. R. App. P. § 4127(1) (same); id. § 4127(2) ("[w]here the decision under review is in
conflict with other decisions of the appellate court"); ILL. S. CT.R. 315(a) ("the existence of a conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the Supreme Court, or of another
division of the Appellate Court"); IND. R. App. P. 1 l(B)(2)(a) ("decision of the Court of Appeals
contravenes a ruling precedent of the Supreme Court"); id. R. 1l(B)(2)(c) ("conflict between the
. . .decision and a prior opinion of the Court of Appeals"); IOWA R. App. P. 402(c)(2) ("decision
...is in conflict with a prior holding of a published Court of Appeals decision or published Supreme
Court decision"); MICH. CT. R. 7.302(B)(5) ("decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or
another decision of the Court of Appeals"); Mo. S. CT. R. 83.03 ("opinion. ..contrary to a previous
decision of an appellate court of this state"); N.Y. CT. App. R. 500.11(d)(1)(v) ("conflict with prior
decisions of this court [court of appeal-New York's court of last resort], or there is a conflict among
the Appellate Divisions"); OR. R. App. P. 9.05(4)(e) ("departure by the Court of Appeals from a
prior decision of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals"); UTAH R. App. P. 46(a) ("panel of
the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court
of Appeals on the same issue of law"); id. R. 46(b) ("panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court");
WASH. R. App. P. 13.4(b)(1) ("decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court"); id. R. 13.4(b)(2) ("decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a decision of
another division of the Court of Appeals"); see MINN. R.CRIM. P. 29.04, subd. 4(3) ("the Court of
Appeals has decided a question in direct conflict with an applicable precedent of a Minnesota appellate court"). But cf. MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 117, subd. 2 (not enumerating conflict).
212. ALA. R. App. P. 39(c)(4) ("decisions in conflict with prior decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court, or the Alabama courts of appeals"); ALASKA R. App.
P. 304(a) ("decision of the intermediate appellate court is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States or the supreme court of the state of Alaska, or with another decision of
the court of appeals"); IDAHO App. R. 118(b)(2) ("Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court or of the United
States Supreme Court"); id.
R. 118(b)(3) ("Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with
a previous decision of the Court of Appeals"); N.J. R. App. PRAC. 2:12-4 ("decision under review is in
conflict with any other decision of the same or a higher court"); N.D. S. CT. ADMIN. R. 27,
§ 13(c)(2) ("Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court or of the United States Supreme Court"); id.
§ 13(c)(3) ("Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a published decision of the
Court of Appeals"); PA. R. App. P. 1114 note ("(1) Where the appellate court below has decided a
question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or the Supreme Court of the United States. (2) Where an appellate court has rendered a decision in conflict
with the decision of the other appellate court below on the same question.
...
); TEx. R. App. P.
200(c)(1) (criminal cases) ("court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another court of appeals on the same matter"); id. R. 200(c)(3) ("[w]here a court of appeals has
decided an important question of state or federal law in conflict with the applicable decisions of the
Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States"); Wis. R. App. P.
809.62(l)(d) ("[t]he court of appeals' decision is in conflict with controlling opinions of the United
States Supreme Court or the supreme court or other court of appeals' decisions").
213. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 602-59(b)(2) (1985) ("obvious inconsistencies in the decision of
the intermediate appellate court with that of the supreme court, federal decisions, or its own decision,
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criteria for discretionary review mention only conflicts at the court of appeals level, apparently on the assumption that the court of appeals deci-

sions will not conflict with those of the state supreme court. 14 Another
variation is to enumerate conflict between the court of appeals and the
state supreme court as a basis for discretionary review, but not conflict
within the court of appeals; the premise evidently is that the court of appeals is responsible for maintaining its own internal decisional consis-

tency.21 Finally, some states do not enumerate conflict as a criterion for
discretionary review, but have other criteria broad enough to include deci-

sional conflict.2 16
As suggested by some of the preceding examples, state practice is not

and the magnitude of such errors or inconsistencies dictating the need for further appeal").
214. ARIz. R. Civ. App. P. 23(c)(4) ("conflicting decisions have been rendered by the Court of
Appeals"); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 31.19(c)(4) (same). However, Arizona's list of criteria is nonexclusive,
so that the state supreme court has the ability to take jurisdiction should such a supreme court-court
of appeals conflict arise. Id.
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c)(3) (1989) ("decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely
to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court"). North Carolina's other criteria for review,
"significant public interest" and "legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the
State," id. § 7A-31(c)(1)-(2), are broad enough to allow supreme court review of an intra-court of
appeals conflict.
In Minnesota the statutory ground for conflict review is "whether the court of appeals has decided a question in direct conflict with an applicable precedent of the supreme court.
... MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 480A.10, subd. 1 (West 1990). The Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure
contain no additional ground for conflict review. The rules of criminal procedure, by contrast, include
the criterion that "the Court of Appeals has decided a question in direct conflict with an applicable
precedent of a Minnesota appellate court." MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.04, subd. 4(3). However, the omission of court of appeals conflict as a ground for review would not preclude consideration of that factor
in a civil case, because the supreme court's statutory and civil appellate rules' criteria are nonexclusive. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480A.10, subd. 1 (West 1990); MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 117 subd. 2. The
Minnesota Supreme Court's just-cited statutory provision and civil appellate rule also include the
exercise of the supreme court's supervisory powers as a ground for review.
216. E.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-203 (1989) ("desirable and in the public
interest"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211A, § 11 (West 1986) ("substantial reasons affecting the
public interest or the interests of justice"); ARK. R. S. CT. & CT. App. 1-2(d), (f)("issue of significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance"); GA. R. S. CT. 29 ("cases of great
concern, gravity, and importance to the public").
In Ohio, "[w]henever the judges of a court of appeals find that a judgment upon which they have
agreed is in conflict with a judgment pronounced upon the same question by any other court of
appeals of the state, the judges shall certify the record of the case to the supreme court for review and
final determination." OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 3(B)(4). The supreme court is required to review any
case so certified. Id. § 2(B)(2)(e). Should there be conflict which has not been certified, the supreme
court has broad power to review courts of appeals' cases "of public or great general interest ....
Id. § 2(B)(2)(d).
Virginia's criteria are of very limited application, but where applicable, include any "substantial
constitutional question as a determinative issue or matters of significant precedential value ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.07(B) (Michie 1988).
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uniform on the question of whether to include, as a ground for discretionary review, a conflict between panels within a single court of appeals. In
the federal system, such conflicts are left to each court of appeals to sort

out through its own en bane procedure, and will not serve as a basis for
United States Supreme Court review.21 7 So long as it is feasible to adopt
an en bane procedure, this system is preferred because it is efficient. Like
the federal system, internal conflict within an intermediate appellate court

does not warrant supreme court review in Florida.21
Some jurisdictions have not adopted en bane procedures for the court
of appeals, 219 and in one state en bane proceedings by the intermediate
appellate court are affirmatively prohibited.22 ° In such states it is left to
the supreme court to resolve conflicts between panels of a court of appeals. Somewhat surprisingly, in a number of states that have an en bane
procedure, the criteria for discretionary supreme court review nonetheless
include that of conflict within the intermediate appellate court. 221 The ex-

planation for this appears to be that it is the court of appeals' responsibil217. See sources cited supra note 209.
218. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); FLA. R. App. P. 9.331; see England et al., supra note 86, at
188. This was a change from the prior 1972 constitutional provision, which provided that the supreme
court "[m]ay review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal . . . that is in direct
conflict with a decision of any district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of
law . . . ." FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1972) (emphasis added).
219. See Overton, supra note 64, at 213.
220. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-2(2) (1991) ("The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.").
221. CONN. R. S. CT. 4127 ("decision under review is in conflict with other decisions of the
appellate court"). Connecticut has a single appellate court with an en banc procedure. CONN. App.
CT. R. 2013.
IOWA R. App. P. 402(c)(2) (supreme court may grant review where Court of Appeals "has
rendered a decision which is in conflict with a prior holding of a published Court of Appeals decision"). The court of appeals has an en banc procedure. IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.5102(4) (West
1992).
MICH. CT. R. 7.302(B)(5) (grounds for review include a Court of Appeals' "decision [which]
conflicts with. . . another decision of the Court of Appeals"). Michigan has an interim en banc rule.
Mich. Admin. Order 1990-6; see id. 1993-4 (extending the effect of Mich. Admin. Order 1990-6
through December 31, 1993).
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.04, subd. 4(3) ("the Court of Appeals has decided a question in direct
conflict with an applicable precedent of a Minnesota appellate court"). Minnesota has an en banc
procedure. STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 195.
OR. R. App. P. 9.05(4)(e) ("departure by the Court of Appeals from a prior decision of. . . the

Court of Appeals"). Oregon has an en banc procedure. OR. REV. STAT. § 2.570 (1991).
In several states the court of appeals has only three members and invariably sits en banc, thus in
theory insuring decisional consistency. Even so, the criteria for discretionary review cite conflicts
within the intermediate appellate court as a criterion for supreme court review in the following states:
HAW. REV. STAT. § 602-59(b)(2) (1985); ALASKA R. App. P. 304(a); IDAHO APP. R. 118(b)(3); N.D.
S. CT. ADMIN. R. § 13(c)(3). A similar situation exists in Alabama. ALA. R. ApP. P. 39(c)(4). The
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has 3 members, and the Court of Criminal Appeals has 5 members;
both sit en banc. STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 172.
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ity to be decisionally consistent; but if the court of appeals fails to do so,
then that fact alone will merit review.
While this approach is understandable, it is also undesirable. Where

the discretionary review criteria indicate that the supreme court will review intra-court of appeals conflict, they invite petitions to the state supreme court predicated on that ground. The proper forum, however, is the
court of appeals.2 22 In the unlikely event that the court of appeals allows
an intolerable internal conflict to exist, it can in most states be reviewed
by the supreme court on other grounds.223 Therefore, the federal model is
preferable.
3. Supervisory Powers
The United States Supreme Court's third consideration in its Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorariis that the "court of
appeals . . .has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of

judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as
to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.""" This standard is followed in many states; some use language substantially identical
to that of the United States Supreme Court,225 and others use a modified
or abbreviated form.22 In federal practice this standard includes interven-

tion to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice.227 In some jurisdictions such

222. Where the intermediate appellate court has the responsibility of maintaining internal decisional consistency, that responsibility generally will be carried out. For practical reasons the court of
appeals will find it unacceptable to allow conflicting lines of authority on a substantial matter to exist
within the court for an extended period of time.
223. The supreme court will have the ability to review an intra-court of appeals conflict if the
state has a nonexclusive list of discretionary review criteria, a general supervisory standard, or a
general standard of importance.
224. SUP. CT. R. 10.1(a).
225. COLO. APP. R. 49(a)(4); CONN. R. S. CT. 4127(3); IDAHO APP. R. 118(b)(4); N.D. S. CT.
ADMIN. R. 27, § 13(c)(4); PA. R. APP. P. 1114 note; TEX. R. APP. P. 200(c)(6); UTAH R. APP. P.
46(c).
226. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3018(b)(3) (1988) ("the need for exercising the supreme court's
supervisory authority"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480A.I0, subd. 1 (West 1990) ("whether the lower
courts have so far departed from the accepted and usual course of justice as to call for an exercise of
the court's supervisory powers"); ALASKA R. APP. P. 304(d) ("[u]nder the circumstances, the exercise
of the supervisory authority of the court of discretionary review over the other courts of the state
would be likely to have significant consequences to others than the parties to the present case, and
appears reasonably necessary to further the administration of justice"); ILL. S. CT. R. 315(a) ("the
need for the exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority"); MINN. R. Civ. APP. P.
117(2)(c) (same as MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480A.10, subd. 1); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.04, subd. 4(4)
(same); N.J. R. APP. PRAC. 2:12-4 ("decision under review ... calls for an exercise of the Supreme
Court's supervision"); TENN. R. APP. P. I1 (a)(4) ("the need for the exercise of the Supreme Court's
supervisory authority").
227. STERN ET AL., supra note 41, § 4.17, at 222-23.
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considerations come under the heading of "interests of justice" 228 or
under criteria recognizing an error correction function. 229 For jurisdictions
having nonexclusive lists of discretionary review criteria, the supervisory
function need not be spelled out, although many jurisdictions have found
it important to do so. 2 30 Florida's discretionary review criteria do not in-

clude a supervisory function.231

4. Dissent
Some states' discretionary review criteria include factors relating to
the proceedings in the intermediate appellate court. While the existence
of a divided vote in the court of appeals is said to be a factor considered
sub silentio by the United States Supreme Court, 2 2 in some states the
existence of a divided panel or a panel unable to agree on a common
rationale is expressly mentioned in the state's discretionary review criteria. 33 In a few other jurisdictions the existence of a dissent in the intermediate court triggers an unqualified right to appeal to the supreme
court 23
.
228. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(6) ("Question of law is involved which ought to be reviewed by
the court of appeals. . . . Such an appeal shall be allowed when required in the interest of substantial
justice."); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21 IA, § 11 (West 1986) (authorizing review in "the interests
of justice"); MICH. CT. R. 7.302(B)(5) ("decision is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice"); NJ. R. App. PRAC. 2:12-4 ("interest of justice requires").
229. See supra note 200.
230. See supra notes 225-26.
231. See FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 3(b).
232. STERN ET AL., supra note 41, § 4.6, at 205-06 (suggesting weight may be given to a
closely divided court of appeals en bane vote, or to intracircuit conflict which "relates to a recurring
and important issue or is accompanied by a 'widespread conflict among the circuits"') (citations
omitted).
233. ARK. R. S. C". & CT. App. 1-2(f) ("case. . . was decided in the Court of Appeals by a
tie vote"); CONN. R. ApP. P. 4127(5) ("where the judges of the appellate panel are divided in their
decision or, though concurring in the result, are unable to agree upon a common ground of decision");
N.D. S. CT. ADMIN. R. 27, § 13(c)(6) ("whether there is a dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals"); S.C. App. CT. R. 226(b)(2) ("[w]here there is a dissent in the decision of the Court of
Appeals"); Tax. R. App. P. 200(c)(5) (criminal cases) ("justices of the court of appeals have disagreed upon a material question of law necessary to its decision"); cf. GA. CONsr. art. VI, § 5, 5
(where court of appeals equally divided, "the case shall be immediately transmitted to the Supreme
Court"); see infra note 246.
234. MO. CONST. art. V, § 10 ("Cases pending in the court of appeals shall be transferred to
the supreme court when any participating judge dissents from the majority opinion and certifies that
he deems said opinion to be contrary to any previous decision of the supreme court or of the court of
appeals, or any district of the court of appeals."); NJ. CONST. art. V, § 5, l(b) ("[a]ppeals may be
taken to the Supreme Court. . . where there is a dissent in the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (1989) ("Except as provided in G.S. 7A-28 [making certain
decisions of court of appeals unreviewable in supreme court], an appeal lies of right to the Supreme
Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case . . . [i]n which there is a dis-
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Certification by Intermediate Appellate Court

In several jurisdictions, including Florida, discretionary review is
available where there is a certification by the intermediate appellate
court. These include certification that there is a substantial question of
law which should be reviewed by the supreme court,2" 5 that the intermediate appellate court has passed on a question of great public importance,
that the intermediate appellate court's decision is in direct conflict with a
decision of another intermediate appellate court,23 6 or that the public interest or interests of justice make further review desirable.23 7 Another variation is to require a certification of importance by at least one judge," 8
or by a dissenting judge.23 9 In these jurisdictions the intermediate appellate court certification is a ground for discretionary, not mandatory, review. This approach is in accord with the Judicial Administration
24 0
Standards.
There are also jurisdictions in which the intermediate appellate
court's certification creates an appeal as a matter of right.2 4' Such mecha-

sent."); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.001 (civil cases) ("justices of a court of appeals disagree on a
question of law material to the decision"); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW & R. 5601(a) ("dissent by at least
two justices on a question of law in favor of the party taking such appeal").
235. CONN. R. App. P. § 4135. (Two or more judges of the panel must concur in certification,
and the opinion must make "a finding that there is a substantial question of law which should be
reviewed by the supreme court.").
236. FLA. CONST art. V, § 3(b)(4) ("supreme court ... may review any decision of a district
court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is
certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal").
237. IDAHO APP. R. 118(b)(5) ("A majority of the judges of the Court of Appeals, after decision, certifies that the public interest or the interests of justice make desirable a further appellate
review."); N.D. S. CT. ADMIN. R. 27, § 13(c)(5) (similar).
238. ILL S CT. R. 315(a) ("no petition for leave to appeal from a judgment of the five-judge
panel of the Appellate Court designated to hear and decide cases involving review of Industrial Commission orders shall be filed, unless at least one judge of that panel files a statement that the case in
question involves a substantial question which warrants consideration by the Supreme Court").
239. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 10 ("Cases pending in the court of appeals shall be transferred to
the supreme court when any participating judge dissents from the majority opinion and certifies that
he deems said opinion to be contrary to any previous decision of the supreme court or of the court of
appeals, or any district of the court of appeals.").
240. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10(c), at 14 (1977) ("Rules of
procedure may provide that a party may seek certification by the lower appellate court that the
matter warrants further review but such a certification should not require the higher court to grant
review nor should its denial preclude review.").
241. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(c) ("Appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme
Court are a matter of right . . . if a division of the Appellate Court certifies that a case decided by it
involves a question of such importance that the case should be decided by the Supreme Court."); N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(6) (appeal "where the appellate division or the court of appeals shall certify
that in its opinion a question of law is involved which ought to be reviewed by the court of appeals.
Such an appeal may be allowed upon application (a) to the appellate division, and in case of refusal,
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nisms are disfavored, since they involve a loss of control by the supreme
court over its own docket.242
6.

Other Criteria

Several other items appear in some of the states' discretionary review
criteria. In one jurisdiction the failure of the court of appeals to write an
opinion on each material point is itself grounds for discretionary review,
as is an inaccurate opinion.245 In another state the absence of jurisdiction
in the court of appeals or a lack of concurrence of the required majority
of qualified judges constitutes grounds for review. 244 Some sa
states expressly

to the court of appeals, or (b) directly to the court of appeals"); see also infra note 242; cf. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(2) (1988) ("Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by...
certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as to
which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.");
17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 4038, at 102 (1988)
("In form and history, this certified question jurisdiction [of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2)] is mandatory. In
fact, the Supreme Court has surrounded it with so many barriers that in recent years only three cases
have been decided on certified questions.") (citations omitted).
242. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10(c) (1977), quoted in supra
note 240.
As to the Illinois procedure, "[t]he supreme court, perhaps concerned that the appellate court
would require it to hear too many cases it did not regard as important, has let it be known that it
disapproves of this procedure, with the result that the appellate court seldom certifies anything."
Eaton et al., supra note 206, at 186 (footnote omitted).
As to the New York procedure, "[w]hile the motion in the Appellate Division is permissible,
there appears to be a tendency among Appellate Division justices to deny such motions as a matter of
course, so as to let the Court of Appeals prescribe its own calendar." Thomas F. Gleason & Salvatore
D. Ferlazzo, The Court of Appeals Moves Towards "Certiorari"Status, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 1986, at
8, 11. Under New York practice, leave to appeal a final order may be obtaine4 either in the Appellate
Division or in the Court of Appeals; where finality as defined in New York practice is not present,
leave must be obtained from the Appellate Division. Id. at 10-11.
243. IND. R. APP. P. 11 (B)(2)(e) ("decision of the Court of Appeals fails to give a statement in
writing of each substantial question arising on the record and argued by the parties"); id. R.
11 (B)(2)(f) ("the . . . decision of the Court of Appeals erroneously and materially misstates the
record").
244. CAL. APP. R. 29(a)(2) ("Court of Appeal was without jurisdiction of the cause"); id. R.
29(a)(3) ("where, because of disqualification or other reason, the decision of the Court of Appeal
lacks the concurrence of the required majority of qualified judges"); OR. R. APP. P. 9.05(4)(d) (issue
regarding "jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the case").
Two jurisdictions consider whether the case should originally have come to, or remained in, the
supreme court instead of going to the court of appeals. ARK. R. S. CT. & CT. APP. 1-2(0 ("the case
• . . should have come to the Supreme Court originally under Section (a) of this Rule [direct appeal
to Supreme Court] . . . or should have been certified to the Supreme Court under Section (d)(2) of
this Rule [issue of significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance]"); IOWA R.
ApP. P. 402(c) ("Court of Appeals. . . has decided a case which should have been retained by the
Supreme Court").
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consider the interlocutory or final character of the decision sought to be
reviewed as a factor to be weighed in deciding whether to grant review.2 ,
On occasion a state will use its discretionary review criteria to describe
what will not be reviewed.2 4
C.

The Florida System

With the foregoing in mind, the Florida system may be analyzed.
The Florida system differs from other jurisdictions' systems in its use of
discretionary review criteria as a constitutional limitation on the ability of
the Florida Supreme 'Court to grant discretionary review. 247 To begin the
analysis, it is necessary to describe how and why Florida's system was
created.
1. The Original Misunderstanding
Florida's two-tier appellate system grew out of a 1954 study by the
Florida Judicial Council. 248 At that time there were relatively few twotier systems in existence. 24 9 By 1957 only thirteen states had them, in-

cluding Florida.2 50 In its initial deliberations on the subject, the Council
concluded that it would be necessary "to study a plan to restrict jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in order that there might not be any possibility
of merely offering two appeals, one to the district court of appeal and one

245. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3018(b)(4) (1988) ("the final or interlocutory character of
the judgment, order or ruling sought to be reviewed"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c) (1989) ("Interlocutory determinations by the Court of Appeals, including orders remanding the cause for a new
trial or for other proceedings, shall be certified for review by the Supreme Court only upon a determination by the Supreme Court that failure to certify would cause a delay in final adjudication which
would probably result in substantial harm."); ILL. S. CT. R. 315(a) ("the final or interlocutory character of the judgment sought to be reviewed"). See generally England et al., supra note 86, at 191
(stating that in Florida, review of trial court interlocutory orders proceeds in the first instance to the
district court of appeal even if on final judgment a direct appeal would lie in the Florida Supreme
Court).
246. CAL. APP. R. 29(b) (providing that the supreme court ordinarily will not consider an issue
which was not raised in the court of appeal, or matters omitted or misstated in the court of appeal's
opinion, unless it was called to the attention of the court of appeal by petition for rehearing); GA. R.
S. CT. 30 (supreme court ordinarily will not review: (1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) court of
appeals' affirmance of denial of certain motions; or (3) workers' compensation cases; unless three
judges dissented in the court of appeals or the cases conflict on a question of law).
247. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); supra part III.
248. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 96, at 10.
249. IMPROVING CASE PROCESSING, supra note 31, at v.
250. Id. The ABA Appellate Court Standards did not come into existence until much later,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS vii (1977), and the literature pertaining to intermediate appellate courts was at that time comparatively sparse. See Arthur J. Simpson, Jr., The Drive to
Sculpture the Ideal Court System, JUDGES J., Summer 1981, at 10, 14-15.
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to the Supreme Court, and thereby making litigation even more costly
251
and prolonged."
The Council's concern-avoiding double appeals-was entirely understandable and laudable. Avoiding double appeals is an objective routinely sought in all two-tier appellate systems.2 52 However, as stated earlier, the ABA has concluded that it is unnecessary to limit the jurisdiction
of a state supreme court to avoid the problem of double appeals. 25 3 That
is so because the supreme court "has- the time to review only a small
proportion of the cases decided by the intermediate appellate court. This
practical limitation forecloses multiple appellate review except in a relatively small number of cases. 25 4
There is empirical support for the ABA conclusion. Most litigants in
cases decided by the intermediate appellate courts do not seek further
appellate review.25 5 Of the petitions for discretionary review which are
filed, only a small percentage are granted. State supreme courts review an
average of thirteen percent of the petitions filed. 25 1 Thus, the selection
process itself eliminates double review in all but a very small number of
cases. 257 This phenomenon is well understood in the federal system, where
the odds of having the United States Supreme Court grant a petition for
discretionary review are less than five percent. 258 As a practical matter,
regardless of the system used, the decisions of the intermediate appellate
courts are final in the great majority of cases. It has not been necessary to
impose categorical restrictions to achieve that result, and most jurisdictions have not done so.
It appears that what is now conventional wisdom was not understood
251. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 96, at 14.
252. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10 & commentary (1977);
OSTHUS, supra note 32, at 2-3; Brown, supra note 63, at 202.
253. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commentary at 5 (1977); see supra
text accompanying note 160.
254. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commentary at 5 (1977).
255. In Florida in 1990, petitions for discretionary review were filed in 910 cases, including
certified decisions, out of a total of 5150 dispositions by written opinion in the district courts of
appeal, or 17.7%. See Supreme Court 1990 Statistics, supra note 114; see also 1992 Certification
Package, District Courts of Appeal 16 (unpublished report, on file with the Florida Law Review)
[hereinafter 1992 Certification Package].
Similar attrition is found in other states. See Overton, supra note 64, at 208 (stating that in 1984
petitions for discretionary review were filed in approximately 25% of the cases decided by California
courts of appeal); id. apps. A-C, at 234-37 (the petitions to invoke discretionary jurisdiction in the 10
largest states [app. A] were a fraction of the intermediate appellate court filings [app. B]); see STATE
COURT STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 52 (filings in intermediate appellate courts substantially exceeded
petitions for discretionary review in state supreme courts).
256. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
257. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commentary at 5 (1977).
258. Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 10.
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when the Council created the model for a two-tier appellate court system
in Florida. The Council mistakenly thought that formal limitations on the

Florida Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction would have to be employed in order to .head off the anticipated problem of double appeals. For
that reason, restrictive categories for discretionary review were written
into the 1956 constitutional amendment creating the two-tier appellate
system.2 59 The principal basis for supreme court discretionary review was
decisional conflict between district courts of appeal, or conflict with the
260
supreme court itself, on a point of law.

2.

Expansion of Florida Supreme Court Jurisdiction by Judicial

Interpretation
The Commentary to the ABA Standards Relating to Appellate
Courts (the Appellate Court Standards) predicts that where an attempt
is made to preclude supreme court review "categorically, by making an
intermediate appellate court's decisions unreviewable in specified circumstances," the result will be "forced or hypertechnical reasoning in the application of the criteria that determine whether further review may be
had." 2 6' That is exactly what happened in Florida. In the first few years
of operation under the 1956 amendment, the Florida Supreme Court described its jurisdiction in a restrictive manner.26 2 Soon, however, the court
began to take a more expansive view.26 3

259. Under the 1956 constitutional amendment, the Florida Supreme Court was authorized to
"review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal that affects a class of constitutional or
state officers, or that passes upon a question certified by the district court of appeal to be of great
public interest, or that is in direct conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the
supreme court on the same point of law ....
" FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 4(2) (1956); see infra app. E.
A litigant could appeal from the district court of appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, as a matter of
right, any decision "initially passing upon the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty,
or initially construing a controlling provision of the Florida or federal constitution." FLA. CONST. art.

V, § 4(2) (1956).
260. See supra note 259.
261. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commentary at 5 (1977).
262. See, e.g., Karlin v. City of Miami Beach, 113 So. 2d 551, 552-53 (Fla. 1959); Lake v.
Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 640-43 (Fla. 1958); Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1958).
Even at this early date, the court was careful to say that it had the latitude to take action in
exceptional cases to review affirmances without opinion, but that it would not ordinarily do so. Lake,
103 So. 2d at 643.
263. See, e.g., Huguley v. Hall, 157 So. 2d 417, 417-18 (Fla. 1963) (finding that a jurisdictional prerequisite may be satisfied where a basis for jurisdiction appears in a dissenting opinion, even
though there was no written majority opinion); Harrell's Candy Kitchen v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport
Auth., 111 So. 2d 439, 441-42 (Fla. 1959) (holding that the supreme court had jurisdiction to review
a district court of appeal decision which inherently passed on the validity of a statute, even though the
district court of appeal did not expressly discuss the point).
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In 1965 in Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc.,264 the supreme court held
that it could exercise its conflict jurisdiction to review a district court of
appeal decision in which no. opinion had been written. 265 The court announced that it would henceforth exercise its conflict jurisdiction where it
could be determined from the "record proper" that the ruling in the pending case was in conflict with a precedent of another district court of appeal or the supreme court itself, even though in the pending case the district court of appeal had affirmed without opinion.266 A vocal minority
argued that an affirmance without opinion did not create a reviewable
decisional conflict within the meaning of the constitution.267
The curious thing about Foley is the way that the decision came
about. The district court of appeal had issued an affirmance without opinion. 268 Foley petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for certiorari, asserting that the decision was in conflict with a precedent of another district
court of appeal. 69 The supreme court requested the district court of apjupeal to reconsider the matter and write an opinion.27° It 27relinquished
1
risdiction to the district court of appeal for that purpose.
The district court of appeal wrote an opinion objecting to the request.2 7 2 Understandably, it objected to a request to reconsider a matter
which it had already decided.2 7 s The district court of appeal also objected
to the request to prepare an opinion, 274 arguing that affirmances without
opinion were necessary to control excessive workload and that preparation
required where the court had previously made
of an opinion should not27be
5
a decision not to do so.
Most significantly, the district court of appeal urged that a written
opinion was not necessary for the Florida Supreme Court to exercise its
conflict certiorari.276 It reasoned that the Florida constitution referred to
"conflict of decisions, not conflict of opinions or reasons . . ,27. The
court pointed out that its decision could be gleaned by reviewing the "rec264.
265.

177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
Id. at 222-26, 229-31 (majority opinion and Drew, C.J., concurring specially).

266. Id.
267. Id. at 231 (Thornal, J., dissenting).
268. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 146 So. 2d 631 (3d DCA 1962), cert. discharged,177 So. 2d
221 (Fla. 1965).
269. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 168 So. 2d 749, 749 (Fla. 1964).

270.
271.

Id. at 750.
Id.

272.

Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 172 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 908.
Id.
Id. at 908 n.2.
Id. at 908 n.1.
Id.
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ord proper" when no opinion had been prepared.27 Since the absence of
an opinion would not, in the district court of appeal's view, preclude review in the Florida Supreme Court, the district court of appeal should not
be required to prepare an opinion. 7 The court acknowledged, however, a
duty to respond to the supreme court's request.2 80 The court did so, but in
a form so abbreviated that the Florida Supreme Court later characterized
28 x
this as a refusal to respond to the supreme court's request .
When the matter returned to the supreme court, the court adopted
the district court of appeal's constitutional analysis and authorized record
proper review as the district court of appeal had suggested. 8 2 In view of
the fact that the district court of appeal had advocated that approach, it
is ironic that later commentary characterized Foley as infringing on the
prerogatives of the district courts of appeal. 83
Through Foley and other means, the supreme court by judicial decision took an increasingly expansive view of its own jurisdiction.28 4 This
was the supreme court's response to the overly narrow jurisdictional
limitations.28 5

278. Id. at 909.
279. See id.
280. Id. at 910.
281. Foley, 177 So. 2d at 226. That characterization was probably occasioned by the fact that
the district court of appeal merely quoted the supreme court's own words back to it. In its decision,
the district court of appeal stated:
In this instance the Supreme Court has discerned our decision from the record, and
has stated it to be "that neither of the plaintiffs had a cause of action against the
defendant retailer for breach of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability," [adding that we also held the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages on the theory of
negligence, but noting the latter holding was not challenged on certiorari]. We adopt
that statement by the Supreme Court as constituting our decision on the appeal.
172 So. 2d at 910 (bracketed text in original).
282. Foley, 177 So. 2d at 224-25. The supreme court affirmed the district court of appeal
decision on the merits, but overruled a conflicting precedent of another district court of appeal. Id. at
229.
283. E.g., William D. Rives, III, Note, The Erosion of Final Jurisdictionin Florida'sDistrict
Courts of Appeal, 21 U FLA. L. REV. 375 (1969).
284. See, e.g., England et al., supra note 86, at 165 (stating that "the jurisprudence had developed that the supreme court would consider the entire case once any appealable issue had arisen")
(footnote omitted). Counsel could bring a case within the court's jurisdictional categories by "raising
a constitutional issue by simple motion, perhaps as one ground of many, before a county or circuit
court, with no intention to develop or argue the constitutional claim." Id. (footnote omitted).
285. See Ben F. Overton, District Courts of Appeal: Courts of Final Jurisdictionwith Two
New Responsibilities-An Expanded Power to Certify Questions and Authority to Sit En Banc, 35
U. FLA L. REV. 80, 88-89 (1983) (describing as "subterfuge" the practice of "finding conflict to
address a truly important legal issue when no real conflict existed ....
"); see also Report of the
Supreme Court Commission on the Florida Appellate Structure, 53 FLA. B.J. 274, 286 (1979) [hereinafter Report on Appellate Structure] (adding an importance standard would mean that "no longer
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3. 1980 Amendment
In 1980 Florida amended its constitution in an effort to reduce the
Florida Supreme Court's excessive workload.286 The amendment reduced
the supreme court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction 287 and made most
discretionary review depend on the existence of a written opinioh. 28 8 The
written opinion requirement is considered in part VI.
Of interest for present purposes are two features of the 1980 amendment. First, the 1980 amendment retained the 1956 approach of placing
categorical limitations on the supreme court's jurisdiction in the constitution. 89 Second, the 1980 amendment modified the system for a district
court of appeal to certify a decision to the Florida Supreme Court for
discretionary review. Prior to 1980, the supreme court could grant discretionary review if the district court of appeal certified that its decision was
one of "great public interest. 290 In 1980 the system was changed so that
a district court of appeal could certify either that it had passed on a question of "great public importance" or that its decision was "in direct conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal. 291
The 1980 amendment took an important step by making importance
an explicit basis for discretionary review.292 The 1980 certification system
enlisted the district courts of appeal in identifying issues of importance, as
well as decisional conflicts, which should be resolved by the supreme
court.
However, the 1980 amendment did not go far enough. Although it
gave a general importance-based standard to the district courts of appeal,
it did not add that same standard to the supreme court's own independent

[would] the court be forced to stretch its other jurisdictional powers to fulfill its role as overseer of
Florida jurisprudence").
286. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3); see Report on Appellate Structure, supra note 285, at
274-76.
287. England et al., supra note 86, at 161-76. Compare FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 4(2) (1956) with
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1)-(3) (1980).
288. See Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357-59 (Fla. 1980) (stating that the imposition of
the written opinion requirement ended record proper review and in that respect overruled Foley v.
Weaver Drugs, Inc.).
289. FLA. CoNsT. art. V,§ 3(b)(3) (1980). The categories were modified to some extent, but
the changes are not significant for purposes of the present analysis.
290. FLA. CONST. art. V,§ 4(2) (1956).
291. FLA. CON sT. art. V,§ 3(b)(4) (1980).
292. See Overton, supra note 285, at 86. "The Appellate Structure Commission suggested replacing the word 'interest' with 'importance' because most district court judges were under the impression that the phrase 'great public interest' required that the public actually know of and be interested in the legal issue to be certified. This construction was never judicially tested." Id. (footnote
omitted).
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criteria for discretionary review.29 The end result is that a denial of certification by the district court of appeal will preclude supreme court review,
unless one of the supreme court's short list of constitutional criteria are
satisfied.29 4 The Appellate Court Standards take the position that a denial of certification should not preclude supreme court review. 295 This is
sound policy, for a state's highest court should have the ability to set its
own docket.
The near universal practice, whether measured by professional standards or practice in two-tier jurisdictions, is to confer on the supreme
court the ability to select cases on the basis of the importance of the question presented. 29 6 A system for certification of decisions by the district
courts of appeal can play an important role in identifying cases for supreme court review. Measured by utilization, the system is popular and
makes a substantial contribution in the selection of cases for supreme
court consideration.2 97 The question, however, is not whether a certification system should exist-clearly it should-but whether the district
courts of appeal should provide the sole mechanism for identifying cases
for supreme court review on the basis of great public importance. For
several reasons, this article suggests that it should not.
It is self-evident that the standards of importance employed by a district court of appeal panel do not necessarily coincide with the standards
of importance of the supreme court. Therefore, the ABA advocates leaving the final choice of case selection to the supreme court. 29 8 The supreme
court evaluates cases in comparison with others which might be reviewed.2 99 Just as the Florida Supreme Court is granted the discretion not
to hear a case certified by the district court of appeal,3 00 the supreme
court might also find an uncertified case to be important.3 0 1 The certification system is also peculiarly vulnerable to error when existing law appears to be well settled, but the supreme court is actively considering, or
prepared to consider, changing the law. 302 In summary, it is unwise to
place exclusive reliance on Florida's present system of certification.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

See FLA CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(4).
See id.§ 3(b)(1)-(3).
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS

§ 3.10(c) (1977).

See supra part V.B.
See supra part III.C.

§ 3.10 commentary at 13 (1977).
Id. § 3.10 commentary at 14.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
See infra part VI.F, G.
See infra part VI.G (discussing Moreland v. State, 582 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1991)).
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS
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D.

Conclusion

Florida's system of categorical constitutional limitations on supreme
court jurisdiction is overly restrictive. It was installed with laudable objectives, but was based on a faulty premise. It was wrongly assumed that
formal barriers would be necessary to avoid having the supreme court
grant rights of successive appeal in every case, or in a large number of
cases. That assumption was incorrect; the system should be revised.
A major part of a supreme court's mission is to resolve the legal issues of greatest importance. It is essential that the court have powers
which are coextensive with its responsibilities. That includes the power to
select a case-any case-for discretionary review on the basis of importance. The power to select cases for the docket is at least as important as
the power to decide the cases chosen.30 3 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court
should have the discretionary power to review any decision of a district
court of appeal. The special considerations relating to the requirement of
a written opinion are considered in Part VI.
Florida should follow the majority of jurisdictions and create guidelines that expressly state that they are illustrative in nature and do not
limit the supreme court's power of review. Many other states have
adopted the United States Supreme Court's language, that the criteria,
"while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered .
*."..
,o4 This language is both concise and familiar to practitioners.
An explicit criterion based on importance should be added for the
exercise of discretionary review. Any number of models can be drawn
upon from the state and federal systems.3 0 5 However, the supreme court's

303. Brennan, supra note 59, at 112, 114 ("The screening process . . . is . . .inextricably
linked to the fulfillment of the Court's essential duties and is ".ital to the effective performance of the

Court's unique mission ....").
A comment should be made about one dogma which has grown up as an adjunct to the 1956
system of jurisdictional categories. Some of the writings.about the Florida system have taken the view
that specific categorical limitations on supreme court jurisdiction are necessary in order to enhance
the power and status of the district courts of appeal. E.g., Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla.
1958). The suggestion is that the stature of the district courts of appeal will be greater if the constitution contains a provision expressly precluding review in some cases. Id.
As explained earlier, when a district court of appeal renders a decision in Florida, or an intermediate appellate court does so in another state or the federal system, that decision is final in the vast
majority of cases. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text. The notion that limits are needed
on Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction in order to enhance the role of the district courts of appeal
should be quietly interred, along with the present system of categorical limitations on supreme court
discretionary jurisdiction.
304. Sup. CT. R. 10.1.
305. See Report on Appellate Structure, supra note 285, at 283-86.
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importance-based standard should dovetail with the standard used by the

district courts of appeal.306 Since the district court of appeal standard is
'
"great public importance,

307

a simple solution would be to add the same

standard to the supreme court's criteria for review.308 Another possibility
would be a standard providing for review when the district court of appeal
has decided an important question of law which should be settled by the
supreme court. 3 9
One objection to this proposal may be that there will be a great increase in petitions filed on the basis of importance. A means to address
that concern is found in the system used in Florida's en banc rule. 3 10

When that rule was amended in 1984 to authorize litigants to request en
banc review on the basis of "exceptional importance," the rule imposed a

corollary requirement that a certificate of counsel be included with any
motion for rehearing en banc.3 1' The certificate of counsel states, in relevant part: "I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment, that the panel decision is of exceptional importance." ' 2
Experience with the en banc rule has shown that the cautionary provisions have had the desired effect. Although counsel could characterize
every case as being of "exceptional importance," the "exceptional impor-

tance" ground has actually been invoked far less frequently than its companion standard, which authorizes review when "necessary to maintain

uniformity in the court's decisions.

3 13

Moreover, where a litigant asserts

306. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(6) (substantially identical standard used by supreme
court and intermediate appellate court); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211A, § 11 (West 1986)
(same).
307. FLA. CONST.art. V, § 3(b)(4).
308. It has been suggested that the existing "great public importance" standard "be changed to
emphasize that the district courts may certify any issue deemed by them to be important enough to
merit supreme court review." Overton, supra note 285, at 94.
309. SuP. CT. R. 10.1(c). The suggested phraseology has been patterned on United States Supreme Court Rule 10.1(c). The federal formulation is that a state court or United States court of
appeals "has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this Court .... " Id. As phrased, the standard identifies questions that are of first impression in
the Supreme Court, but does not explicitly address, as the standards of some states do, the need for
modification or overruling of existing precedent. However, so long as the standards are promulgated
as nonexclusive guidelines, the court can in any event entertain a petition which proposes a change in
existing precedent.
310. FLA. R. APP.P. 9.331.
311. Id. R. 9.331(c)(1).
312. Id.R. 9.331(c)(2). The rule also cautions: "A rehearing en banc is an extraordinary proceeding. In every case the duty of counsel is discharged without filing a motion for rehearing en bane
unless one of the grounds set forth in (1) is clearly met." Id. Under subsection (1), "a party may
move for an en bane rehearing solely [when] the case is of exceptional importance or . . .such
consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions." Id. R. 9.331(c)(1).
313. Id.R. 9.331(c)(2). The court system does not collect statistics enumerating how many

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss1/2

50

Cope: Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate C
REVIEW OF APPELLATE COURTS

that the matter is of exceptional importance, it is usually evident on the
most cursory reading whether or not the case actually is exceptionally
important.
By contrast, determining whether there is decisional conflict can be a
difficult and time-consuming proposition. As one authority suggests:
"[T]he judgment as to whether a conflict exists or not is often
quite a difficult one. The literature abounds with adjectives for
describing conflicts: true conflicts, general conflicts, head-on
conflicts, sideswipes, and the like. The easiest case is that in
which there are clearly stated rules of law that conflict as to the
exact same subject matter * * *. Most conflicts are not so
clean, however. Many involve rule applications to divergent fact
situations. For these cases, the issue is necessarily
one involving
31 4
judgment [as to which] opinions often differ." 1
Based on the experience with the en banc rule, a comparable cautionary
system can keep filings within manageable bounds. Review of petitions
submitted on grounds of importance should require considerably less effort than review of petitions based on conflict of decisions.
The other categories for discretionary review presently in the constitution can be retained intact as guidelines. 3 5 The existing criterion regarding decisional conflict properly places the responsibility on the district
courts of appeal to maintain internal decisional consistency.3 16 That standard should be retained.
One criterion employed in the federal system and many states is review for supervisory reasons.3 1 7 The federal standard allows review where
the court of appeals "has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision."3 18 A
number of state jurisdictions have adopted a similar supervisory
standard. 319

motions for rehearing en banc were predicated on (a) decisional conflict, (b) exceptional importance,
or (c) both. It is the author's observation that motions for rehearing en banc are more frequently
predicated on intradistrict decisional conflict than on exceptional importance.
314. STERN, supra note 8, § 2.6b, at 43 (quoting COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL
COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,

STRUCTURE

AND INTERNAL

PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

CHANGE app. II at 97, 67 F.R.D. 306 (1975)).

315. For a listing of states which have promulgated discretionary review criteria by rule, see
supra note 124.
316. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); supra text accompanying notes 89, 221-23.
317. See supra part V.B.3.
318. SuP. CT. R. 10.1(a).
319. See supra part V.B.3.
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Florida has no supervisory standard. 2 Whether Florida should
adopt a supervisory standard is a difficult question. While a case can be
made for the adoption of an explicit supervisory standard, it is not essential so long as the guidelines for discretionary review are nonexclusive and
include criteria authorizing review based on the importance of the issue
presented. Since there is an understandable desire to keep the supreme
court's workload manageable, it would be best to add a single, simple
importance-based standard which would be accompanied by a certificate
of counsel.
VI.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR A WRITTEN OPINION

Under Florida's jurisdictional system, the supreme court may not
conduct discretionary review of a district court of appeal decision unless
there is a written opinion which shows on its face that one of the jurisdictional prerequisites is satisfied. 2 ' These jurisdictional prerequisites include decisional conflict, construction of the state or federal constitution,
declaration of validity of a state statute, or a decision affecting a class of
constitutional or state officers.3 22 If there is no opinion at all, or if the
written opinion fails to show that one of the categories is satisfied, then
the Florida Supreme Court has no jurisdiction.3 23
A.

ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Courts

The Appellate Court Standards impose no requirement that there be
a written opinion as a condition for supreme court review. To the contrary, the Appellate Court Standards provide that "[t]he supreme court
should have authority to review all justiciable controversies and proceedings, regardless of subject matter or amount involved." ' 4 As summarized
previously, the Appellate Court Standards oppose the imposition of categorical limitations on supreme court review . 2 5 The written opinion re-

320. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
321. Id. art. V, § 3(b)(3). The constitution requires that the district court of appeal decision
"expressly" satisfy one of the enumerated criteria, which is construed to require a written opinion.
Id.; see Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357-59 (Fla. 1980).
322. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
323. Id.; see Jenkins, 385 So. 2d at 1357-59; STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS
§ 3.00(a)(1) (1977).
324. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00(a)(1) (1977); accord STANDARDS
RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13(a) (1990). This includes "authority to review any case already
determined by an intermediate appellate court, even if the decision in the latter court is unanimous
and purports to accord with the law as previously announced by the supreme court." STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commentary at 4 (1977).
325. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commentary at 5 (1977).
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quirement is just the type of categorical limitation opposed by the Appel326
late Court Standards.
B.

United States Supreme Court Practice

The United States Supreme Court's Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorarido not require that there be a written opinion
as a precondition for United States Supreme Court review.3 27 The Supreme Court can, and does, grant review where there is no opinion.3 28
C. Practice in the States
In virtually no jurisdiction is the absence of a written opinion, or the
absence of an opinion discussing the point at issue, given preclusive effect. 29 Exceptions are found in California and Alabama, but those states
provide the litigant with an alternative avenue to obtain supreme court
review.
In California, the appellate rules provide:
As a matter of policy, on petition for review the Supreme Court
normally will not consider

. . .

any issue or any material fact

that was omitted from or misstated in the opinion of the Court
of Appeal, unless the omission or misstatement was called to
the attention of the Court of Appeal in a petition for rehearing.
All other issues and facts may be presented in the petition for
review without the necessity of filing a petition for rehearing. 330
In California practice, therefore, a litigant must call an omission or misstatement to the attention of the court of appeal, which may elect to
amend or amplify its opinion. 33 ' However, if the court of appeal chooses
not to do so, the litigant is free to petition for review in the supreme
court.332 Alabama has a similar rule,33 and in both jurisdictions the rele-

326. See id. Closely related is the Appellate Court Standards' position that an intermediate
appellate court's denial of a request for certification should not preclude the supreme court's ability to
review a case. Id. § 3.10(c). The same logic applies to a district court of appeal's decision not to write
an opinion; a ruling without opinion should not automatically preclude supreme court review.
327. Sup. CT. R. 10.1.
328. See infra part VI.F.
329. See infra sources quoted in app. C.
330. CAL APP. R. 29(b)(2) (emphasis added).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(k) provides:
The review ... will ordinarily be limited to the facts stated in the opinion of the particular court of appeals. If the petitioner is not satisfied with that statement of facts, he
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vant provision is a matter of procedural rule, not constitutional
mandate.3 34
Pennsylvania takes a different approach, placing the burden on the
intermediate appellate court, not the litigant. There, upon the filing of the
petition for review, "the appellate court below which entered the order
sought to be reviewed, if the reasons for the order do not already appear
of record, shall forthwith file of record at least a brief statement, in the
form of an opinion, of the reasons for the order."3 35 In another jurisdiction the absence of an opinion, or alleged deficiencies in an opinion, are
themselves grounds for discretionary supreme court review.336 In a few
jurisdictions the wording of the appellate rules effectively acknowledges
that petitions for review may be filed where there is no written opinion.
However, those states attach no further significance to the absence of an
opinion.337

In short, most states do not condition access to the state supreme
court on the existence or contents of a written opinion. In the two jurisdictions in which such a requirement is imposed, the requirement may be
satisfied if the litigant has by motion for rehearing requested the preparation of an appropriate opinion. The intermediate appellate court is not
required to write, but its failure to do so will not preclude the litigant's

may, on application for rehearing in that court, present any additional or corrected
statement of facts and request that court to add or correct those facts in its opinion on
rehearing. If the court fails to accede to this request, petitioner may copy the statement
in the petition to this court, with references therein to the pertinent portions of the
clerk's record and reporter's transcript, and it will be considered along with the statement of facts in the opinion of the appellate court, if found to be correct.
ALA. R App. R. 39(k).
334. See id. R. 39(k); CAL. App. R. 29(b)(2).
335. PA. R. App. P. 1925(c). The Florida Supreme Court has held that it lacks the authority to
order a district court of appeal to write an opinion. School Bd. v. District Court of Appeal, 467 So. 2d
985, 986 (Fla. 1985).
336. IND. R. App. P. I l(B)(2)(e) ("The opinion or memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals fails to give a statement in writing of each substantial question arising on the record and argued
by the parties."); id. R. 1 l(B)(2)(f) ("the opinion or memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals
erroneously and materially misstates the record, concisely setting out the misstatement . . ., the materiality of the misstatement, and specifically stating the resulting prejudice to the petitioner").
337. MD. R. App. P. 8-303(b)(3) ("If an opinion of that Court [the Court of Special Appeals]
has been filed, it shall be attached."); N. MEx. R. App. P. 12-502(C)(4)(a), (b) (stating that where a
litigant seeks review on basis of decisional conflict, the litigant shall include "a quotation from that
part of the Court of Appeals opinion [the opinion under review], if any," as well as a quotation from
the part of the supreme court or court of appeals opinion which will demonstrate the conflict) (emphasis added); see also ARIZ. R. Civ. App. P. 23(c)(2) ("The petitioner shall also list, separately and
without argument, those additional issues which were presented to, but not decided by, the Court of
Appeals and which may need to be decided if review is granted."); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 31.19.C.2
(same).
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access to the state supreme court. Pennsylvania places the onus entirely
on the intermediate appellate court, and the other jurisdictions do not require a written opinion at all.338
D. Effect of Absence of Opinion on Granting of Review
Another question to be examined is whether the absence of a written
opinion is a factor which may be considered by a supreme court in determining whether to grant discretionary review. It is certainly true that a
substantial question of law does not become insubstantial merely because
the intermediate appellate court elected not to write an opinion. On the
other hand, the existence of a written and published opinion plainly has
precedential impact, while an affirmance without opinion does not. Thus,
the existence or absence of a written opinion is a factor which can be
considered, but it should not be given dispositive weight. 339
Where a state limits affirmances without opinion to those cases in
which there is no substantial question of law, one would expect supreme
court review to be granted at a lower rate than when the intermediate
appellate court has rendered a written opinion. That conclusion is supported by a study conducted in Massachusetts. 40 This ten-year study3 41
showed that the supreme court granted 13.3 % of the petitions for discretionary review overall.3 4 However, the study also showed that where litigants sought review of decisions rendered without written opinion, the supreme court granted review in only 3.8% of the cases. 43
This study indicates that no-opinion cases are accepted for review
less frequently than decisions with opinion. While the study does not draw
a conclusion about cause and effect, there appear to be two reasonable
338. It should be noted that most American jurisdictions now have a selective publication rule,
pursuant to which written opinions of the intermediate appellate court will not be published unless
specified criteria are met. In general the opinions are selected for publication which are deemed to
have some precedential effect. See Harry L. Anstead, Selective Publication: An Alternative to the
PCA?, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 189 (1982). See generally Jane Williams, Survey of State Court Opinion
Writing and PublicationPractices,83 LAw LIBR. J. 21 (1991). Even though an unpublished interme-

diate appellate court opinion is by definition deemed to lack precedential value or effect, the various
states have not used the "no-publish" designation to preclude supreme court review.
339. See Report on Appellate Structure, supra note 285, at 284.
340. See Byrgen P. Finkelman, FurtherAppellate Review in Civil Cases: How the Court Decides What Cases to Take, 69 MASS. L. REV. 116 (1984). The study concluded, among other things,

that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court "is primarily interested in maintaining a uniform
body of law in the Commonwealth. Thus the [Supreme Judicial Court] regularly granted review in

cases which raised issues of first impression or novel questions of law." Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
341.

The study included civil cases filed between January 31, 1973 and December 30, 1982. Id.

at 116.
342.
343.

Id. at 117.
Id.
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inferences. First, where the standard is "no substantial question of law"
and the standard is properly administered, the no-opinion cases are less
likely to present a substantial issue. Second, the absence of an opinion
itself may be factored into the supreme court's decision on whether to
accept jurisdiction in the pending case or deny review and allow the issue
to percolate further.
On the other hand, a striking result of the Massachusetts study is
that despite a "no substantial question of law" standard, and despite the
absence of a written opinion, the supreme court still accepted jurisdiction
in almost four percent of the cases. Given the relatively low rate at which
petitions for discretionary review are accepted overall," that is a significant percentage. The data help explain why every jurisdiction (except
Florida) has declined to preclude review on the basis of absence of a written opinion: a case may present an important question of law which
should be reviewed by the supreme court even though there is no written
opinion.
E.

Opinion Writing Standards and Practices

1. ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Courts
The Appellate Court Standards recommend an opinion in every case.
In less significant cases, the Appellate Court Standards recommend at
least a statement of grounds.145 That view also is urged by appellate authorities 4 6 and favored by practitioners.3 47 It should be noted that even
under the Appellate Court Standards, the preparation of a reasoned opinion in every case would not necessarily result in an opinion showing an
arguable basis for supreme court jurisdiction under the Florida Supreme
Court's four restrictive categories.3 4 The Appellate Court Standards recognize that full opinions will be called for in some cases, but more abbreviated treatment will be appropriate in others. 4 9 Under Florida's system,
the existence of an opinion does not automatically make the decision reviewable; the opinion still must show on its face that one of the four juris-

344. In this study the acceptance rate was 13.3 %. Id. See generally STERN, supra note 8,
§ 6.7(c), at 159.
345. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.36(b) (1977).
346. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31-35 (1976); STERN, supra note 8,
§ 17.5, at 477-79.
347. Daniel N. Hoffman, Nonpublication of FederalAppellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. SYS. J.
405, 409 (1981). A Federal Judicial Center survey found 79% of attorneys believe "[i]t is important
that the courts issue written explanations"; 63% of federal district judges agreed; 49% of federal
court of appeals judges agreed. Id.
348. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
349. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.36(b) (1977).
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dictional prerequisites has been satisfied.35 0
2.

State Practices

The states are divided in their opinion writing practices. Some states
utilize affirmances without opinion while others do not.3 51 In jurisdictions
where an opinion is prepared for the decision of each appeal, the requirement is sometimes prescribed by rule and in other instances is a matter of
custom. 3 52 In the remaining jurisdictions, affirmance without opinion is
permitted. 353 These states have typically permitted affirmance without
opinion as a caseload management technique to relieve excessive appellate
workload. 5 4
3.

Florida Practice

The use of affirmances without opinion is described as a practice
born of necessity in Florida, where the workload for appellate judges is
higher than that recommended by appellate experts.3 55 Moreover, Florida
350. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
351. See Thomas B. Marvell, State Appellate Court Responses to Caseload Growth, 72 JUDICATURE 282, 287-88 (1989). The article reports opinion writing practices through 1984. Id. The data
indicate that 22 of 45 states decided some appeals without opinion, including intermediate appellate
courts in ten states. Id. & tbl. 5. The study counted the District of Columbia as a state. Id. See
generally Williams, supra note 338, at 21-49 (surveying state court opinion writing and publication
practices).
352. E.g., INw. R. APP. P. 15(A)(1) (opinion required); Tix. R. APP. P. 90(a) (same). See
Charles G. Douglas, III, Innovative Appellate Court Processing: New Hampshire'sExperience with
Summary Affirmance, 69 JUDICATURE 147, 149-50 (1985) (stating that the practice of writing an
opinion in each case continued after the explicit requirement was abolished, but the practice ended
after adoption of a summary affirmance rule); see also IMPROVING CASE PROCESSING, supra note 31,
at 74 (stating that the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One (Phoenix) "writes a reasoned decision
in every appeal"); id. at 93 (stating that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals wrote a "reasoned
opinion . . . in every appeal"); id. at 101 (stating that the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division-a statewide intermediate appellate court-requires a written decision in every case). See
generally Williams, supra note 338, at 21.
353. Marvell, supra note 351.
354. Id. The practice is regulated by rule in a number of jurisdictions. E.g., 1ITH CIR. R. 36-1;
GA. CT. App. R. 36. See generally Williams, supra note 338, at 22-49.
355. See, e.g., Whipple v. State, 431 So. 2d 1011, 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (stating that an
excessive workload restricts the number of opinions which an appellate judge can write); see also
School Bd. v. District Court of Appeal, 467 So. 2d 985, 986 (Fla. 1985) ("the reason and necessity
for district courts [of appeal] to render summary decisions are explained in Whipple v. State"); ARTICLE V REPORT, supra note 142, at 18 (stating that Florida's intermediate appellate judges have the
third highest caseload in the nation).
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.035(b)(2) contemplates that there be one appellate
judge per 250 annual filings. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.035(b)(2). This would be the number of cases for
which any single judge would have primary responsibility. See id. Since the district courts of appeal
operate in panels of 3, id. R. 2.040(a)(1), each judge would participate in three times the guideline
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tends not to add appellate judges until the workload exceeds, sometimes

by substantial amounts, the state's workload standard."' Since an opinion
is invariably needed in cases of reversal, 57 affirmance without opinion is
widely, though not universally,"' used to relieve excessive workload.35 9
Although frequently criticized,36 0 affirmance without opinion has been a
customary feature in Florida appellate practice. 3 6'

Several observations may be made about Florida's use of affirmances
without opinion. First, the practice is unregulated.36 2 A number of other
jurisdictions have promulgated rules regulating opinion-writing,36 3 but
that has not been done in Florida.3 64 While it has been said that an opin-

ion should be written in any case in which there is any arguable basis for

figure. See id. R. 2.035(b)(2).
It is to be expected, of course, that there will be attrition of cases through settlement or involuntary dismissal. Even after making such allowances, the workload exceeds that recommended by professionals in the field. See ROBERT A. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE
COURTS 9 (1976) (recommending in substance that an individual judge would participate with colleagues in no more than 300 substantial cases per year); Harry L. Anstead, The Shape and Size of
Florida's Judiciary: Report of the Courts' Restructure Commission, FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 1986, at
21, 25 n.2 ("The [1979 Supreme Court Commission on the Florida Appellate Court Structure] set
the 250 figure as a realistic goal with the hope of further reductions in the future.").
356. See Anstead, supra note 355, at 22. In 1990, for example, there were 292 filings per judge
in the district courts of appeal, with filings forecasted to rise to 308 per judge through 1992. 1992
Certification Package, supra note 255, at 2.
357. Whipple, 431 So. 2d at 1015.
358. Davis v. Sun Banks, 412 So. 2d 937, 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (Mills, J.). The Davis court
stated:
I shall write a short opinion in each case assigned to me and shall tersely give the
reason for affirming each issue raised by the appellant or cross-appellant. I hope that
this action by me will answer the frequent complaints about per curiam affirmed decisions. . . . The possible remedies from adverse decisions will be preserved for consideration by the Supreme Court.
Id.
359. Whipple, 431 So. 2d at 1015-16; Scheb & Scheb, supra note 103, at 481; see also Williams v. State, 425 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (Orfinger, C.J., concurring specially)
(stating that the growing caseload makes it impracticable to write opinions in every case).
Some also argue that an opinion of affirmance should not be written unless it will make some
contribution to jurisprudence or disclose a jurisdictional basis for the Florida Supreme Court. Whipple, 431 So. 2d at 1015-16. See generally Anstead, supra note 338, at 201-07 (reviewing the history
and practice of per curiam affirmance without opinion). Workload considerations are, however, cited
more frequently.
360. E.g., CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 346, at 31-32; see Davis, 412 So. 2d at 937; Anstead, supra note 338, at 203-07.
361. See, e.g., Whipple, 431 So. 2d at 1015-16; Williams, 425 So. 2d at 1164 (Orfinger, C.J.,
concurring specially) (quoting Foley v. Weaver Drugs, 172 So. 2d 907, 908 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)).
362. See Anstead, supra note 338, at 207; Williams, supra note 338, at 27.
363. See Williams, supra note 338, at 22-49.
364. Anstead, supra note 338, at 207.
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supreme court jurisdiction, 65 no rule has been adopted containing such a
standard or guideline.3 66
Second, affirmances without opinion are used in some cases in which
there is a debatable legal issue.367 This is demonstrated by the fact that
affirmances without a written opinion which are accompanied by a written
dissenting opinion or a written concurrence are published with some regularity. 318 Affirmance without opinion is also used on occasion where the
panel agrees on the result but cannot agree on a common rationale.
Third, there are significant variations among the five district courts
of appeal in their use of affirmances without opinion. 369 While this may
stem in part from workload variations between districts,37 0 ithas been
suggested that the variations also relate in part to differences in custom
and opinion-writing philosophy.37 1 As one judge suggests, because of the
absence of written standards, there will be a greater "margin of error and
variance of view between districts in determining precedential
"lue .

..32

The above observations suggest some of the reasons why the written
opinion requirement is not a desirable screening device. Where a written
opinion has been rendered, it undoubtedly will be helpful to the supreme
court in determining whether to grant discretionary review. It does not
follow, however, that a matter is unimportant merely because no opinion
has been written.
There are several reasons why this is so. First, the standard of importance applied by a district court of appeal will not always coincide with
the standard of importance applied by the supreme court. 37 ' Second,
365. Whipple, 431 So. 2d at 1015; Scheb & Scheb, supra note 103, at 485.
366. Anstead, supra note 338, at 207.
367. Id. at 203.
368. Id. ("Although most PCAs [affirmances without opinion] are issued with the concurrence
of all three panel members, numerous two-judge majorities publish PCAs with an accompanying
special concurrence or dissent.").
369. Id. at 203, 207, 216.
370. In 1990 the filings per judge varied from 265 per judge in the Third District Court of
Appeal to 310 per judge in the Second District. 1992 Certification Package, supra note 255, at 2. For
1992 the range was predicted to be from a low of 269 to a high of 345 per judge. Id. All figures
exceed, of course, the guideline of 250 filings per judge. See FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.035(b)(2).
371. See Anstead, supra note 338, at 203, 207, 216.
372. Id. at 207.
373. Florida formally accepts that logic, at least in part. Where a district court of appeal certifies that a decision is of great public importance or that there is a decisional conflict, supreme court
review is discretionary, not mandatory. Scheb & Scheb, supra note 103, at 482. The theory is that
the supreme court must have the opportunity to make the final determination on the question of
importance by applying its own standard, notwithstanding that the district court of appeal has already certified great public importance. See STANDARDS RE rING TO APPELLATE COURTS 3.10(c)
& commentary at 17 (1977).
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workload considerations play a significant part in determining whether
the district court of appeal will write an opinion and in determining how
much will be written. An abbreviated opinion which omits jurisdictionally
relevant words can be as preclusive as a decision without opinion. 74
Third, impending changes in decisional law will be known in the supreme
court for considerable periods of time before an opinion is approved and
released. That pre-announcement information will be known and applied
by the justices in making decisions to accept or reject petitions for discretionary review in cases presenting the same or related issues. It will not be
known in advance to the district courts of appeal and, therefore, cannot
be taken into account in deciding whether to write an opinion or certify a
decision.
F. Review by the United States Supreme Court
From the standpoint of judicial administration, it is unsound to allow
a district court of appeal decision to be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court, while depriving the Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction
to review the same matter. That is, however, the effect of Florida's system
of categorical limitation, including the written opinion requirement.
The United States Supreme Court does not impose any written opinion requirement. 7 5 It can, and does, review decisions from Florida and
other states which have been rendered without written opinion. Although
not in the class of cases with which we are now concerned, a useful illustration is Gideon v. Wainwright. 76 In Gideon, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed directly with the Florida Supreme Court and after consideration on the merits, was denied without opinion. 377 The United States
Supreme Court granted review,3 78 resulting in the landmark decision on
the right to counsel in a criminal case. 79 Gideon is a reminder that importance is not necessarily measured by the existence of a written opinion
and that denial of relief summarily on the basis of existing law does not
preclude a higher tribunal from taking a different view.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has on a number of
occasions reviewed decisions of Florida district courts of appeal, even
though there was no written opinion. Such cases simply bypassed the

374. See infra notes 387-401 and accompanying text.
375. See Sup. CT. R. 10.1.
376. 372 U.S. 335 (1963), rev'g Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961) (habeas corpus
denied without opinion).
377. Id. at 337.
378. Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
379. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338-45.
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Florida Supreme Court.38 0 Examples include a case in which a child custody issue was decided on the basis of racial considerations; 81 a case that
involved "a misapprehension of the controlling principles of law governing
airport stops"; 382 a case that involved the denial of a speedy trial under

the Sixth Amendment;38 3 a case that involved the involuntariness of a
confession;384 a case in which unemployment insurance payments had
been denied to persons who filed unfair labor practice charges against
their former employer;3 85 and a summary reversal in a racial discrimination case.3 8
The United States Supreme Court has also reviewed cases in which
the district court of appeal issued a written opinion, but the opinion failed
to reveal a basis for Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction. An example of
this is found in Florida Star v. B.J.F.817 In that case, a newspaper defended an invasion of privacy suit on First Amendment grounds, including
a constitutional challenge to a Florida statute involved in the case.38 8 A
judgment against the newspaper was affirmed in a brief per curiam opin380. On matters of federal law, the United States Supreme Court may review final judgments
"rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had ..
" 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(a) (1988). Where the state supreme court is without jurisdiction to review an intermediate
appellate court decision, the intermediate appellate court is the highest court in which a decision can
be had. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80 n.5 (1970); STERN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3.16; see
also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431 (1984); Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 237
n.1 (1967); Callendar v. State, 181 So. 2d 529, 531-33 (Fla. 1966).
381. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 430-31.
382. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5 (1984); see also Florida v. Rodriguez, 461 U.S. 940
(1983) (vacating earlier decision without opinion in same case).
383. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 31 (1970).
384. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 415 (1967) (describing record in the case as documenting
"a shocking display of barbarism which should not escape the remedial action of this Court").
385. Nash, 389 U.S. at 236.
386. Callender v. Florida, 380 U.S. 519 (1965) (reversing an unlawful assembly conviction on
authority of Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960)). The United States Supreme Court spelled the
petitioner's name Callender, but the Florida courts spelled it Callendar. See Callendar v. State, 181
So. 2d 529, 531 (Fla. 1966). The facts of Callendarare unreported. Boynton reversed a conviction for
trespass into the "whites only" section of a restaurant in an interstate bus terminal. Boynton, 364
U.S. at 455, 464.
In Callendar,the Florida district court of appeal denied review of a criminal conviction without
opinion. Callendar,181 So. 2d at 531. The Florida Supreme Court denied review because it lacked
jurisdiction. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review of the district court of
appeal's no-opinion affirmance. Id. On summarily reversing, the Court addressed its mandate to the
Florida Supreme Court. Id. The Florida Supreme Court objected that it had no jurisdiction and
returned the mandate to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 533. In response, the United States
Supreme Court vacated its prior ruling and addressed its mandate to the Florida District Court of
Appeal. Callender v. Florida, 383 U.S. 270, 270 (1966); see also Florida v. Rodriguez, 461 U.S. 940
(1983).
387. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
388. Id. at 526-30.
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ion.3"' Although making reference to the statute and affirming the judgment, the district court of appeal's decision "did not discuss [the statute]
except to quote it verbatim, nor did it expressly uphold the statute against
appellant's constitutional challenge." ' The Florida Supreme Court de"nied review.3 91 Although the supreme court gave no reason for its denial
of review, it is reasonably clear that the district court of appeal had not
written enough to satisfy one of the four constitutional categories, even
though the First Amendment issues had been squarely presented and
ruled on in substance. 2
The United States Supreme Court granted review,3 9 3 noting "[t]he

somewhat uncharted state of the law in this area,"3 94 and reversed on
First Amendment grounds. The
Florida constitutional provision,
preclude review, but the writing
tionally relevant words will also

case illustrates the fact that under the
not only will the absence of an opinion
of an opinion that does not use jurisdicpreclude review.3 95

389. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883, 884 (lst DCA 1986), rev. denied, 509 So. 2d 1117
(Fla.), question certified, 484 U.S. 984 (1987), certified question answered, 530 So. 2d 286 (Fla.
1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
390. Florida Star, 530 So. 2d at 287.
391. Florida Star, 509 So. 2d at 1117.
392. In later answering a jurisdictional question certified by the United States Supreme Court,
see infra note 395, the court ultimately took the view that its discretionary jurisdiction under the
Florida Constitution, article V, § 3(b)(3), has two separate, but related, elements. FloridaStar, 530
So. 2d at 288. "The first is a general grant of discretionary subject-matter jurisdiction, and the second
is a constitutional command as to how the discretion itself may be exercised. In effect, the second is a
limiting principle dictated to this Court by the people of Florida." Id.
In order to invoke the court's jurisdiction on the basis of conflict of decisions, "it is not necessary
that conflict actually exist for this Court to possess subject-matter jurisdiction, only that there be
some statement or criterion in the opinion that hypothetically could create conflict if there were another opinion reaching a contrary result." Id. Therefore the court has jurisdiction where there is an
opinion containing "a statement or citation effectively establishing a point of law upon which the
decision rests." Id.
The court concluded that when The Florida Star petitioned for discretionary Florida Supreme
Court review, the court had subject matter jurisdiction in the broad sense and answered the United
States Supreme Court's certified question accordingly. Id. at 288-89. The court declined to offer any
view on whether the district court of appeal decision had satisfied any of the four jurisdictional pigeonholes. Id. at 288. The writer was counsel for amici curiae in this phase of the proceedings. Id. at
287.
393. The Court granted review under the Court's appellate jurisdiction. FloridaStar, 491 U.S.
at 529.
394. Id. at 530 n.5.
395. The FloridaStar litigation eliminated a potentially serious "Catch 22" for litigants, but in
doing so created another procedural anomaly. The Florida Star litigation confronted the Florida Supreme Court with a difficult issue regarding the relationship between its own jurisdiction and that of
the United States Supreme Court. Florida Star, 530 So. 2d at 287. Because of the United States
Supreme Court's exhaustion requirements, a litigant must seek review in the highest state court in
which a decision could be had before petitioning for United States Supreme Court review. See 28
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A useful comparison is found in Williams v. Florida."8 In Williams,
the district court of appeal wrote a brief opinion disposing of the federal
constitutional claims with an abbreviated discussion.3 9 7 Under the then
existing jurisdictional system, the opinion did not satisfy the criteria for
discretionary Florida Supreme Court review.39 8 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, thus bypassing the Florida Supreme
Court.39 9 The United States Supreme Court upheld Florida's notice of

alibi rule, and upheld the use of a six-member jury over Williams' contention that it violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 00
As the examples suggest, 0 1 a substantial matter does not become in-

substantial merely because there is no written opinion. These examples
also illustrate a material weakness in Florida's judicial process. Matters of

U.S.C. § 1257. B.J.F. contended that The FloridaStar had petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for
review when, in fact, the district court of appeal opinion disclosed no basis for Florida Supreme Court
jurisdiction. FloridaStar, 530 So. 2d at 287. B.J.F. moved to dismiss in the United States Supreme
Court, arguing that in the absence of jurisdiction in the Florida Supreme Court, the time for seeking
United States Supreme Court review had run from the date of the district court of appeal decision,
not from the date of the Florida Supreme Court's denial of discretionary review. Id. at 287-88. The
FloridaStar's appeal to the United States Supreme Court was timely when measured from the denial
of discretionary review by the Florida Supreme Court, but untimely when measured from the date of
the decision of the district court of appeal. See id. at 289.
The Florida Supreme Court resolved the problem by construing its jurisdictional article to contain a broad grant of discretionary jurisdiction, limited by the four constitutional categories. Id. at
288-89. The court concluded that so long as there was a written opinion on a point of law, the court
had jurisdiction over the case. Id.
The opinion creates an orderly pathway for appellate review, by requiring in most instances that
a litigant wishing to reach the United States Supreme Court must first petition for review in the
Florida Supreme Court. In so doing, the litigant will invoke Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction in the
broad sense.
The irony, however, is that in a number of cases the district court of appeal opinion will not
satisfy the four narrow criteria for review and the Florida Supreme Court will be unable to take the
case on the merits.
396. 399 U.S. 78, 80 n.5 (1970).
397. Williams v. State, 224 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), aff'd, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
398. Williams had initially appealed directly from the trial court to the Florida Supreme Court,
under the 1956 Florida constitutional provision which allowed an appeal where a trial court had
construed "a controlling provision of the Florida or federal constitution ....
" FLA. CoNsT. art. V,
§ 4(2) (1956). The Florida Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction. See Williams, 399
U.S. at 80 n.5. The appeal was therefore heard by the district court of appeal. Williams, 224 So. 2d
at 406. The written opinion provided no criterion which would have allowed a petition for discretionary review to the Florida Supreme Court. See id. Review was therefore taken directly to the United
States Supreme Court. Williams, 399 U.S. at 80.
399. Williams, 399 U.S. at 80 n.5.
400. Id. at 86, 103.
401. The writer has not undertaken to identify all such cases heard by the United States Supreme Court.
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importance can and do bypass the Florida Supreme Court because the
district court of appeal decided not to file a written opinion.
G. No-Opinion Cases and the FloridaSupreme Court
Some Florida decisions also reveal that the written opinion requirement is an undesirable screening device. For example, in Moreland v.
State,4' Moreland argued in the trial court that Palm Beach County's
system of selecting jurors for the petit jury pool resulted in a systematic
exclusion of blacks. A criminal defendant in another case, Spencer v.
State, made the same argument.40 3
Spencer was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to
death. 40 4 As a result, he had a right of direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. 40 5 In his appeal he raised the issue of unconstitutional selec4 06
tion of the jury pool.
Meanwhile, Moreland was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.40 7 He appealed to the district court of appeal
and raised the same constitutional challenge to the jury selection process.40 8 While Spencer was pending in the Florida Supreme Court, the
district court of appeal affirmed Moreland's conviction without opinion.4 0
Because there was no opinion, Moreland could not petition the Florida
Supreme Court for discretionary review.
Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court reversed Spencer's conviction, holding that the jury selection system was unconstitutional.4 10 Moreland then petitioned the trial court for post conviction relief.4 11 The trial
court granted relief, holding that Spencer should be applied retroactively. 4 2 On appeal, the district court of appeal reversed, holding that the
Spencer decision did not meet the recognized tests for retroactivity." 3
This time there was a written opinion which satisfied one of the jurisdictional criteria, so the Florida Supreme Court granted discretionary review. 4 4 The supreme court ruled that the existing tests for retroactivity

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

582 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1991).
Spencer v. State, 545 So. 2d 1352, 1353-54 (Fla. 1989).
Id. at 1353.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1); see Spencer, 545 So. 2d at 1353.
Spencer, 545 So. 2d at 1354.
Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 619.
Id.
Id.
Spencer, 545 So. 2d at 1355; see Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 619.
Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 619.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
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were not satisfied and that the district court of appeal had been correct on
that point.4 5 The supreme court concluded, however, that "fundamental
fairness" required that Moreland be given the benefit of the Spencer
41 6
decision.
The fundamental fairness issue arose because the absence of a written opinion, along with the fact that Moreland was not sentenced to
death, had prevented Moreland from obtaining discretionary supreme
court review even though the same issue was then pending before the supreme court in Spencer.1 7 If, of course, Spencer's case had never existed
at all, Moreland's case presented a substantial and meritorious issue
which could not reach the supreme court for want of a written opinion.
The Moreland decision reveals a flaw in Florida's system. The system
precludes a litigant from reaching the Florida Supreme Court on a properly preserved legal issue which is already pending in the supreme court
in another case. Second, it illustrates that a district court of appeal's standard of importance will at times diverge from the standard of importance
applied by the supreme court itself. This is not to criticize the district
court of appeal; rather plainly, the district court of appeal believed that
the applicable law was both clear and well settled, while the supreme
court had taken a different view.
This is not the first time the Florida Supreme Court has addressed
this issue. In Jollie v. State,4 18 the supreme court noted the problem created by the written opinion requirement where a district court of appeal
had disposed of a related group of cases which presented the identical
legal issue. 419 The court noted that one commonly used practice was for
the district court of appeal to write a reasoned opinion in the first case to
be decided, and then affirm the related cases on the strength of the lead
case. 42 0 That had occurred in Jollie; Jollie's appeal had been resolved in
the district court of appeal by the single word "affirmed," followed by a
citation to the district court's earlier case, Murray v. State.42 ' The supreme court had in the meantime granted review in the district court of
appeal's lead case, Murray v. State, and had disapproved that decision. 422
The question for the supreme court in Jollie was whether it could

415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
(Fla. 5th
422.

Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 619.
Id. at 619-20.
See id.
405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981).
Id. at 419-21.
Id.
Jollie v. State, 381 So. 2d 351 (5th DCA 1980) (citing Murray v. State, 378 So. 2d 111
DCA 1980)), quashed, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981).
See Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 418; Murray v. State, 403 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1981).
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grant jurisdiction and afford Jollie consistent treatment, or whether the
absence of a written opinion (other than a citation of authority) precluded
jurisdiction.4 23 Since the decision in Jollie had expressly cited Murray,
the supreme court decided that there was a sufficient basis on which to
conclude that there was an express conflict of decisions.424 Thus, the supreme court had jurisdiction to grant review and reversed, just as it had
in Murray.42 5
Although the court obviously reached the correct result, the discussion in Jollie is unsettling. The court noted that its ability to review a
companion case like Jollie was entirely dependent on the particular citation of authority utilized by the district court of appeal.4 26 The court explained that so long as the companion case expressly cited the lead case,
then the companion case could be considered for review along with the
lead case.4 27 If, however, the district court of appeal did not cite the lead
case but instead cited other "counsel-advising" case authority, then the
supreme court would not have jurisdiction.42 8 The court suggested that
each district court of appeal establish a procedure to expressly "pair" the
first-decided case with subsequent cases presenting the same issue. 429 The
court also suggested that mandates be withheld in the related cases
"pending final decision of the petition for review, if any, filed in the controlling decision. ' 430 Furthermore, the court suggested that procedures be
adopted so that the later-decided cases, even those without written opinion, would contain a statement expressly stating that the later cases
presented the same legal issue as the earlier case.43 '
The Jollie decision illustrates the weakness in screening on the basis
of written opinions. Where the supreme court has already granted discretionary review in a case, the court should be able to grant review in all
other cases which present the identical issue. This should occur regardless
of whether the district court of appeal wrote an opinion in the related case
and regardless of whether the district court of appeal chose the proper
citation. It should not be necessary to create elaborate case-tracking and
pairing mechanisms in the district courts of appeal to satisfy the written

423. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 419.
424. Id. at 419-21.
425. Id. There were two dissents. Id. at 421. See generally Lisa Pratt, Case Note, Florida
Supreme Court Jurisdiction-Supreme Court JurisdictionRevisited: A Look at Five Recent Cases,
9 FLA. ST. U L. REV. 693 (1981).
426. Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 420.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 421.
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opinion requirement and thereby confer jurisdiction on the supreme court.
It is worth noting that where the supreme court itself has had a
choice, it has not applied the written opinion litmus test to other areas of
its own jurisdiction. For example, the requirement for a written opinion
does not apply to petitions for extraordinary writs. The supreme court has
regularly granted petitions for mandamus and prohibition directed to the
432
district courts of appeal where there was no written majority opinion.
The absence of a written opinion in those cases has not been found to be
an impediment to review, and the supreme court has not imposed a written opinion requirement as a matter of practice.
In summary, the written opinion requirement is an unwieldy and unreliable device for screening cases for supreme court review. The ultimate
inquiry in discretionary review should be whether the legal question
presented is important enough to be resolved by the supreme court. In
some cases the presence or absence of an opinion will be a strong consideration in granting or denying review, while in others it will not. Where
the legal question presented is a highly important one, the court should
not be impeded from accepting jurisdiction.
The succeeding sections will suggest alternatives to the written opinion requirement. However, to fashion an alternative, it is necessary first to
explain why the written opinion requirement was adopted.
I

H. Pre-1980 Practice and the 1979 Report of the Commission on the
Florida Appellate Court Structure
Florida's written opinion requirement was adopted in 1980 as a device to limit the supreme court's workload. as When Florida's 1956 constitutional amendment created the two-tier appellate system, the amendment did not require a written opinion as a condition of Florida Supreme
Court review. 434 The Florida Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction
was based then, as it is today, almost entirely on conflict of decisions. For
432. See Cantera v. District Court of Appeal, 555 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1990) (prohibition); Fox v.
District Court of Appeal, 553 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1989) (prohibition); Sky Lake Gardens Recreation,

Inc. v. District Court of Appeal, 511 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1987) (mandamus); Davidson v. District Court
of Appeal, 501 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1987) (mandamus); Jellen v. District Court of Appeal, 488 So. 2d
825 (Fla. 1986) (mandamus); see also In re Estate of Laflin, 569 So. 2d 1273, 1274 (Fla. 1990)

(mandamus) (district court of appeal denied relief by order which cited case authority).
The Florida Supreme Court does not have common law certiorari jurisdiction. FLA. CoNsT. art.
V, § 3; Vetrick v. Hollander, 464 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 1983). A petition for discretionary review is
the procedure for invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court. Vetrick, 464 So. 2d at 553.
Review prior to 1980 was by certiorari. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (amended 1972); FLA. CONST.

art. V, § 4 (1956).
433.

434.

England et al., supra note 86, at 159.
FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 4, 5 (1956).
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the first few years the Florida Supreme Court took the position that it
would not ordinarily review district court of appeal decisions which had

been decided without opinion. 35 The court was careful to note that such
decisions were not entirely insulated from review, but would be examined
only in exceptional cases.436
As explained earlier, the court soon began taking an increasingly expansive view of its own jurisdiction.4 3 7 This was reflected in the court's
1965 decision in Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc.4"' In Foley, the Florida Supreme Court adopted "record proper" review for cases in which the dis-

trict court of appeal had not written an opinion.4 9 In the period between
1965 and 1980, the supreme court's discretionary review practice evolved
in an unexpected way. According to one study: "The court's current prac-

tice of accepting jurisdiction over any case in which a conflict is found has
all but written the word 'may' out of Article V, § 3(b)(3), Florida Consti-

tution."'4 40 If conflict could be shown on the basis of an individual issue,
including a subsidiary one, the court would grant review and consider the
entire case.44 ' The reason for the court's practice was suggested in a 1977

concurring opinion: "A majority of this Court may hold the view that
district court decisions without opinions are precedents, and that the Constitution imposes on us an obligation, as opposed to a right, to harmonize
all conflicts which are detectable among the four judicial districts of the

state."44
In the mid-1970s two of the newer justices on the court urged that

the court begin exercising discretion in connection with conflict certiorari;
443
thus, only the most important matters would be selected for review.

435. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 1958).
436. Id.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 261-85.
438. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
439. Id.; see Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 172 So. 2d 907, 908-09 (3d DCA 1962), cert. discharged, 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
440. Report on Appellate Structure, supra note 285, at 285.
441. England et al., supra note 86, at 165.
442. Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders Ass'n v. West Flagler Assocs., 347 So. 2d 408,
412 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring). Foley itself had held that "an affirmance without opinion
of a trial court by a district court is generally deemed to be an approval of the judgment of the trial
court, and becomes a precedent, certainly, in the trial court rendering the judgment." Foley, 177 So.
2d at 225-26.
The quoted passage from Florida Greyhound Owners refers to four district courts of appeal,
which was the number then existing. 347 So. 2d at 412. Today there are five. FLA. STAT. § 35.01
(1991).
443. Florida Greyhound Owners, 347 So. 2d at 412 (Overton, C.J., concurring specially; England, J., concurring); Golden Loaf Bakery, Inc. v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585, 586
(Fla. 1976) (Overton, C.J. & England, J., concurring); see AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625,
628-30 (Fla. 1975) (England & Overton, JJ., dissenting).
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Record proper review was criticized because it required a higher than
usual investment of time in order to evaluate jurisdictional briefs.44 ' The
two justices contended, among other things, that cases were not being selected on the basis of importance. 445 Their
view did not, however, per446
suade the court to change its practice.
By 1978 the supreme court was suffering from persistent excessive
workload.4 47 The court created the Commission on the Florida Appellate
Court Structure to recommend solutions. 44 A portion of the study focused on the supreme court's practices relating to discretionary review. 449
The Commission recommended that the court assume control over its
own docket by exercising its discretion and ceasing what the Commission
described as "the practice of granting 'second appeals' .... .
The
Commission urged, "in the strongest possible terms, that the court reconsider its role within Florida's appellate system. To serve the state as its
highest judicial tribunal, the Supreme Court must consider only cases
which substantially affect the law of the state.' ' 1
To that end, the Commission recommended that the court engage in
rulemaking to spell out "the discretionary nature of the writ [of certiorari] and listing several factors which the court will consider in screening
petitions for writs of certiorari
. 4 2 The Commission proposed a set
of criteria to embody in a rule.453 The Commission also considered recom-

444.

Florida Greyhound Owners, 347 So. 2d at 411-12 (Overton, C.J., concurring specially;

England, J., concurring).
445. See cases cited supra note 443.
446.

See Report on Appellate Structure, supra note 285, at 283.

447. Id.
448. Id. at 274.
449. Id. at 283-87.
450. Id. at 283.
451. Id.
452.

Id. at 282. The court had not adopted explicit criteria to guide discretion in the review of

petitions for certiorari. Id.
Under the constitutional provision existing prior to 1980, discretionary review was procured by
petition for writ of certiorari. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (amended 1972); FLA. CONsT. art. V,
§ 4(2) (1956). The reference to certiorari has since been eliminated. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
453. Report on Appellate Structure, supra note 285, at 284-85. The language proposed by the
Commission was:
Review by writ of certiorari is not a matter of right. The supreme court will determine as a matter of sound judicial discretion whether to exercise its constitutional certiorari jurisdiction to review a decision of a district court of appeal. While the considerations mentioned in this rule are neither controlling nor exclusive, the court will, in
determining whether a decision is sufficiently important to warrant review by certiorari,
consider:
(1) whether or not the decision has been embodied in a written opinion;
(2) the extent to which the rule of law announced in the decision will defeat or
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mending an entirely discretionary system of supreme court review (except

for death penalty appeals) as a mechanism for reducing supreme court
workload.4 5 4 It concluded, however, that such a step was unnecessary for
that purpose and that the desired workload reduction could be achieved
55
by the supreme court itself, operating within the existing framework.
The Commission also recommended that the court be permitted to review
by certiorari cases of great public importance. 45 a The Commission recommended that this be accomplished by constitutional amendment if it could
5
not be accomplished within the court's existing certiorari powers. 1

Two points should be made about the Commission's report. First, the
Commission did not recommend that a written opinion be required as a
condition precedent for supreme court review.4 58 The Commission concluded that the existence of a written opinion was only one factor to be
considered in deciding whether a matter had sufficient importance to war-

rant supreme court review. 4 9 It was not, however, a factor to be given
conclusive weight.460

render doubtful rights acquired in reliance on previously rendered decisions;
(3) the extent to which the decision will create uncertainty with respect to the
applicable rule of law and the extent to which the uncertainty will impair the ability of
persons to plan future courses of action, to enter into contractual and other relationships, to settle disputes or to conduct judicial proceedings;
(4) the extent to which the decision will create uncertainty with respect to obligations of public officials;
(5) the number of persons affected by the decision or likely to be affected in the
future by the rule of law announced in the decision;
(6) the frequency with which events raising the question of law answered in the
decision are likely to occur;
(7) the degree to which the decision is incorrect or inconsistent with established
principles of law.
In any event, where a petition for certiorari is predicated upon a conflict of decisions, the supreme court will not exercise its constitutional certiorari jurisdiction to review a decision of a district court of appeal:
(1) in which the alleged conflict exists only because of statements expressed in
dicta, dissent, or other parts of the opinion which are not controlling; or
(2) in which a settled rule of law has been applied to facts which are not substantially the same as those in a prior decision; or
(3) in which the alleged conflict of decisions is based upon the comparison of the
weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.

Id.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Id. at 283-84.
Id.

Id. at 286.
Id.
See id. at 284.

Id.
See id.
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Second, although much of the Commission's report was implemented,4 61 the recommendations on discretionary jurisdiction were not.4 2
Although at any time the court could have receded from the Foley decision or adopted rules as recommended by the Commission, neither came
about. Foley was never rescinded, but instead was overruled by constitutional amendment.4 6 3 The revision of the supreme court's jurisdictional
article in 1980 transferred away much of the court's mandatory appellate
jurisdiction and created the current system for certification of decisions by
district courts of appeal. 4
The written opinion requirement was imposed primarily to curtail the
invocation of the court's conflict jurisdiction where the district court of
appeal had not written an opinion.4 6' The method chosen was a categorical preclusion of review where no opinion has been written. This was said
to be desirable on policy grounds and because
it would reduce the time
466
required to review jurisdictional petitions.
This article has suggested that the written opinion requirement is an
unwise limitation on the supreme court's ability to review cases on the
basis of importance. In view of the reasons for the limitation, the question
is what adjustments could be adopted in order to improve the system.
I.

The Need to Readjust the 1980 Amendment

Under the present Florida system, a litigant must have a written
opinion in order to petition for review in the supreme court, 46 7 but the
litigant has been given neither an entitlement to an opinion nor an alter468
native if his or her request for an opinion is refused.
In the two jurisdictions which have something approaching a written
opinion requirement, the states have created an alternative pathway for
the litigant.46 9 Under the California approach, the litigant must request
an opinion on the points sought to be reviewed; if that request is refused,
the litigant may request discretionary review in the supreme court.470 At a
bare minimum, Florida should adopt the California system.4 7 1

461.
(1979).
462.
463.
464.
465.

See Arthur J. England, Jr., 1979 Report on the Florida Judiciary, 53 FLA. B.J. 296
See id. at 298-99.
England et al., supra note 86, at 179.
Id. at 161-76, 194.
See England, supra note 461, at 299.

466. Id.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
See sources cited supra note 102.
See supra part VI.C.
See supra part VI.C.
It is to be anticipated that such requests will be made in a relatively small percentage of
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The better alternative would be to abolish the written opinion requirement entirely. It is virtually unheard of in other American jurisdictions.4" 2 It may have been the only feasible alternative in 1980 as a transition away from Foley's record proper review. 7 a The written opinion
requirement should not, however, remain a fixture in the Florida
Constitution.
Some may object that the elimination of the written opinion requirement could resuscitate record proper review-the exact phenomenon the
written opinion requirement was intended to abolish. 4 That need not be
so. Whether record proper review returns hinges entirely on the discretionary review criteria which the court adopts. One solution to this problem would be to provide by rule that review of no-opinion decisions would
be evaluated purely on the basis of the importance of the question
presented, and would require an appropriate certificate of counsel.4 75 The
court's rules could provide that the conflict criterion would not be applied
where there is no written opinion. In sum, a no-opinion decision could be
reviewed on the basis of exceptional importance, but not on the basis of
conflict.4 6
Such an approach appears to be the reality in federal practice. Although the United States Supreme Court's rules do not require written
opinions, 477 it has long been known that the Court has followed a practice
in many cases of allowing an issue to "percolate" before it will grant discretionary review. 11 As one commentary explains, "Justice Brennan has
revealed that 'there is already in place, and has been ever since I joined
the Court [in 1956], a policy of letting tolerable conflicts go unaddressed
until more than two courts of appeals have considered a question.' ' 479
While there are signs that the percolation doctrine may be on its way

cases. Many litigants do not petition for further review, see supra note 255 and accompanying text,
and in many instances an opinion will already have been issued. In addition, the nature of the California rule allows the district court of appeal discretion about whether to write and how much to write.
See supra part VI.C.
472. See supra part VI.C.; infra app. C.
473. See England, supra note 461, at 299.
474. See id.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 310-14.
476. A variation on this theme would be to adopt the approach recommended by the 1979
Report of the Supreme Court Commission on the FloridaAppellate Structure. Under that approach,
the existence or nonexistence of a written opinion was a factor which would be explicitly considered in
deciding whether to exercise discretionary review, including where review is sought on the basis of
conflict of decisions. Report on Appellate Structure, supra note 285, at 284.
477. See Sup. Cr. R. 10.1(a).
478. See STERN ET AL., supra note 41, § 4.4, at 200.
479. Id. (footnote omitted).
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out, 480 it is reasonably clear that the United States Supreme Court's practice has been to resolve conflicts between United States courts of appeals
on the basis of written opinions, not on the basis of decisions without opinion. On the other hand, as the examples earlier in this section indicate,
the Supreme Court does not hesitate to review a decision without opinion
if the issue presented is sufficiently important.8 l
Some may also object that either proposal-the California alternative or the complete elimination of the written opinion requirement-could cause the supreme court's workload to increase. There are
several responses to that contention. First, if the criterion for review requires great public importance and a certificate of counsel, the experience
with the en banc rule suggests that there will not be a voluminous increase in filings.482 Second, as the experience under the en banc rule also
indicates, petitions asserting that the matter is one of exceptional importance are ordinarily easy to evaluate. By contrast, petitions asserting conflict are not.483 Third, it is proposed that the entire system be under the
control of the supreme court and be regulated by rule. Adjustments can
be made, if need be, to fine tune the system.48 4
Finally, some may object to the elimination of the written opinion
requirement because it would increase the reliance on staff for the screening of petitions. If the system is implemented as suggested above, the
workload should remain within reasonable boundaries. However, even if it
were necessary to rely on staff to examine petitions for review in no-opinion cases, that would be an improvement over the present situation in
which such decisions are excluded from review entirely.
J.

Conclusion

Florida's written opinion requirement was imposed in a time of crisis
and should be revisited. The categorical restriction is the most severe limitation on access to the state supreme court in any American jurisdiction.485 It runs counter to ABA Standards, the experience of other states,
and the recommendation contained in the Report of the Supreme Court

480.

Rehnquist, supra note 9, at I1 (commenting that the percolation theory is a "strange" and

inappropriate form of decisionmaking).
481. A court of appeals decision without opinion which is very materially in conflict with settled
principles might also call for the exercise of the Court's supervisory jurisdiction. See Sup. CT. R.
10.1(a).
482.
483.
484.
485.

See
See
See
See

supra part
supra note
supra part
supra part

V.D.
314 and accompanying text.
IV.D.
VI.C.
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Commission on the Florida Appellate Structure.486 The preferred alternative would be to delete the requirement. Decisions without opinion
would be reviewed on the basis of importance, but not conflict. A certificate of counsel patterned on the en banc rule would be required.
Alternatively, if the written opinion requirement is retained, then the
California system should be adopted whereby an opinion may be requested by motion for rehearing. 8 7 If the request is denied, the litigant
may nonetheless petition for discretionary review. 48 Either of these reforms would provide greater access to the supreme court and provide a
more flexible system of discretionary review.
VII.

A

COMMENT ON THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S MANDATORY
WORKLOAD

The Florida Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction forms only
part of the court's workload. The court spends much of its time reviewing
cases that fall within its mandatory jurisdiction.4 89 In addition, the court
has responsibility for the administration and management of the judicial
490
branch, has broad rulemaking authority, and oversees the Bar.
Any proposal to expand the court's discretionary jurisdiction cannot
be divorced from consideration of the remainder of the court's workload.
The court's capacity to allocate time to discretionary review, whether it
be on the merits or on consideration of petitions for review, is directly
impacted by the court's other tasks, particularly by its mandatory
jurisdiction.
I
By far the largest single item of the court's workload is its
mandatory review of death penalty cases.4 91 A recent court estimate
states, "While capital cases comprise only 6 % of [the Court's] caseload,
they take approximately 30 to 40% of the Court's time. 49 2 This work-

486.
487.
488.

See supra parts VI.A; C.-F.
See supra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
489. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
490. See id. §§ 2, 3, 4(b)(1), 9, 15.
491. See Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida'sPractice of Imposing
Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 54 (1985).
492. Memorandum from Sid J. White, Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court, to Chief Justice
Shaw (Nov. 19, 1991) (on file with the Florida Law Review); accord Mello & Robson, supra note
491.
One former Justice of the Florida Supreme Court estimated that the court spent from
thirty-five to forty percent of its time on death penalty cases, and two former research
aides to Florida Supreme Court Justice Ben Overton have written that
"[u]nquestionably, the most difficult and time-consuming class of cases which the court
reviews is the direct appeal from a circuit court order imposing the death penalty."
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load figure is unexpectedly large. 493 Plainly, it has an impact on the

court's ability to handle other work. From the standpoint of judicial administration, the workload presents two issues, which will be discussed
below.
A.

Jury Unanimity and the Death Penalty

In a significant majority of the jurisdictions having capital punishment, the jury decides the sentence and must unanimously vote for the

death penalty in order for it to be imposed. 4 4 The "requirement of unanimity reflects the judgment that sentence of death is a sanction so enormous and exceptional that it should not be imposed unless the case is

Id. (citation omitted). Among the factors influencing the percentage of workload is not only the number of death penalty appeals filed, but the governor's practice in signing warrants for execution. See
Justice Raymond Ehrlich, First FSU Jurist-in-Residence, Heads Back to Private Practice,
ALUMNEWS, FLA. ST. U. C. L., Winter 1992, at 5. The number and timing of warrants influence
requests for emergency relief, which must be given priority. Id.
It is conceivable that the workload will move upward, at least in the near term. The Supreme
Court Committee on Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases recommended time standards for the
processing of petitions for postconviction relief, including a shortening of the period of time within
which a petition for postconviction relief may be filed. Report of the Supreme Court Committee on
Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases, at 4 (May 31, 1991) (unpublished report, on file with the
Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court). The time-shortening recommendation for filing a postconviction
petition has been adopted as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, effective for convictions becoming final after January 1, 1994. In re: Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 (Collateral Relief After
Death Sentence Has Been Imposed) and Rule 3.850 (Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence), 18 Fla. L. Weekly S553 (Fla. Oct. 21, 1993).
493. One Justice has estimated that in Illinois the death penalty workload consumes 18% of
the court's time. Keith H. Beyler, Illinois Appellate Courts: Meeting the Challenge of Heavier
Caseloads, 78 ILL B.J. 440, 443 (1990). A California justice put the figure at 20% for that court.
Marcus M. Kaufman, Crisis in the Courts, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1990, at 28, 30.
494. Thirty-six states, plus the United States Government and United States military, have
capital punishment statutes. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A.
REPORTER, CURRENT SERVICE, Summer 1993, at 477. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia
do not. Id.
"At least 26 jurisdictions with presumptively valid capital statutes allow a death sentence only if
the jury votes for death, unless the defendant has requested sentencing by the court." Michael Mello,
The Jurisdictionto Do Justice: Florida'sJury Override and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 923, 924 n.2 (1991) (citations omitted). Mello's tabulation includes Delaware, which has subsequently become an advisory jury state, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1987 & Supp. 1992), but
omits Mississippi, Missouri, and Oregon, all of which require a unanimous jury in order to impose the
death penalty. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-103 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (Vernon
1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1991). "A 1980 survey found that 23 states explicitly required
jury unanimity to impose death, and most of the remaining capital punishment states did so by implication." Mello, supra, at 926 n.3 (citation omitted); see Raymond J. Pascucci, Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuitof Fairnessand Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
1129, 1240-41 (1984).
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clear enough to convince all the jurors."4 95 It is in accord with "the tradi-

tion of jury unanimity in criminal matters.""96 Under the most common
practice, if the jury is not unanimous, then the sentence is for life.
Florida's system is different. In Florida and three other states, the

jury has an advisory role. In Florida, a vote by seven or more of the
twelve jurors for the death sentence is deemed to be a recommendation
for death; a tie vote or a majority vote for a life sentence constitutes a
recommendation for life. The judge is not bound by the recommendation;

in particular, the judge may override a jury recommendation for life and
impose the death sentence. 497 Commentators describe Florida's advisory

jury system as having been chosen primarily in the belief that it was required by Furman v. Georgia.4 98 It was also suggested by some that a
judge would be less likely to impose the death penalty than would a
jury,4 99 a prediction that has not been borne out in practice.50 0 To the
extent that Florida's advisory jury system rested on a perception that
Furman required it, that perception has been dispelled. 5 0' Later United
States Supreme Court decisions have made clear that jury sentencing is

permissible, 502 an approach now followed in the majority
of states which
5 03
impose the death penalty and in the federal system.

On principle, the majority American view, which requires a unanimous jury vote in order to impose the death penalty, is by far the more

495. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary at 150 (footnote omitted).
496. Id. (footnote omitted).
497. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1991). The other states using an advisory jury are Alabama and
Indiana, Mello, supra note 494, at 925 n.2, and recently, Delaware. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(1987 & Supp. 1992).
In four other states-Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska-the judge serves as the sentencer
without a jury of any kind. Mello, supra note 494, at 925 n.2.
498. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
As the Model Penal Code Comment states:
The decisions in Furman left retentionist jurisdictions [states retaining the death
penalty] in a quandary. The Court had made it clear, albeit by the slightest of majorities, that a system of wholly unguided jury discretion in imposing the death penalty
would not be permitted. On the other hand, one could only speculate as to whether
some other basis for capital punishment might survive constitutional scrutiny.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 12(a) at 155; see also Mello, supra note 494, at 928.
499. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973).
500. It has been suggested that this phenomenon was entirely foreseeable. "In the most extensive empirical study yet conducted on jury behavior in America, Kalven and Zeisel collected data
indicating that jurors were less likely than judges to impose a death sentence." Michael L. Radelet,
Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1409,
1413 (1985) (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 434-39 (1966)).

501.
502.
503.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
E.g., id.
Mello, supra note 494, at 369 n.2.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss1/2

76

Cope: Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate C
REVIEW OF APPELLATE COURTS

desirable one. The death penalty is the most extreme sanction and is irreversible. Imposition of the death penalty should be reserved for cases in
which the jury, as the voice of the community, is unanimously in agreement. The requirement of unanimity reduces the risk of erroneous adjudication, and would likely simplify the supreme court's review of the penalty phase. If the jury is less than unanimous, then the sentence should be
for life. Where the sentence is life, the
appeal lies in the district court of
50 4
court.
supreme
the
of
appeal instead
The foregoing considerations are, of course, substantive ones and do
not relate primarily to judicial administration. Legislation has been introduced in Florida which would require that the jury either be unanimous
or have a vote of 11-1 to impose the death penalty. 50 5 Although that measure was not adopted, the question to address is the possible impact on
judicial administration if Florida were to follow the great majority of
states by requiring jury unanimity.
Based on the supreme court's 1991 dispositions, there were unanimous recommendations for death in only eleven percent of capital
cases. 50 The Assistant Attorney General in charge of death penalty appeals has been quoted as saying, "In all murder cases, I would say 10
percent would be the top number of cases that end up with a 12-0 vote
recommending death. ' 5 ° The legislation introduced most recently in
Florida did not propose a rule of unanimity, but instead required a vote of
11-1 or 12-0 in order to impose the death penalty. 508 Based on 1991 dispositions, juries voted 11-1 or 12-0 to impose the death penalty in twentythree percent of the cases. 509

504. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
505. Fla. H.B. 911 (1992); Fla. S.B. 1150 (1992).
506. See Death Penalty Cases-Jury Votes, Cases Disposed of from 1/1/91-12/3/91 (unpublished report, on file with the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court) [hereinafter Death Penalty
Cases]. In 1991 there were 63 dispositions in capital cases, of which two were transferred to district
courts of appeal because the death penalty had not been imposed or had been reduced to a life
sentence. Of the remaining 61 cases, there was a unanimous verdict for the death penalty in 7 cases,
representing 11% of the total of 61. Id.
In one of the cases, there were three counts. On one count the jury made a unanimous 12-0 death
recommendation; on another, 11-1; on another, 10-2. For this calculation the case has been counted
once, as a 12-0 recommendation for death.
507. Patrick May, Order Damsel of Death Executed, Jury Advises Judge, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 31, 1992, at 4B.
508. Fla. H.B. 911 (1992); Fla. S.B. 1150 (1992).
509. After reduction for the two transferred cases, see supra note 506, there were seven unanimous recommendations for death, id., and another seven with a vote of 11-1. In the multiple count
case described supra note 506, the defendant had a vote of 12-0 on one count and 11-1 on another
count; for this computation the case has been counted once. The 14 cases represent 23% of the total
of 61. See supra note 506.
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Naturally, if the statute were changed in order to require jury unanimity to impose the death penalty, the dynamics within the jury would
change. At present the jury is instructed that its vote is advisory and that
a simple majority vote is sufficient to recommend the death penalty. If the
system were changed and the jury were advised that a unanimous verdict
is necessary to impose the death penalty, it is reasonable to expect greater
pressure for unanimity where a majority, especially a large majority, favors the death sentence for that case.
It is difficult to predict the quantitative impact of such a change in
law. It seems reasonable to assume that juries presently voting in favor of
a life sentence would continue to do so. It also appears reasonable to expect that where the jury's tentative vote discloses a strong majority in
favor of the death sentence, there will be a tendency for many of those
cases to become unanimous. Based on 1991 dispositions, approximately
fifty-four percent of the supreme court's death penalty cases had jury recommendations of 9-3, 10-2, 11-1, or 12-0. Farther along the spectrum are
the cases having 8-4 or 7-5 votes for death; they comprised about twentyseven percent of the 1991 dispositions.51 0 The remaining death penalty
workload is comprised of "override" cases. As explained in the next section, the so-called "override" cases, in which the trial court overrides a
jury's life recommendation and imposes the death sentence, comprise an
average of twenty-one percent of the supreme court's death penalty workload, and were approximately nineteen percent in 1991. Based on those
rough assumptions, a change in law would reduce the supreme court's
death penalty workload by (a) eliminating the override cases discussed in
the next section, and (b) shifting other nonunanimous cases (which would
receive life sentences) to the district courts of appeal. It is impossible to
predict with any certainty exactly what the resulting workload savings
would be.
It will be recalled that death penalty workload consumes thirty to
forty percent of the supreme court's time. 51' Hypothetically, if that workload were reduced by one-third, then there would be a net savings of ten
to thirteen percent of the supreme court's entire working time. Any work-

510. See Death Penalty Cases, supra note 506. There were 10 dispositions having a 10-2 vote,
amounting to 16%, and 9 dispositions having a 9-3 vote, amounting to 15%. Id. When added to the
23% having a vote of 11-1 or 12-0, the total is 54%. See id. The multiple count case described supra
note 506 has been counted once for this computation.
Twelve cases had jury recommendations of 8-4, representing 20% of the total. For these purposes two 2-count cases have been excluded, each of which also had one count with a 9-3 vote. In
addition, four cases had votes of 7-5, representing 7 % of the total. See Death Penalty Cases, supra
note 506.
511. See supra note 492 and accompanying text.
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load reduction in this general range would be significant from the standpoint of judicial administration.
B.

The Trial Judge Override of Jury Recommendations for Life
Sentences

Adoption of a unanimous jury requirement as described above would
automatically eliminate the so-called "override" cases-cases in which
the trial judge overrides a jury recommendation for a life sentence and
imposes the death penalty. As an alternative to the foregoing recommendation for jury unanimity to impose the death penalty, Florida should prohibit judicial override outright.
Prior to 1972, Florida's death penalty statute provided that if the
jury in a capital case recommended mercy by a majority vote, the court
was required to follow the jury's recommendation and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.5 12 The judge could not override the jury's
decision regarding a life sentence. 13
After the invalidation of the state death penalty statutes in 1972, 51"
Florida revised its death penalty law in order to meet what were perceived
to be constitutional objections. 5 In doing so, Florida became one of a
very few states to make the jury completely advisory.51 Under Florida's
revised statute, the trial judge may override a jury recommendation for
life and impose the death penalty. 1 Sentencing judges have done this
with some regularity. In the period through March 1988, twenty-one percent of the defendants sentenced to death had received a jury recommendation for a life sentence. 18

512.

FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1971). This had been Florida law since 1872. MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 210.6 cmt. 4(c) at 129 n.67 (1980). This followed the general pattern of nineteenth-century American reform in which the automatic death penalty for all murder, or first degree murder, was replaced
by "discretionary imposition of capital punishment for the highest category.of murder." Id. at 129

(footnote omitted).
513.

Mello, supra note 494, at 969 (citing Newton v. State, 21 Fla. 53, 101 (1884)).

514. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally Mello & Robson, supra note 491,
at 35 n.19.
515.
516.
517.

See supra note 498 and accompanying text.
Mello, supra note 494, at 925 n.2; see FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)-(3) (1991).
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1991). The legal standard for overriding the jury recommenda-

tion is set forth in Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
518. Mello, supra note 494, at 926. Mello reported that between December 1972 and March
1988, there were 526 death sentences under the new statute, of which 113 had received jury recommendations for life. Id. Thus, the life recommendations were 21% of the total.
More recent statistics are not significantly different. Sixty-three death penalty cases were dis-

posed of in 1991. Death Penalty Cases, supra note 506. Excluding one case transferred (death penalty
not imposed), the remainder is 62. Of those, 12 were cases in which the trial judge had imposed the
death sentence despite a jury recommendation for a life sentence. See id. That constitutes 1.9 % of the
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The simple fact about the override cases is that the override is almost
always reversed.5 1 In 1989 the supreme court put the reversal rate at
approximately eighty percent. 520 The reversal rate was ninety-one percent
in 1991.521 Thus, in approximately eighty to ninety percent of the override
cases, the death penalty is vacated and the jury recommendation for life is
reinstated. Given the high reversal rate and the applicable substantive
law,522 it might have been thought that override cases would largely disappear. Surprisingly, override cases continue to comprise a significant percentage of the supreme court's workload.
From the standpoint of judicial administration, it makes no sense to
continue to allow the judge to override a jury's recommendation for a life
sentence when such cases result in reversal eighty to ninety percent of the
time. In reality the override cases have little actual effect on the ultimate
imposition of the death penalty, because the cases are so frequently reversed. As a practical matter, most such defendants wind up with a life
sentence.
Life sentence cases are reviewed in the district courts of appeal, not
the supreme court. A prohibition against imposing the death penalty
where the jury recommended life would cause the override cases to be
deflected to the district courts of appeal. The workload savings to the su-

62 total. See id. One of the 12 was reduced to life by the trial court pursuant to a relinquishment of
jurisdiction, but is counted as an override because that was the status of the case when appealed. Id.
519. For present purposes, an "override case" is one in which the judge overrides a jury recommendation for life and instead imposes the death sentence.
520. Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla. 1989). The court referred to the time period
since 1985. Id.
521. In 1991 the court disposed of 12 cases in which a judge overrode a life recommendation by
the jury and imposed the death penalty. See Death Penalty Cases, supra note 506. For purposes of
computing the reversal rate, one case must be eliminated because the circuit court reduced the death
sentence to a life penalty during a relinquishment of jurisdiction. See id. That case was transferred to
a district court of appeal. Id.
Of the remaining 11 cases, the Florida Supreme Court reduced 9 to a life sentence as the jury
had recommended. See id.
One additional case was reversed for a new trial. See Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1025
(Fla. 1991). However, the court also reversed the imposition of the death penalty. Id. The court
concluded that the trial court's reasons for overriding the jury recommendation were insufficient, and
under double jeopardy principles the death penalty could not be sought in the new trial. Id. at 103132.
In one case, the override was affirmed. Death Penalty Cases, supra note 506.
In sum: of the 11 override cases adjudicated in 1991, 10 overrides were reversed; 1 was affirmed.
Id.; see also Mello, supra note 494, at 936-38 (discussing jury override statistics from 1974-1990);
Mello & Robson, supra note 491, at 53-54 (discussing 1984 jury override statistics).
522. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) ("In order to sustain a sentence of death
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.").
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preme court would be significant. Override cases constitute an average of
twenty-one percent of the supreme court's death penalty caseload. 523
Since death penalty cases consume thirty to forty percent of the supreme
court's time,524 elimination of the override category would reduce the supreme court's overall workload by six to eight percent. Accordingly, the
statute should be amended to eliminate the trial judge's authority to override a jury's life sentence recommendation. This recommendation is, of
course, an alternative to the previous section's recommendation of a rule
of jury unanimity for imposition of the death penalty. Adoption of a
unanimous jury requirement would automatically eliminate the override
cases.
C. Conclusion
Florida's death penalty workload is high, consuming thirty to forty
percent of the court's time. Unlike most states, Florida does not require a
unanimous jury vote in order to impose the death penalty. This appears to
influence the rate at which Florida courts impose the death penalty, and
has a corresponding impact on the supreme court workload. While a requirement of jury unanimity is desirable as a matter of policy, it would
also result in a reduction in the supreme court's workload.
If the first measure is not adopted and the advisory system is retained, the statute should be amended to eliminate the trial judge's ability
to override a jury recommendation of life. Trial judges override jury recommendations of life imprisonment in twenty-one percent of the cases,
despite the fact that such death sentences are rarely upheld. Elimination
of the override cases would thus reduce the death penalty workload by
twenty-one percent, resulting in an overall workload savings of six to eight
percent. At the same time, the elimination of judicial overrides would
have little effect on the number of defendants given the death penalty,
5 25
because few of the override sentences survive judicial review.
VIII.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The responsibility of a supreme court is to resolve the questions of
greatest importance for the public interest and the administration of justice. At the heart of the discretionary review function is the ability of the

523. See supra note 518 and accompanying text.
524. See supra note 492 and accompanying text.
525. In some jurisdictions debate is ongoing about other possible alternatives for management
of death penalty review. See generally Beyler, supra note 493, at 445; Kaufman, supra note 493, at
32; Robert Weisberg, Essay-RedistributingWealth of Capital Cases: Changing Death Penalty Appeals in California, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 243, 256-66 (1988).
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court to select cases on the basis of the importance of the question
presented and to decline those cases which do not require the supreme
court's attention. The supreme court's jurisdictional arrangements and
discretionary review criteria should facilitate, rather than impede, the attainment of those objectives.
Florida's discretionary review system should be modified by granting
the supreme court explicit authority to review any case on the basis of
importance. Experience with the district court of appeal en banc rule 526
suggests that where exceptional importance is the standard to be applied,
screening of petitions for review will be relatively straightforward. Ordinarily, in such cases it is facially obvious whether the question presented
is important or not. By contrast, screening petitions on the basis of conflict is often an arduous task because significant analysis 52is7 required to
determine whether the asserted conflict is real or illusory.
In accordance with the practice in other jurisdictions, the Florida Supreme Court should have plenary authority to promulgate rules and
guidelines for the exercise of its discretionary review powers. Rules should
be adopted for the guidance of the Bar and the court, indicating the reasons which call for the exercise of the court's discretion to grant review.
Through the rulemaking power or otherwise, 52 8 the court should be given
ample latitude to fine-tune the discretionary review process.
In an importance-based system of review, the requirement of a written opinion with jurisdictionally relevant words is neither reliable nor desirable. That is especially true where considerations of workload require
district courts of appeal to affirm without opinion or in abbreviated opinions. To be sure, the existence or nonexistence of a written opinion is a
relevant factor in deciding whether to grant review. As a matter of policy,
the court could decline to consider petitions for review in no-opinion cases
where review is sought because of an asserted conflict of decisions. However, the written opinion requirement should be eliminated as a general
precondition for review, or if retained, should be deemed satisfied where
the litigant has sought, but failed to obtain, a written opinion.
The Florida Supreme Court's time and opportunity for discretionary

526. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.331.
527. It seems probable that a shift to an importance-based standard at the supreme court level
would also result in the district courts of appeal being more sparing in the certification of questions of
great public importance. Because of the supreme court's present jurisdictional limitations, there seems
to be a tendency toward liberal certification of questions, thereby preserving the possibility of supreme
court review. Were there to be an importance-based standard at the supreme court level and explicit
importance-based guidelines for review, the district courts of appeal would probably certify fewer
questions.
528. The 1984 Article V Review Commission recommended the creation of a special courtlegislative procedure for amending the supreme court's jurisdictional article. See supra part IV.C.
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review is affected by the size of its other workload. The court's largest
single commitment is the review of death penalty cases, absorbing thirty
to forty percent of the court's time. In the majority of states, the death
penalty can be imposed only by the vote of a unanimous jury, in contrast
with Florida's advisory jury system. As a matter of policy, the ultimate
penalty should not be imposed by less than a unanimous vote. Accordingly, Florida should switch to the system used in most states by requiring
jury unanimity. Such a change would also reduce the supreme court's
death penalty workload by shifting to the district courts of appeal any
cases which remain non-unanimous. Related are the so-called override
cases, in which the trial court overrides a jury recommendation for life
and instead imposes the death penalty. These cases are reversed eighty to
ninety percent of the time, and constitute about twenty-one percent of the
death penalty workload. A prohibition of override would likewise result in
a supreme court workload reduction.
In short, Florida should take the following steps:
(1) The criteria for discretionary review should not be expressed as
constitutional limitations, but instead should be nonlimiting guidelines
promulgated by rule. The preferred approach would be to confer special
rulemaking power on the supreme court as contemplated by the 1984 Article V Review Commission and the Model Judicial Article, so that the
court could by rule modify the relevant portions of its judicial article.
Enhanced rulemaking power would give the supreme court needed flexibility. An alternative approach would be to follow the federal model and
authorize the supreme court to review any decision of a district court of
appeal; California's constitutional language is apt.
(2) The criteria for discretionary review by petition to the supreme
court should include an explicit standard authorizing review because of
the importance of the question presented. This standard should at least be
equivalent to the district court of appeal's power to certify a decision on
the basis of great public importance. A petition for discretionary review
on this ground would be accompanied by a certificate of counsel patterned
529
on the en banc rule.
(3) The requirement for a written opinion as a condition of discretionary review should be changed. The preferred alternative is to abolish
the written opinion requirement in favor of the procedure just outlined.
Discretionary review of a decision without opinion would be permitted on
the basis of the importance of the question presented, but not on the basis
of decisional conflict. Alternatively, if the written opinion requirement is
retained, then the California system should be adopted. Under this sys-

529.

FLA. R. App. P. 9.331.
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tem, the litigant may seek supreme court review if the litigant has requested a written opinion on the point in question, but the court of appeals has declined to write such an opinion.
(4) Florida should follow the great majority of states by adopting
legislation requiring jury unanimity in order to impose the death penalty.
While desirable on substantive grounds, such a modification would also
reduce the supreme court's death penalty caseload. Alternatively, legislation should be adopted which would prohibit a trial judge from overriding
a jury recommendation of a life sentence and imposing the death penalty.
Such death sentences are almost invariably reversed, and they amount to
twenty-one percent of the death penalty workload.
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APPENDIX A
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
ARTICLE V, SECTIONS
FLA. CONST.

3(b), 4(b)

(CURRENT VERSION)

art. V, § 3(b):

SECTION 3. Supreme court.(b) JURISDICTION.-The supreme court:
(1) Shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing
the death penalty and from decisions of district courts of appeal declaring
invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution.
(2) When provided by general law, shall hear appeals from final
judgments entered in proceedings for the validation of bonds or certificates of indebtedness and shall review action of statewide agencies relating to rates or service of utilities providing electric, gas, or telephone
service.
(3) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state statute, or that expressly construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of
constitutional or state officers, or that expressly and directly conflicts with
a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on
the same question of law.
(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes
upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is
certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another district
court of appeal.
(5) May review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by
the district court of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great
public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper administration
of justice throughout the state, and certified to require immediate resolution by the supreme court.
(6) May review a question of law certified by the Supreme Court of
the United States or a United States Court of Appeals which is determinative of the cause and for which there is no controlling precedent of the
supreme court of Florida.
(7) May issue writs of prohibition to courts and all writs necessary to
the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.
(8) May issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers
and state agencies.
(9) May, or any justice may, issue writs of habeas corpus returnable
before the supreme court or any justice, a district court of appeal or any
judge thereof, or any circuit judge.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss1/2

86

Cope: Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate C
REVIEW OF APPELLATE COURTS

(10) Shall, when requested by the attorney general pursuant to the
provisions of Section 10 of Article IV, render an advisory opinion of the
justices, addressing issues as provided by general law.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b):
SECTION 4. District courts of appeal.(b) JURISDICTION.(1) District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals,
that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of
trial courts, including those entered on review of administrative action,
not directly appealable to the supreme court or a circuit court. They may
review interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by rules
adopted by the supreme court.
(2) District courts of appeal shall have the power of direct review of
administrative action, as prescribed by general law.
(3) A district court of appeal orany judge thereof may issue writs of
habeas corpus returnable before the court or any judge thereof or before
any circuit judge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. A district
court of appeal may issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo
warranto, and other writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. To the extent necessary to dispose of all issues in a cause properly
before it, a district court of appeal may exercise any of the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts.
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RULE

SUP. CT.

10

R. 10. Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorari

1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a United States court of appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the
same matter; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with a
state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a
lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.
(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal question
in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last
resort or of a United States court of appeals.
(c) When a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should
be, settled by this Court, or has decided a federal question in a way that
conflicts with applicable decisions of this Court.
2. The same general considerations outlined above will control in respect to a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the
United States Court of Military Appeals.
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APPENDIX C*
CRITERIA FOR DISCRETIONARY SUPREME COURT REVIEW
OF INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
DECISIONS IN THE STATES

ALABAMA
R. APP. P. 39(c):
(c) Grounds. The petition for writ of certiorari to this court in a
criminal case in which the death penalty was imposed as punishment shall
be filed by counsel representing the petitioner on the appeal of the case,
and will be granted as a matter of right. Unless counsel who represented
the appellant on the original appeal has been replaced by new or additional counsel, he shall prepare the petition for the writ of certiorari and
file the same in accordance with these rules. If new or different counsel
has been appointed to represent the appellant, it shall be his duty to prepare the petition for writ of certiorari and file the same in accordance
with these rules. In all other cases, civil or criminal, petitions for writs of
certiorari will be considered only:
(1) From decisions initially holding valid or invalid a city ordinance,
a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or initially construing a conof the Alabama or Federal Constitution;
trolling
'(2) provision
From decisions that affect a class of constitutional, state or
county officers;
(3) From decisions where a material question requiring decision is
one of first impression in Alabama;
(4) From decisions in conflict with prior decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court, or the Alabama
courts of appeals; provided that when (4) is the basis of the petition, it
must quote that part of the opinion of the appropriate court of appeals,
and that part of the prior decision with which the conflict is alleged; or it
shall state specifically and with particularity wherein such decision is in
conflict; and,
(5) Where petitioner seeks to have controlling Supreme Court cases
overruled which were followed in the decision of the court of appeals.
ALA.

R. APP. P. 39(k) (excerpt):
(k) Scope of Review. The review shall be that generally employed by
certiorari and will ordinarily be limited to the facts stated in the opinion
of the particular court of appeals. If the petitioner is not satisfied with
ALA.

* This appendix omits rules which merely reiterate the contents of a constitutional or statutory
set of discretionary review criteria.
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that statement of facts, he may, on application for rehearing in that court,
present any additional or corrected statement of facts and request that
court to add or correct those facts in its opinion on rehearing. If the court
fails to accede to this request, petitioner may copy the statement in the
petition to this court, with references therein to the pertinent portions of
the clerk's record and reporter's transcript, and it will be considered along
with the statement of facts in the opinion of the appellate court, if found
to be correct.
The application of the law to the stated facts is included in the scope
of review.
ALASKA
ALASKA

R. App. P. 303(b)(5):

(5) A statement of concrete reasons, apart from those asserted for
reversal, explaining why the issues presented have importance beyond the
particular case and require decision by the court of discretionary review,
and referring to specific paragraphs of Rule 304;
R. App. P. 304:
Rule 304. Grounds for Granting Petition for Hearing
The granting of a petition for hearing is not a matter of right, but is
within the discretion of the court of discretionary review. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring that court's discretion, indicates the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) The decision of the intermediate appellate court is in conflict with
a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States or the supreme
court of the state of Alaska, or with another decision of the court of
appeals.
(b) The intermediate appellate court has decided a significant question concerning the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
or the Constitution of Alaska, which question has not previously been decided by the supreme court of the United States or the supreme court of
the state of Alaska.
(c) The intermediate appellate court has decided a significant question of law, having substantial public importance to others than the parties to the present case, which question has not previously been decided by
the supreme court of the state of Alaska.
(d) Under the circumstances, the exercise of the supervisory authority of the court of discretionary review over the other courts of the state
would be likely to have significant consequences to others than the parties
to the present case, and appears reasonably necessary to further the administration of justice.
ALASKA
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ARIZONA
ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 5.3:
The Supreme Court shall have ...

[a]ppellate jurisdiction in all ac-

tions and proceedings except civil and criminal actions originating in
courts not of record, unless the action involves the validity of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, statute, or municipal ordinance.
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 31.19.c.4 (excerpt):
4. The reasons why the petition should be granted, which may include, among others, the fact that no Arizona decision controls the point
of law in question, that a decision of the Supreme Court should be overruled or qualified, that conflicting decisions have been rendered by the
Court of Appeals, or that important issues of law have been incorrectly
decided.
ARIZ. R. Civ. APP. P. 23(c)(4) (excerpt) (identical to above excerpt from
Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure).
ARKANSAS
R. S. CT. & CT. APP. 1-2(d), (f):
(d) CERTIFICATION FROM COURT OF APPEALS TO SUPREME COURT.
A case which has been appealed to the Court of Appeals may be certified
to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals if the Court of Appeals
finds that the case: (1) is excepted from its jurisdiction by section (a)
hereof [listing cases appealable directly to Arkansas Supreme Court]; or
(2) involves an issue of significant public interest or a legal principal of
major importance. The Supreme Court may accept for its docket cases so
certified or may remand any of them to the Court of Appeals for decision.
ARK.

(f) PETITION FOR REVIEW. No appeal as of right shall lie from the

Court of Appeals to *the Supreme Court. A petition for review may be
granted by the Supreme Court for review of decisions of the Court of
Appeals only if the Supreme Court determines that the case (1) should
have come to the Supreme Court originally under Section (a) of this
Rule, (2) should have been certified to the Supreme Court under Section
(d)(2) of this Rule, or (3) was decided in the Court of Appeals by a tie
vote.
R. S. CT. & CT. APP. 2-4(c):
(c) REQUIREMENT FOR ASSERTING RULE 1-2(d)(2). To invoke the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction asserting that the case involves an issue of

ARK.

significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance as set

forth in Rule 1-2(d)(2), the petitioner must have filed a motion in the
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Court of Appeals requesting certification to the Supreme Court before the
case was submitted to the Court of Appeals. The motion must contain a
certificate of counsel stating that it is filed in good faith belief that the
case should be certified to the Supreme Court.
CALIFORNIA
CAL. App. R. 29:

RULE 29. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW IN SUPREME COURT
(a) [Grounds] Review by the Supreme Court of a decision of a Court
of Appeal will be ordered (1) where it appears necessary to secure uniformity of decision or the settlement of important questions of law; (2)
where the Court of Appeal was without jurisdiction of the cause; or (3)
where, because of disqualification or other reason, the decision of the
Court of Appeal lacks the concufrence of the required majority of qualified judges.
(b) [Limitations] As a matter of policy, on petition for review the
Supreme Court normally will not consider:
(1) any issue that could have been but was not timely raised in the
briefs filed in the Court of Appeal;
(2) any issue or any material fact that was omitted from or misstated
in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, unless the omission or misstatement
was called to the attention of the Court of Appeal in a petition for rehearing. All other issues and facts may be presented in the petition for review
without the necessity of filing a petition for rehearing.
COLORADO
COLO. App. R. 49:
Rule 49. Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari
(a) Addressed to Judicial Discretion. A review in the Supreme Court
on writ of certiorari as provided in section 13-4-108, C.R.S., and section
13-6-310, C.R.S., is a matter of sound judicial discretion and will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Supreme
Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
considered:
(1) Where the district or superior court on appeal from the county
court has decided a question of substance not heretofore determined by
this court;
(2) Where the Court of Appeals, or district or superior court on appeal from the county court, has decided a question of substance in a way
probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(3) Where a division of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision
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in conflict with the decision of another division of said court; the same
ground applies to judgments and decrees of district courts on appeal from
the county court when a decision is in conflict with another district court
on the same matters;
(4) Where the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such
procedure by a lower court as to call for the exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of supervision.
CONNECTICUT
CONN. R. S. CT. 4127:

4127. Certification by Supreme Court-Basis for Certification
Certification by the supreme court on petition by a party or request
by the appellate panel is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be allowed only where there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring
the court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons which will be
considered:
(1) Where the appellate court has decided a question of substance
not theretofore determined by the supreme court or has decided it in a
way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the supreme
court.
(2) Where the decision under review is in conflict with other decisions of the appellate court.
(3) Where the appellate court has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by any other court, as to call for an exercise of the supreme
court's supervision.
(4) Where a question of great public importance is involved.
(5) With respect only to appeals from the appellate court, where the
judges of the appellate panel are divided in their decision or, though concurring in the result, are unable to agree upon a common ground of
decision.
FLORIDA

§ 3(b)(3), (4):
(b) JURISDICTION.-The supreme court:
(3) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state statute, or that expressly construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of
constitutional or state officers, or that expressly and directly conflicts with
a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on
FLA. CONST. art. V,
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the same question of law.
(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes
upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is
certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another district
court of appeal.
GEORGIA
GA. CONST. art. 6, § 6, l 5:
The Supreme Court may review by certiorari cases in the Court of
Appeals which are of gravity or great public importance.
GA. S. CT. R. 29, 30:
Rule 29
A review on certiorari is not a right. A petition for the writ will be
granted only in cases of great concern, gravity, and importance to the
public.
Rule 30
Subject to Rule 29 certiorari will not be granted:
(1) To review the sufficiency of evidence;
(2) Where the Court of Appeals has affirmed the denial of a motion
to dismiss, denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a denial
of a motion for summary judgment;
(3) In workers' compensation cases unless three judges of the Court
of Appeals have dissented or the cases conflict on a question of law.
HAWAII
HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 602-59(b) (1985):
(b) The application for writ of certiorari shall tersely state its
grounds which must include (1) grave errors of law or of fact, or (2)
obvious inconsistencies in the decision of the intermediate appellate court
with that of the supreme court, federal decisions, or its own decision, and
the magnitude of such errors or inconsistencies dictating the need for further appeal.
[NOTE: For criteria governing initial assignment of cases, see HAW.
R. App. P. 31 (a).]
IDAHO
IDAHO

App. R. 118(b):

(b) Criteria for Granting Petitions for Review by the Supreme
Court. Granting a petition for review from a final decision of the Court of
Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court, and will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons and a majority
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of the Justices direct that the petition be granted. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the Supreme Court's discretion,
are factors that will be considered in the exercise of the Court's
discretion:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not heretofore determined by the Supreme Court;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court or of the United States Supreme Court;
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with a previous decision of the Court of Appeals;
(4) Whether the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such
procedure by a trial court as to call for the exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of supervision;
(5) Whether a majority of the judges of the Court of Appeals, after
decision, certifies that the public interest or the interests of justice make
desirable a further appellate review.
[NOTE: For criteria governing initial assignment of cases, see id. R.
108.]
ILLINOIS
ILL. S, CT.

R. 315(a):

(a) Petition for Leave to Appeal; Grounds. Except as provided below
for appeals from the Industrial Commission division of the Appellate
Court, a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the Appellate Court may be filed by any party, including the State, in any case
not appealable from the Appellate Court as a matter of right. Whether
such a petition will be granted is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: the
general importance of the question presented; the existence of a conflict
between the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the Supreme
Court, or of another division of the Appellate Court; the need for the
exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority; and the final or
interlocutory character of the judgment sought to be reviewed. However,
no petition for leave to appeal from a judgment of the five-judge panel of
the Appellate Court designated to hear and decide cases involving review
of Industrial Commission orders shall be filed, unless at least one judge of
that panel files a statement that the case in question involves a substantial
question which warrants consideration by the Supreme Court. A motion
asking that such a statement be filed may be filed as a prayer for alterna-
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tive relief in a petition for rehearing, but must, in any event, be filed
within the time allowed for filing a petition for rehearing.
INDIANA
IND. R. App. P. ll(B)(2):
(2) Errors upon which a petition to transfer shall be based may
include:
(a) That the opinion or memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals contravenes a ruling precedent of the Supreme Court, indicating the
ruling precedent, or
(b) That the opinion or memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals erroneously decides a new question of law, concisely stating the
same, or
(c) That there is a conflict between the opinion or memorandum decision and a prior opinion of the Court of Appeals stating concisely the
conflict and opinion in which it occurs, or
(d) That the opinion or memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals correctly followed ruling precedent of the Supreme Court, but that
such ruling precedent is erroneous or is in need of clarification or modification, or
(e) The opinion or memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals
fails to give a statement in writing of each substantial question arising on
the record and argued by the parties. If this error is relied upon, the petition shall set forth such portions of the record so as to affirmatively disclose such failure, and establish that petitioner was prejudiced thereby [,
or]
(f) That the opinion or memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals erroneously and materially misstates the record, concisely setting
out the misstatement (with reference to the record where appropriate),
the materiality of the misstatement and specifically stating the resulting
prejudice to the petitioner.
IOWA
IOWA

R. APP. P. 402(c):

(c) Grounds. An application to the Supreme Court for further review
shall allege precisely and in what manner the Court of Appeals: (1) Has
erred; (2) has rendered a decision which is in conflict with a prior holding
of a published Court of Appeals decision or published Supreme Court
decision; (3) has not considered a potentially controlling constitutional
provision in rendering its opinion; or (4) has decided a case which should
have been retained by the Supreme Court.
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[NOTE: For criteria governing initial assignment of cases, see id. R.
401.]
KANSAS
§ 20-3018(b) (1988):
(b) Any party aggrieved by a decision of the court of appeals may
file a motion with such court for a rehearing, in accordance with rules of
the supreme court, but such motion shall not be a condition precedent to a
review of such decision by the supreme court, and any such party may
petition the supreme court for review within thirty (30) days after the
date of such decision. The procedures governing petitions for review shall
be prescribed by rules of the supreme court, and the review of any such
decision shall be at the discretion of the supreme court. While neither
controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, the following shall
be considered in determining whether review will be granted: (1) The
general importance of the question presented; (2) the existence of a conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and a prior decision of
the supreme court, or of another panel of the court of appeals; (3) the
need for exercising the supreme court's supervisory authority; and (4) the
final or interlocutory character of the judgment, order or ruling sought to
be reviewed.
KAN. STAT. ANN.

KENTUCKY
Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.20(1):
(1) General
A motion for discretionary review by the Supreme Court of a decision of the Court of Appeals, and a motion for such review by the Court
of Appeals of a judgment of the circuit court in a case appealed to it from
the district court, shall be prosecuted as provided by this Rule 76.20 and
in accordance with the Rules generally applicable to other motions. Such
review is a matter of judicial discretion and will be granted only when
there are special reasons for it.
LOUISIANA
[NOTE: Louisiana has no explicit criteria.]
MARYLAND
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.

CODE ANN. §

12-203 (1989):

If the Court of Appeals finds that review of the case described in

§ 12-201 is desirable and in the public interest, the Court of Appeals
shall require by writ of certiorari that the case be certified to it for review
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and determination. The writ may issue before or after the Court of Special Appeals has rendered a decision. The Court of Appeals may by rule
provide for the number of its judges who must concur to grant the writ of
certiorari in any case, but that number may not exceed three. Reasons for
the denial of the writ shall be in writing.
MASSACHUSETTS
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 211 A, § 11:

§ 11. Further appellate review of certain cases by supreme judicial
court
There shall be no further appellate review by the supreme judicial
court of any matter within the jurisdiction of the appeals court which has
been decided by that court, except:-(a) where a majority of the justices
of the appeals court deciding the case, or of the appeals court as a whole,
certifies that the public interest or the interests of justice make desirable a
further appellate review, or (b) where leave to obtain further appellate
review or late review is specifically authorized by three justices of the
supreme judicial court for substantial reasons affecting the public interest
or the interests of justice. Upon the written order of a majority of the
justices of the appeals court, the decision of a panel of the appeals court
may be reviewed and revised by a majority of the justices of the appeals
court. Such a review shall not be a condition precedent to obtaining further appellate review by the supreme judicial court.
MICHIGAN
MICH. CT.

R. 7.302(B):

Rule 7.302 APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
(B) Grounds. The application must show that
(1) the issue involves a substantial question as to the validity of a
legislative act;
(2) the issue has significant public interest and the case is one by or
against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions or by or against an
officer of the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions in the officer's
official capacity;
(3) the issue involves legal principles of major significance to the
state's jurisprudence;
(4) in an appeal before decision by the Court of Appeals, delay in
final adjudication is likely to cause substantial harm;
(5) in an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, the decision
is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice or the decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of
Appeals; or
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(6) in an appeal from the Attorney Discipline Board, the decision is
erroneous and will cause material injustice.
MINNESOTA
MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 480A.10 (West 1990):

480A.10. Further review in supreme court
Subdivision 1. After decision in court of appeals. The supreme court
may grant further review of any decision of the court of appeals upon the
petition of any party. In determining whether to grant such a petition, the
supreme court should take into consideration whether the question
presented is an important one upon which the court has not, but should
rule, whether the court of appeals has held a statute to be unconstitutional, whether the court of appeals has decided a question in direct conflict with an applicable precedent of the supreme court, or whether the
lower courts have so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
justice as to call for an exercise of the court's supervisory powers. The
supreme court shall issue its decision whether to grant a petition for review within 60 days of the date the petition is filed.
MINN.

R. CRIM. P. 29.04, subd. 4:

Subd. 4. Discretionary Review. Review of any decision of the Court
of Appeals is discretionary with the Supreme Court. The following criteria may be considered:
(1) the question presented is an important one upon which the Supreme Court should rule;
(2) the Court of Appeals has ruled on the constitutionality of a
statute;
(3) the Court of Appeals has decided a question in direct conflict
with an applicable precedent of a Minnesota appellate court;
(4) the lower courts have so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of justice as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's
supervisory powers; or
(5) a decision by the Supreme Court will help develop, clarify, or
harmonize the law; and
1. the case calls for the application of a new principle or policy;
2. the resolution of the question presented has possible statewide impact; or
3. the question is likely to recur unless resolved by the Supreme
Court.
[NOTE: Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 117, subd. 2,
is identical to Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.04, subd. 4, above, except
that it contains no counterpart to the "direct conflict" criterion of Rule
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29.04 subd. 4(3) supra.]
MISSOURI
Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 10:
Section 10. Cases pending in the court of appeals shall be transferred
to the supreme court when any participating judge dissents from the majority opinion and certifies that he deems said opinion to be contrary to
any previous decision of the supreme court or of the court of appeals, or
any district of the court of appeals. Cases pending in the court of appeals
may be transferred to the supreme court by order of the majority of the
judges of the participating district of the court of appeals, after opinion,
or by order of the supreme court before or after opinion because of the
general interest or importance of a question involved in the case, or for
the purpose of reexamining the existing law, or pursuant to supreme court
rule. The supreme court may finally determine all causes coming to it
from the court of appeals, whether by certification, transfer or certiorari,
the same as on original appeal.
Mo. S. CT. R. 83.03:
RULE 83.03 Transfer by Supreme Court After Opinion by Court of
Appeals
In any case in which a motion for rehearing has been overruled and
an application for transfer under rule 83.02 has been denied, the case
may be transferred by order of this court on application of a party for any
of the reasons specified in rule 83.02 [because of the general interest or
importance of a question involved in the case, or for the purpose of reexamining the existing law], or for the reason that the opinion filed is contrary to a previous decision of an appellate court of this state. Application
for such transfer shall be filed in this court within 15 days of the date on
which transfer was denied by the court of appeals. Motions for reconsideration of the court's action in refusing an application for transfer shall
not be accepted or filed.
NEBRASKA
[NOTE: Nebraska has no explicit criteria for discretionary review
of a decision of its intermediate appellate court.]
NEW JERSEY
N.J. R. ApP. PRAC. 2:12-4:
2:12-4. Grounds for Certification
Certification will be granted only if the appeal presents a question of
general public importance which has not been but should be settled by the
Supreme Court or is similar to a question presented on another appeal to
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the Supreme Court; if the decision under review is in conflict with any
other decision of the same or a higher court or calls for an exercise of the
Supreme Court's supervision and in other matters if the interest of justice
requires. Certification will not be allowed on final judgments of the Appellate Division except for special reasons.
NEW MEXICO
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14 B (Michie 1990):
34-5-14. Supreme court; appellate jurisdiction; review by certiorari to
court of appeals; certification of cases to supreme court.
B. In addition to its original appellate jurisdiction, the supreme court
has jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari to the court of appeals any
civil or criminal matter in which the decision of the court of appeals:
(1) is in conflict with a decision of the supreme court;
(2) is in conflict with a decision of the court of appeals;
(3) involves a significant question of law under the constitution of
New Mexico or the United States; or
(4) involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the supreme court.
Application to the supreme court for writ of certiorari to the court of
appeals shall be filed with the clerk of the supreme court within twenty
days after final action by the court of appeals. A copy of the application
shall be filed by the clerk of the supreme court with the clerk of the court
of appeals and the clerk of the court of appeals shall forthwith transmit
the record in the case to the clerk of the supreme court. Upon filing of the
application, the judgment and mandate of the court of appeals shall be
stayed pending final action of the supreme court. No further briefs or oral
argument in support of an application for writ of certiorari shall be filed
or had in the supreme court unless so directed by the supreme court. If an
application has not been acted upon within thirty days, it shall be deemed
denied.
NEW YORK
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(5), (6):
3. [Jurisdiction of court of appeals]
b. Appeals td the court of appeals may be taken in the classes of
cases hereafter enumerated in this section;
In civil cases and proceedings as follows:
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(5) From an order of the appellate division of the supreme court in
any department, in a proceeding instituted by or against one or more public officers or a board, commission or other body of public officers or a
court or tribunal, other than an order which finally determines such proceeding, where the court of appeals shall allow the same upon the ground
that, in its opinion, a question of law is involved which ought to be reviewed by it, and without regard to the availability of appeal by stipulation for final order absolute.
(6) From a judgment or order entered upon the decision of an appellate division of the supreme court which finally determines an action or
special proceeding but which is not appealable under paragraph (1) of
this subdivision where the appellate division or the court of appeals shall
certify that in its opinion a question of law is involved which ought to be
reviewed by the court of appeals. Such an appeal may be allowed upon
application (a) to the appellate division, and in case of refusal, to the
court of appeals, or (b) directly to the court of appeals. Such an appeal
shall be allowed when required in the interest of substantial justice.
N.Y. CT. App. R. 500.11(d)(1)(v):
500.11 Motions
(d) Permission to Appeal in Civil Cases.
(1) The moving papers . . . shall contain . . .
(v) A direct and concise argument showing why the questions
presented merit review by this court, such as that they are novel or of
public importance, or involve a conflict with prior decisions of this court,
or there is a conflict among the Appellate Divisions. The particular portions of the record where the questions sought to be reviewed are raised
and preserved shall be identified.
[NOTE: New York has no explicit criteria for discretionary review
of a decision of its intermediate appellate court in criminal cases.]
NORTH CAROLINA

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 7A-31(c) (1989):

§ 7A-31. Discretionary review by the Supreme Court.
(c) In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this section, certification may be made by the Supreme Court after determination
of the cause by the Court of Appeals when in the opinion of the Supreme
Court:
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(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest,
or
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the
jurisprudence of the State, or
(3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court.
Interlocutory determinations by the Court of Appeals, including orders
remanding the cause for a new trial or for other proceedings, shall be
certified for review by the Supreme Court only upon a determination by
the Supreme Court that failure to certify would cause a delay in final
adjudication which would probably result in substantial harm.
NORTH DAKOTA
N.D. S. CT. ADMIN. R. 27, § 13(c):
Section 13. Review by the Supreme Court.
(c) The Supreme Court may grant a petition for review from a judgment or order of the Court of Appeals when there are special and important reasons and a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court direct
that the petition be granted. The following criteria, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Supreme Court's discretion, will be considered in the exercise of the court's discretion:
(1) whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not previously determined by the Supreme Court;
(2) whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court or of the United States Supreme Court;
(3) whether the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with a published decision of the Court of Appeals;
(4) whether the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such
procedure by a trial court as to call for the exercise of the supervisory
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
(5) whether a majority of the judges of the Court of Appeals, after
decision, certify that the public interest or the interests of justice make
desirable review by the Supreme Court; and
(6) whether there is a dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals.
[NOTE: For criteria governing initial assignment of cases, see id. 27,

§ 10.]
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OHIO

§ 2(B)(2)(d):
2(B)(2) The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
follows:
OHIO CONST. art. IV,

(d) In cases of public or great general interest, the supreme court
may direct any court of appeals to certify its record to the supreme court,
and may review and affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment of the court
of appeals[.]
OHIO S. CT. PRAC. R. II, 4(A)(2):
(A) A motion to certify, a motion for leave to appeal or a claimed
appeal as of right shall be supported by a memorandum which shall
contain:
(2) Only to the extent not indicated by such propositions of law and
such argument, a concise statement of why the case is of public or great
general interest, why a substantial constitutional question is involved or
why leave to appeal should be granted, such statement to follow the
argument.
OKLAHOMA
[NOTE: Oklahoma has no explicit criteria for discretionary review of
a decision of its intermediate appellate court. For criteria governing retention of cases in the supreme court, rather than assignment to court of
appeals, see OKLA. R. Civ. App. P. 1.16(F).]
OREGON
OR. R. App. P. 9.05(3)(e), (4):
RULE 9.05 PETITION FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
(3) The petition shall contain in order:
(e) A statement of specific reasons why the issues presented have
importance beyond the particular case and require decision by the Supreme Court.
(4) An assertion of the grounds on which the decision of the Court of
Appeals is claimed to be wrong, without more, does not constitute compliance with subsection 3(e) of this rule. A petitioner may claim that one or
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more of the following factors gives the issue presented importance beyond
the particular case: [FN2. This list of factors is a guide to parties preparing petitions for review, not a limitation on the authority of the Supreme
Court to grant petitions for review; the list is not exhaustive, but illustrative only.]
(a) the interpretation of a statute not previously construed by the
Supreme Court and which affects large numbers of persons or governs
transactions of public importance;
(b) the constitutionality of a statute or the legality of an important
governmental action which will have irreversible consequences;
(c) the use and effect of a rule of trial court procedure;
(d) the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the case; or
(e) a departure by the Court of Appeals from a prior decision of the
Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals.
PENNSYLVANIA
PA. R. App. P. 1114 & note:
RULE 1114. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING ALLOWANCE
OF APPEAL
Except as prescribed in Rule 1101 (appeals as of right from the
Commonwealth Court), review of a final order of the Superior Court or
the Commonwealth Court is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and an appeal will be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor.
Note
Based on [former] U.S. Supreme Court Rule 19 .

. .

. The follow-

ing, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the discretion of the
Supreme Court, indicate the character of the .reasons which will be
considered:
(1) Where the appellate court below has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided
it in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or the Supreme Court of the United States.
(2) Where an appellate court has rendered a decision in conflict with
the decision of the other appellate court below on the same question, or
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by an administrative
agency or lower court, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision of the Supreme Court.
(3) Where the question involves an issue of immediate public importance such as would justify assumption of plenary jurisdiction under 42
I
Pa. C.S. 726 (extraordinary jurisdiction).
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SOUTH CAROLINA
S.C. App. CT. R. 226(b):
RULE 226. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
(b) Considerations Governing Review. A writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
where there are special and important reasons. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the Supreme Court's discretion or
power to grant review in general, indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:
(1) Where there are novel questions of law.
(2) Where there is a dissent in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
(3) Where the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a
prior decision of the Supreme Court.
(4) Where substantial constitutional issues are directly involved.
(5) Where a federal question is included and the decision of the
Court of Appeals conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme
Court.
TENNESSEE
TENN.

R. App. P. 11(a):

Rule 11. APPEAL BY PERMISSION FROM APPELLATE
COURT TO SUPREME COURT.
(a) Application for Permission to Appeal; Grounds. An appeal by
permission may be taken from a final decision of the Court of Appeals or
Court of Criminal Appeals to the Supreme Court only on application and
in the discretion of the Supreme Court. In determining whether to grant
permission to appeal, the following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that
will be considered: (1) the need to secure uniformity of decision, (2) the
need to secure settlement of important questions of law, (3) the need to
secure settlement of questions of public interest, and (4) the need for the
exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority.
TEXAS
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.

§ 22.001(a)(6) (West 1988) (civil cases):

22.001. Jurisdiction
(a) The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction, except in criminal
law matters, coextensive with the limits of the state and extending to all
questions of law arising in the following cases when they have been
brought to the courts of appeals from appealable judgment of the trial
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courts:
(6) any other case in which it appears that an error of law
has been committed by the court of appeals, and that error is of such
importance to the jurisprudence of the state that, in the opinion of the
supreme court, it requires correction, but excluding those cases in which
the jurisdiction of the court of appeals is made final by statute.
TEx. R. App. P. 200(b), (c) (criminal cases):
RULE 200. DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN GENERAL
(b) Discretionary review by the Court of Criminal Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.
(c) In determining whether to grant or deny discretionary review, the
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court of
Criminal Appeals' discretion, indicates the character of reasons that will
be considered:
(1) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another court of appeals on the same matter;
(2) Where a court of appeals has decided an important question of
state or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by the
Court of Criminal Appeals;
(3) Where a court of appeals has decided an important question of
state or federal law in conflict with the applicable decisions of the Court
of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States;
(4) Where a court of appeals has declared unconstitutional, or appears to have misconstrued, a statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance;
(5) Where the justices of the court of appeals have disagreed upon a
material question of law necessary to its decision; and.
(6) Where a court of appeals has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals' power of supervision.
UTAH
UTAH

R. App. P. 46:

RULE 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons.
The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be
considered:
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(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision
that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as
to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.
VIRGINIA
[NOTE: Virginia has no generally applicable criteria for discretionary review.]
§ 17-116.07 (Michie 1988):
[Virginia Code § 17-116.07.A states that certain traffic infraction,
misdemeanor, administrative, matrimonial, criminal, and inmate cases
cannot be appealed to the Supreme Court. However, § 17-116.07.B
provides:]
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, in any case other
than an appeal pursuant to § 19.2-398 [appeal by Commonwealth in felony action], in which the Supreme Court determines on a petition for
review that the decision of the Court of Appeals involves a substantial
constitutional question as a determinative issue or matters of significant
precedential value, review may be had in the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of § 17-116.08.
VA. CODE ANN.

[NOTE:

§ 17-116.08 provides generally for discretionary review in the Virginia Supreme Court.]
VA. CODE ANN.

WASHINGTON
WASH. CONST.

art. 4, § 4:

The supreme court jurisdiction . . . shall not extend to civil actions
at law for the recovery of money or personal property when the original
amount in controversy, or the value of the property does not exceed two
hundred dollars ($200) unless the action involves the legality of a tax,
impost, assessment, [toll], municipal fine, or the validity of a statute.
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R. App. P. 13.4(b), 13.5(b):
RULE 13.4 DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF DECISION TERMINATING REVIEW
WASH.

(b) Considerations Governing Acceptance of Review. A petition for
review will be accepted by the Supreme Court only:
(1) if the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court; or
(2) if the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a decision of another division of the Court of Appeals; or
(3) if a significant question of law under the Constitution of the
State of Washington or of the United States is involved; or
(4) if the petition involves an issue of substantial public interest that
should be determined by the Supreme Court.
RULE 13.5 DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF INTERLOCUTORY DECISION
(b) Considerations Governing Acceptance of Review. Discretionary
review of an interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeals will be accepted by the Supreme Court only:
(1) if the Court of Appeals has committed an obvious error which
would render further proceedings useless; or
(2) if the Court of Appeals has committed probable error and the
decision of the Court of Appeals substantially alters the status quo or
substantially limits the freedom of a party to act; or
(3) if the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a trial court or administrative agency, as to call for the exercise of revisory jurisdiction by the Supreme Court.
WISCONSIN
Wis. R. App. P. 809.62(1):
(1) A party may file with the supreme court a petition for review of
an adverse decision of the court of appeals pursuant to s. 808.10 within 30
days of the date of the decision of the court of appeals. Supreme court
review is a matter of judicial discretion, not of right, and will be granted
only when special and important reasons are presented. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate criteria that will be considered:
(a) A real and significant question of federal or state constitutional
law is presented.
(b) The petition for review demonstrates a need for the supreme
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court to consider establishing, implementing or changing a policy within
its authority.
(c) A decision by the supreme court will help develop, clarify or harmonize the law, and
1. The case calls for the application of a new doctrine 'rather than
merely the application of well-settled principles to the factual situation; or
2. The question presented is a novel one, the resolution of which will
have statewide impact; or
3. The question presented is not factual in nature but rather is a
question of law of the type that is likely to recur unless resolved by the
supreme court.
(d) The court of appeals' decision is in conflict with controlling opinions of the United States Supreme Court or the supreme court or other
court of appeals' decisions.
(e) The court of appeals' decision is in accord with opinions of the
supreme court or the court of appeals but due to the passage of time or
changing circumstances, such opinions are ripe for reexamination.
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APPENDIX D
STATE POPULATIONS,

1990

Rank States

Pop.
(000's)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

29,760
17,990
16,987
12"938
11,882
11,431
10,847
9,295
7,730
6,629
6,478
6,187
6,016
5,544
5,117
4,892
4,877
4,867
4,781
4,375
4,220
4,041
3,685
3,665
3,487
3,294
3,287
3,146
2,842
2,777
2,573
2,478
2,351
1,793
1,723
1,578
1,515
1,228

California
New York
Texas
Florida
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Ohio
Michigan
New Jersey
North Carolina
Georgia
Virginia
Massachusetts
Indiana
Missouri
Wisconsin
Tennessee
Washington
Maryland
Minnesota
Louisiana
Alabama
Kentucky
Arizona
South Carolina
Colorado
Connecticut
Oklahoma
Oregon
Iowa
Mississippi
Kansas
Arkansas
West Virginia
Utah
Nebraska
New Mexico
Maine
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39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
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Nevada
New Hampshire
Hawaii
Idaho
Rhode Island
Montana
South Dakota
Delaware
North Dakota
Vermont
Alaska
Wyoming

Source: U.S.

DEP'T

UNITED STATES

1,202
1,109
1,108
1,007
1,003
799
696
666
639
563
550
454
OF

COMMERCE,

STATISTICAL

ABSTRACT

OF

THE

6 (111th ed. 1991)
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APPENDIX E
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
ARTICLE V, SECTION

FLA. CONST.

4(2)

(AS ADOPTED IN

1956)

art. V, § 4(2) (1956):

SECTION 4. Supreme Court.(2) JURISDICTION. Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly to the supreme court, as a matter of right, only from judgments
imposing the death penalty, from final judgments or decrees directly passing upon the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or
construing a controlling provision of the Florida or federal constitution,
and from final judgments or decrees in proceedings for the validation of
bonds and certificates of indebtedness. The supreme court may directly
review by certiorari interlocutory orders or decrees passing upon chancery
matters which upon a final decree would be directly appealable to the
supreme court. In all direct appeals and interlocutory reviews by certiorari, the supreme court shall have such jurisdiction as may be necessary
to complete determination of the cause on review.
Appeals from district courts of appeal may be taken to the supreme
court, as a matter of right, only from decisions initially passing upon the
validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or initially construing a controlling provision of the Florida or federal constitution. The
supreme court may review by certiorari any decision of a district court of
appeal that affects a class of constitutional or state officers, or that passes
upon a question certified by the district court of appeal to be of great
public interest, or that is in direct conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same point of law,
and may issue writs of certiorari to commissions established by law.
The supreme court may issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto
when a state officer, board, commission, or other agency authorized to
represent the public generally, or a member of any such board, commission, or other agency, is named as respondent, and writs of prohibition to
coinmissions established by law, to the district courts of appeal, and to the
trial courts when questions are involved upon which a direct appeal to the
supreme court is allowed as a matter of right.
The supreme court may issue all writs necessary or proper to the
complete exercise of its jurisdiction.
The supreme court or any justice thereof may issue writs of habeas
corpus returnable before the supreme court or any justice thereof, or
before a district court of appeal or any judge thereof, or before any circuit
judge.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

113

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 2
134

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

The supreme court shall provide for the transfer to the court having
jurisdiction of any matter subject to review when the jurisdiction of another appellate court has been improvidently invoked.
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